# Daily Report

# East Europe

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*FBIS-EEU-94-063* *1 April 1994*

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## Berisha Warns About 'All-Out War' in Balkans

*AU3103134794 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 31 Mar 94*

["I.M."-initialled report: "Berisha Warns Against Balkans War"]

[Text] Vienna—"The outbreak of hostilities in Kosovo would have a destabilizing effect on the neighboring states of the former Yugoslavia and particularly Albania, and an all-out war in the Balkans would be unavoidable." On his way home from London, Albania's President Sali Berisha stopped in Vienna to give a news conference. In London he did not only discuss bilateral relations with the main focus on the economy, but he also submitted the proposal that a relaxation of the UN sanctions against Serbia should be linked with a solution to the Kosovo problem, the president stressed. Berisha stated that Prime Minister Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd had shown understanding.

## Berisha Discusses Results of London Visit

*AU0104074094 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Interview with President of the Republic Sali Berisha by Vjollca Vokshi; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Vokshi] What are the conclusions of President Berisha on his visit to Great Britain?

[Berisha] [passage omitted] I would say there were three main themes of the talks. First, we discussed bilateral relations between Albania and Great Britain. In the talks that I held there, I pointed out all the developments in Albania and, what pleased me the most, was the knowledge that my interlocutors had about Albania and their assessment about the great changes that Albania has achieved in two years on the democratic road.

What seemed important to me, and it is extremely important, was the complete predisposition I found in top British officials to encourage further cooperation between both countries. For this, I got assurances from Prime Minister Major, her majesty the queen, and Secretary of State Douglas Hurd. I think that in this spirit, the signing of four agreements on the last day of my visit undoubtedly marks an important event in cooperation between Albania and Great Britain. I would like to stress that all the talks and meetings that I held were open, kind, and friendly.

Another very important theme was the Albanian question, the crisis in the region, and the Albanian issue. [sentence as heard] In the talks, I stressed that the Albanian question is the main question in the Balkan crisis. It is true that war is being waged in Bosnia today and this constitutes a sharper phase of the Balkan crisis. However, the most fundamental question is the Albanian one, because Albanians are a nation divided in two—half live in Albania, while the other half in several states. In this respect, there is no doubt that the most delicate point of this question is Kosova. In general, this constitutes a very serious issue.

I expressed my view that the Albanians are not seeking a change of borders by force, but on the other hand Albanians will react as a single nation toward every massacre or practice of ethnic cleansing that anyone may undertake against them. I have my doubts that that is possible, because as has been shown by the developments of the two last years, Milosevic is practicing and putting into practice the memorandum of the Academy of Sciences of Serbia, according to whose map of Greater Serbia, 40 percent of non-Serbian peoples should be exterminated and cleansed. Here I expressed Albania's readiness to make its own contribution and assistance in resolving these problems through dialogue. I pointed out that it is indispensable that a direct dialogue between Chairman Rugova, a president elected through the free vote of the people of Kosova, and Belgrade in the presence of a third party is indispensable. I do not see this as unfruitful if there exists the will on both sides.

I also stressed that it is necessary that the embargo be related to the situation and the solution of the problem of Kosova and that UN monitors be sent to Kosova, so as to monitor and directly inform the UN Security Council about all the progress, obstacles, and developments that are encountered on the road to resolving this question.

I think that we achieved understanding in many directions. I can say that the British Government is seriously worried about the crisis in the region, and the situation and condition of the Albanians in Kosova, and is committed to paying more attention to them so as to resolve this problem gradually.

[Vokshi] Mr. President, in Great Britain you held talks with many businessmen, the most famous in the British business world. Did you see any concrete result, any concrete interest on the part of British businessmen in these talks?

[Berisha] You are right. I did regard as very important and I do consider very important the meetings that I held with businessmen. What encouraged and pleased me very much was that I found Prime Minister Major and Secretary of State Hurd very determined to encourage British investors. For this aim, I held a meeting at the Confederation of British Industry and presented the great possibilities that Albania offers. Though a small country to lokk at, in fact, at the investment level, Albania should not be considered as such, as it is a country of great possibilities, a country that achieves a 10-percent growth means that it has a strong turnover and earnings and it is a country where money is not lost. I think that the representatives of major British industry got this message in full. [passage omitted]

We discussed petroleum, airport supplies on the basis of a contract signed with British Petroleum, tourism, chromium, fishing, constructions, and other multiple fields, such as the glass industry. I am convinced that British

investors are increasing their interest in Albania. The reform in Albania is very encouraging for them. [passage omitted]

The third theme that I discussed extensively with high-level British personalities was Albania's integration into European structures and Europe. I assured my interlocutors that Albania's great aim is its integration into Europe and that the Albanian Government considers this not as an immediate process, but as a process that will come, as an active process that comes through Albania's dignified efficiency to become a member of these institutions. Within this framework, we welcome the Partnership for Peace. We also insist that the time is coming to open negotiations for the association agreement into the European Community, as well as to sign an agreement with the Western European Union.

I can say that I found complete understanding among my interlocutors and got their assurance that they will unreservedly support Albania's integration into European institutions.

To conclude, I can say that this visit was extremely important and successful for us. I want to thank Prime Minister Major heartily, her majesty the queen, Secretary of State Douglas Hurd, and many other friends whom I met in Great Britain and who showed a great interest both in the development of relations between Albania and Great Britain and provided support to Albania's integration into Europe and a solution to the regional crisis.

## Economic Cooperation Accord Signed With Austria

*AU3103071794 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 30 Mar 94*

[Report by Arben Karapici]

[Text] [Announcer] You will now hear two reports on economic cooperation between our country and the world. An agreement on Albanian-Austrian economic cooperation has been reached in Vienna, but both sides are of the opinion that the potential of cooperation relations between Austria and Albania is still unexploited. Based on information provided by our diplomatic representatives in Vienna, our reporter Arben Karapici has prepared the following report:

[Karapici] The intensification of Albanian-Austrian inter- governmental contacts and the exchange of visits to Vienna and Tirana have inspired experts and observers to express the opinion that economic cooperation between Albania and Austria seems to be frequent and fruitful.

After the agreement on freeing the Albanian foreign debt, which was reached in Vienna in early March by our bank governor, Dylber Vrioni, another important document has been signed in the Austrian capital—an agreement on bilateral economic cooperation. The agreement was signed by our industry and trade minister, Selim Belortaja, and his Austrian counterpart Wolfgang Schuessel. According to the agreement, the Austrian side is committed to encouraging the development of projects with priority in our country's economy through financial means. This applies to industries dealing with the extracting and processing of minerals, metallurgy, energy, forestry, etc. This latter Albanian-Austrian agreement of Vienna also anticipates direct Austrian investment in all the priority fields of bilateral economic cooperation, with the participation of third countries as well.

This concrete Austrian commitment has already been expressed with the introduction into Albania of companies such as Rogner, Suag [as heard], OeMV, etc., which are already involved in important projects in tourism, airports, aqueducts, etc.

According to all the experts and observers who closely follow the frequent Albanian-Austrian cooperation, the results of the economic revival of our country should not be far away, as long as Austria shows itself as a very active partner in Albania.

More convincing is the argument that both parts still see unexploited potential in the economic exchanges between Tirana and Vienna. This was pointed out during the visit of Minister Belortaja to the Austrian capital, where they held long discussions about further cooperation possibilities. Thus, the support that Austria is committed to granting to projects of railroad network privatization should not be far off. In this regard, it is reported that Vienna has accepted Tirana's proposal to sign a new agreement in the field of goods and urban transportation. There are chances to achieve this, and they are considered high if we add the special interest shown in this case by the Austrian Industrialists Association and businessmen during Minister Belortaja's visit to Vienna.

### Berov's Political Consultations Reported

*AU3103173194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] During the period of 25-31 March Prime Minister Berov had working meetings with Ahmed Dogan, chairman of the parliamentary faction of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS]; Nora Ananieva, chairman of the Parliamentary Alliance for Social Democracy; and Zhan Videnov, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council; as well as with Stefan Bozhilov and Georgi Kostov, cochairmen of the parliamentary faction of the New Alliance for Democracy.

The prime minister insisted on speeding up the adoption of the amendments to the Law on Reorganizing and Privatizing the State and Municipal Enterprises, and assured the representatives of the National Assembly that the government is prepared to implement the mass privatization program.

Certain weaknesses in the work of certain governmental structures also were discussed. Prof. Berov proposed structural changes in the cabinet that will be discussed by the parliamentary factions.

The prime minister outlined his views on overcoming the crisis situation in the foreign currency market and stressed the government's determination to successfully complete negotiations on the country's foreign debt.

### SDS Confirms Plan on Government Resignation

*AU3103173094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] At a briefing after the extraordinary meeting of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] National Coordinating Council, the SDS confirmed its intention to prompt the resignation of the government, which it blames for the financial crisis in the country.

If the parliament does not adopt an appropriate decision on the cabinet's policy, the SDS will propose a new vote of no-confidence. The SDS will organize a rally on 5 April at St. Aleksandur Nevski Square in Sofia.

### German Defense Minister Promises 'Full Support'

*AU3103183194 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 28 Mar 94 p 1*

[Interview with German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe by Liliya Popova "especially for BULGARSKA ARMIYA"; place and date not given: "Bulgaria Can Count on Our Full Support"]

[Text] German Federal Defense Minister Volker Ruehe will pay a visit to Bulgaria from 28 to 30 March at the invitation of Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov. The two ministers will discuss issues concerning mutual security, European defense, and the two countries' roles in the all-European integration process.

Prior to his departure for Bulgaria, Minister Ruehe answered some questions especially for the readers of BULGARSKA ARMIYA.

[Popova] Mr. Ruehe, for the first time in more than 50 years a German defense minister is to visit Bulgaria. How do you assess this fact and what does this new reality indicate?

[Ruehe] I would first like to point out that I am very glad to be able to visit Bulgaria. As you know, Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov was in Germany last fall. The new features in our countries' military-political relations that are reflected in the bilateral agreement on cooperation in defense policy create prerequisites for a new responsibility that our states have to bear in relation to European stability.

[Popova] During your Bulgarian counterpart's visit to Germany last fall you reached agreement on closer cooperation between your two ministries, especially in staff education. What projects have been implemented and which ones will be put into effect in the future?

[Ruehe] This year our two armies carried out a lively exchange of officers, through which your officers visited various Bundeswehr educational institutions. Many Bulgarian officers are in Germany at the moment attending various courses; some are attending Bundeswehr language schools and others are undergoing practical training in internal administration. We plan a further 30 such arrangements this year alone, including an exchange of lecturers between our staff colleges.

[Popova] Last year you issued an assurance that Bulgaria can count on German support in its efforts to join NATO. The serious situation in the Balkans at the moment requires a new security policy. Will you also assist Bulgaria in this respect?

[Ruehe] NATO's decision to open itself up to partners from throughout Europe should be regarded as one of the alliance's priority tasks. It gives countries like Bulgaria a good picture of future prospects. The Partnership For Peace program that Bulgaria joined last February enables us to cooperate with our partners from the east, deepen our relations with them, and at the same time to react flexibly to the needs of individual states. In this way the future members can be systematically prepared for joining these structures late.

The Partnership For Peace is the first important step on the road to integration. It should under no circumstances be interpreted or understood as some kind of second league position. Accordingly, Bulgaria can rely on our full support in the future.

[Popova] What do you think about Bulgarian policy on the Balkan crisis?

[Ruehe] I believe that Bulgaria will stick with its previous policy and do everything necessary to promote the peace process in the Balkans. Precisely in connection with the embargo imposed on the Danube, we attach

great importance to Bulgaria because of geographical position. According to my information, Bulgaria is a model in this respect, despite the great economic losses it is suffering. Sarajevo, the talks between Croatia and Bosnia, and the recent events in Tuzla have demonstrated that only firm determination and intensive political and diplomatic efforts can provide a chance for the peace process. It has also become clear that a peaceful solution in the Balkans needs Russia to become involved and exert its influence. Bulgaria has an important part to play here as well.

## VMRO-SMD Official on FYROM Issues

*AU3003134794 Sofia REPORTER 7 in Bulgarian No. 12 25 Mar 94 p 7*

[Interview with Evgeniy Ekov, secretary of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies, by Svetlana Tikhova; place and date not given: "Revolutionary Terror Is Part of History"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Tikhova] Do great differences exist between the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies [VMRO-SMD] and the VMRO-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity [DPMNE]?

[Ekov] From the historical point of view, the name is the same. We both claim that we have legitimately inherited it. Some of the tasks that our organization and [VMRO-DPMNE leader] Ljupco Georgievski's organization have set for themselves are the same, such as the democratization of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the struggle for its final recognition. Nevertheless, these seem to be the only things that we have in common. Unfortunately, despite its name, the DPMNE has betrayed the principle on which the VMRO has always based itself and developed. I mean the defense of the Bulgarian spirit in Macedonia. An ideology has been adopted embodying a regime of terror and all the repressive methods of the Macedonian state, along with the theory of an independently existing Macedonian nation. Thus, Macedonian nationalism, partly rejecting the outdated form of the Communist Party, is trying to assume some kind of democratic image. Naturally, this was not accepted by part of the DPMNE, which was followed by an inevitable split. Those who thought differently organized a new VMRO—the Fatherland Party [Tatkovinska Partiya], led by Dimitar Crnomarov, former deputy chairman of DPMNE, who was expelled for "pro-Bulgarian tendencies." Unfortunately, these are unpleasant facts that affect our national interests. However, they should be known so that the Bulgarian public may be acquainted with the biased and hostile feelings prevailing among the ruling forces in the Republic of Macedonia.

[Tikhova] In that case, what kind of Macedonia should be established and by what means?

[Ekov] It should be an independent, sovereign, and democratic Macedonia, based on legal, political means.

[Tikhova] Do you mean Vardar Macedonia, or all three parts?

[Ekov] We are talking about Vardar Macedonia. The truth is that after 1934, when the VMRO, which was an underground organization at the time, and the legal organizations were also dissolved, the slogan for an independent Macedonia within its geographical borders was raised. Then came World War II. The Paris system of peace accords actually buried the idea of a "geographic" Macedonia. To talk about the creation of a new, united Macedonia today means causing an explosion in the Balkans. We have a typical example of how borders are being shifted here. In our opinion, the Macedonian problem, whose crucial point is related to the fate, the rights, and freedoms of the Bulgarian population in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, should be decided by opening the borders rather than shifting them. If this should appear as utopia today, it could become reality in the future. Let us recall that many similar conflicts have existed in Western Europe, but see how the problem between Germany and France related to the no less controversial territories of Alsace and Lorraine was resolved. There is no reason to believe that different kinds of people live in the Balkans, people who are incapable of settling their conflicts in the same manner.

[Tikhova] Nevertheless, the Macedonian problem also affects Albania.

[Ekov] Yes, you are talking about Mala Prespa, Korchansko, and Golo Brdo.... We went to Albania for the first time in July 1993. I shall never forget what I experienced during my meetings with the people there. The people could not believe that Bulgaria had remembered them. Most of them identify themselves as Bulgarians, although I must admit that some of them behave like Albanians, while others try to appear as Macedonians.

[Tikhova] Nevertheless, how did we reach a situation in which it is possible to talk about Bulgarians in Albania?

[Ekov] Albania has not recognized a Bulgarian minority, but it is tolerant toward activities aimed at cultivating the Bulgarian spirit of self-preservation among individual members of our population in Albania. We have no claims and do not intend to raise any claims toward the Republic of Albania for recognizing the Bulgarian minority. In our view, the solution of the problem should be sought in terms of guaranteeing individual rights.

[Tikhova] The organization whose successors you are did not particularly respect the sanctity of human life. Does the historical memory of the VMRO bear some marks of guilt?

[Ekov] If anything is on our conscience, it may be the unnecessary fratricidal conflicts during some periods of our organization's existence. However, such deadly conflicts were inspired from the outside. It is impossible to

react with traditional methods when one is deprived of all real opportunities whatsoever to express his free will, and when one is subject to physical violence and brutality. The revolutionary terror exerted by the organization was always a reaction to the violence used first in the Turkish Empire and later on in Greece and Serbia against the Bulgarian population. Whenever the VMRO had the opportunity to do so, it became a legal organization. World War I gave us the opportunity for the legal establishment of a party defending the interests of the Bulgarian population both in the Vardar part and in the Aegean region. Hence, the choice of our methods was not prompted by the organization, but was rather imposed by external circumstances. [passage omitted]

[Tikhova] Is it true that Mr. Tatarchev is introducing a split in the ranks of the VMRO?

[Ekov] I doubt it, because Mr. Tatarchev has repeatedly proved to be in sympathy with the goals and tasks of the VMRO, as well as with the practical activities of the organization. He is the descendant of a family that has given much to the organization.

[Tikhova] Generally speaking, there can be no question of a split within the VMRO-SMD?

[Ekov] I think that we have learned from the numerous splits of the past, and we are the only organization that has not split today.

[Tikhova] How could you resist the currently escalating activities of the Ilinden United Macedonian Organization [OMO]

[Ekov] In our opinion, we have always resisted it through our active propaganda work on a local scale and by our persistent demands that the official Bulgarian institutions should do their duty in preventing subversive activities directed against the state. Many people would like to see us involved in a conflict, but it has already become evident that such things belong to the past. As a matter of fact, OMO has long since been a fiction, solely supported by the interests of the mass media.

## Expert Theorizes Ames Arrest Prompted by KGB

*AU3103162194 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 29 Mar 94 p 12*

[Interview with Jaroslav Basta, former deputy chief of intelligence and current chairman of the Independent Screening Commission, by Evzen Stanek; place and date not given: "KGB Launched Its Offensive"]

[Text] *"Certain recent events indicate a very considerable offensive on the part of the Russian security forces. I consider also the affair with resident-agent Ames recently discovered in the ranks of the CIA to be evidence of this. I believe that his arrest was prompted by the Russians themselves." This was stated in an interview by Jaroslav Basta, former deputy chief of intelligence and current chairman of the Independent Screening Commission, who engages in the study of the development of secret services. "It is something similar to the Kozeny-Wallis affair, when Mr. Kozeny informed on Wallis in such a way that the case could no longer be processed by intelligence means but only by penal ones."*

[Stanek] What does it have to do with the Czech Republic?

[Basta] According to the postwar statistics, the KGB had its "moles" in every security service. Under the circumstances existing in the Czech Republic since November 1989, it is completely impossible for someone like Ames not to sit in the Czech secret services. If the Czech secret service has not discovered any agent so far, it means either that we are an exception or that we are incapable of finding him.

[Stanek] What makes our small country so interesting for the KGB now?

[Basta] Intelligence services are working in anticipation. Their main task is to detect future dangers and possibilities. It is advantageous for Russia to be here if it has imperial aspirations, which has been demonstrated more than once.

Moreover, it is possible to have cover firms in the Czech Republic, or firms making money for espionage. In this context, I remember how Ames drew attention to himself—his expenses were higher than his income. It is customary in the United States to examine the financial situation of all government employees, and not just of the secret service staff. The common practice in the Czech Republic, on the other hand, is that only disagreeable people are checked. Hence, no one cares whether a prominent person purchased a Jaguar like Mr. Ames, or how much the house in which he lives cost.

[Stanek] Why would the Russians eliminate their own resident-agent?

[Basta] The KGB needs to improve its reputation. It is a part of the revival of the empire. I cannot but recall the words uttered by Zhirinovskiy as he burst in at the conference on the KGB in Moscow last May and attacked its participants for aggression against the KGB, which, in his opinion, belongs to the best tradition of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union.

By the "Ames action," the KGB immediately improved its reputation at home, because it demonstrated—look, the supreme boss of the U.S. counterintelligence against Russian intelligence was in fact our man; that is the kind of person we can recruit. Shortly thereafter, the Russians also came up with the exposure of the British spy.

[Stanek] Was it worth it to them?

[Basta] The Americans had suspected Ames for three years, which would present the possibility of Ames being recruited back to the U.S. side, or the Russians could have thought that this was in the works. As far as Ames's arrest goes, there was no need for FBI agents to go through the waste baskets. They could have foisted well-prepared disinformation upon him, for instance, and waited until it appeared on the Russian side. That would suffice for his condemnation. In the end, it was not the FBI but, rather, the Russians who won this discreet game.

[Stanek] Immediately after Ames was exposed, KGB head Golushko resigned, allegedly for health reasons. How do you feel about this?

[Basta] Although Russian intelligence officially disclosed that Golushko's resignation had nothing to do with the Ames affair, Nikolay Golushko is, after Vadim Bakatin, the second KGB head who came to the organization from without and had to leave. The similarity between their fates is also in their start following a failed coup. It seems that the immunity ability of the KGB and its successor organizations remains completely unhurt. If such a person as Golushko leaves, it does not mean anything good for our future. Every such event brings up the question of whether something like that is also possible here.

## Viruses Studied by Military Specified

*AU3103201194 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 30 Mar 94 p 2*

[Article by "km": "Czech Scientists Reportedly Never Tried To Develop Biological Weapons"]

[Text] Prague—The dangerous organisms that Czechoslovak scientists were studying in military establishments in the 1970's and 1980's included, for example, the Muray Valley encephalitis virus, which originates in Australia; a virus called St. Louis encephalitis; bacteria of the Japanese B encephalitis, strain "schun" [word as published]; and the virus of the "murman" seal species. These microorganisms cause mainly inflammations of the meninges; they have a very severe clinical progression and a lethal conclusion. The former Soviet Union asked the former government for an analysis of the above microorganisms.

Czech scientists supposedly never worked with the most dangerous infections such as smallpox, pestilence, and anthrax.

According to Ales Macela, dean of scientific activity at the Jan Evangelista Purkyne Military Medical Academy in Hradec Kralove, conditions have never been established in the Czech Republic for the handling of genetic material of microorganisms or for the production of a larger quantity of microbes, which would have been necessary for the development and production of a biological weapon.

### Research Had Possible Military Aims

*AU3103200994 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 30 Mar 94 p 1*

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta: "Viruses Kept by the Army Could Have Killed on a Large-Scale; Research Requested by Military Secret Services of the USSR"]

[Text] Prague—In the 1970's and 1980's, Czechoslovak scientists in military establishments studied several dozen particularly dangerous exotic viruses and bacteria that could be used as lethal bacteriological weapons. Their collection was liquidated by the Army, along with all common viruses such as influenza or mumps, only in February 1994.

The dangerous viruses and bacteria studied by Czechoslovak experts belonged to the group that mainly cause severe cases of meningitis. The military officials of the former Eastern bloc states were allegedly convinced that these organisms could be used by the enemy in the event of a bacteriological war. The military secret services of the former USSR therefore designated several dozen particularly dangerous microorganisms and recommended their research with the aim of creating serums for diagnostic and protective purposes.

Following the liquidation of the bank of virus strains, the Ministry of Defense was accused of having developed bacteriological weapons in its military establishments. The Army command, along with the Ministry of Health, denied this, however. The Ministry of Defense stated that the research involving those viruses was of a purely defensive nature. Some experts argue, however, that it is virtually impossible to distinguish between defensive and offensive research.

According to expert circles, it cannot be ruled out that the results of Czechoslovak studies could have been used by the Soviet Union for military purposes. This suspicion is confirmed by the recent admission of Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chief of the Russian presidential committee for chemical and biological weapons, who confirmed last September that, even though Moscow had signed the treaty on banning these weapons, the former USSR and, subsequently, Russia, continued to develop for 20 years bacteriological weapons and aircraft and missile systems for their transport.

### Official Discusses Czech-German Border Treaties

*AU3103160394 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 31 Mar 94 p 1*

[Interview with Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra by Jiri Hrasek and Andrea Behounkova; place and date not given: "The Regime at the Czech-German Border Is Regulated by Treaties"]

[Text] *Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra and Dieter Kastrup, state secretary at the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met in Prague at the beginning of last week [22-23 March] to discuss the Czech-German border regime. We asked Alexandr Vondra for details.*

[CESKY DENIK] Deputy Minister, have there been any agreements signed yet to regulate the local borderland traffic [maly pohranicni styk] and the state-border problems?

[Vondra] Not so far. Both agreements were discussed at the expert level. In the instance of the so-called large-scale border treaty, the Czech Government already expressed its approval of the text, and all that is left to do is to decide by whom, where, and when the agreement will be signed. The agreement on the local borderland traffic that deals, above all, with the problem of tourist zones and paths crossing the common border is almost finished, and only some technical details must still be approved.

[CESKY DENIK] How will the joint clearance at the border be expedited?

[Vondra] The treaty on the simplification of the border clearance in railroad, highway, and water transport between the Czech Republic and the FRG is almost finished. The treaty assumes the establishment of joint clearance facilities for the customs and passport control on either side of the border. A gradual increase in the number of border crossings also contributes to expediting the border clearance between the two countries.

[CESKY DENIK] Will the regime be altered at the state border in connection with complaints from the German side concerning criminal activities, for instance, by Czech citizens on the German side?

[Vondra] The regime at our common border will be defined in detail by the aforementioned treaty regulations. The treaty on cooperation in the struggle against organized crime, which was signed already in 1991, deals with the eradication of crime transgressing the border. The effectiveness of the detection and punishment of crime is improved also, for instance, by the possibility of direct contact between the Bavarian and the Czech police. An intergovernment agreement on cooperation of police bodies is also in the works.

[CESKY DENIK] Has there been any discussion regarding the use of names of communities in two languages?

[Vondra] After the latest talks with Dieter Kastrup, state secretary at the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it seems that a solution to this controversial problem was found that is acceptable to both sides. I expect that, following the appropriate internal talks on both sides, the problem of using local names in joint documents will be definitively solved. At this time, I do not wish to discuss the details of the solution.

## Privatization of Defense Ministry Facility

*AU3103174694 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 31 Mar 94 p 3*

[Commentary by Lubor Kohout: "Ministry of Defense Full of Beetles"]

[Text] In a large housing estate in Prague, there is a supermarket. Not only is it the only supermarket, but there also does not exist any building lot where a second supermarket could be built. There is not even room for small shops. The owner rents out the supermarket to its manager. Naturally, they conclude a lease contract. The contract concerns only the building in which the supermarket is located. The former manager of the supermarket thus becomes its lessee. The owner lets him keep all of the furnishings, some of which are older and some brand new, without asking anything for it. That is not all, however. Out of sheer goodness, he leaves in the supermarket all of the merchandise plus a full warehouse. The only thing the new lessee must do is hire shop assistants and start selling. For a while, he does not even have to buy new stock, of which he had received enough.

The owner does not ask anything for it. He does not even have an idea how many millions or tens of millions [currency not specified] worth of merchandise he had donated to his former employee in this way. Nonsense? No, this is the style of the Army's economic management, only transferred into a different environment.

This is exactly how the Ministry of Defense proceeds in relation to the Klinlab limited liability company (just a little reminder: this is the company that had administered those innocuous virus strains that were hastily destroyed on 25 February of this year). First, on 10 September 1993, the Municipal Military Accommodation Administration signs a lease contract with a still nonexistent company, which is signed on behalf of Klinlab by Army members Moravek, MD, and Choluj, MD, as Klinlab's statutory representatives and managing directors. At the same time, these gentlemen collect from the Army a lump-sum payment as compensation for not being engaged in private enterprise. Only a month later, on 21 October, the Klinlab partnership agreement is signed, and, another 11 days later, Klinlab is registered by the Municipal District Court in Prague-1. Certain activities are then set apart from the Central Military Medical Institute and transferred to Klinlab.

### Through Loss Toward Savings?

However, the Army, whose motive for the entire operation, according to M. Kalousek, deputy minister of defense in charge of economic affairs, is to achieve savings in its budget, transfers to the private company Klinlab only those activities that were well established, lucrative, and profitable, such as diagnostics. Activities that are loss-making and that the ministry must continue to subsidize are left in its own facility, the Central Military Medical Institute. From the viewpoint of the private company Klinlab, this sounds logical. Why should anyone rush into a business that will cost him money? It is less logical, however, from the viewpoint of the "cost-conscious" Army.

### Setting the Wolf To Mind the Sheep?

At an extraordinary news conference on 19 March, M. Kalousek even claimed that the Ministry of Defense would save 50 million korunas [Kc] a year thanks to Klinlab. This amount is equivalent to the annual overhead expenses of the entire former Central Military Medical Institute. It is peculiar that a deputy minister in charge of economic affairs operates with sums that include only expenditures and disregard revenues, such as payments from the Military Health Insurance for medical services performed, and so forth. He also "forgot" to mention that the Ministry of Defense must continue to subsidize the nonprofitable activities of the Central Military Medical Institute. In substantiating the savings, Deputy Minister Kalousek thus evidently did not speak the truth, the opposite of which is called a lie. Klinlab has thus taken over from the institute well-established activities, clients, and, within the framework of the UVN [possibly Ustredni Vojenska Nemocnice, Central Military Hospital], also a monopoly position. What did it pay for it? Nothing. It only concluded a contract on the lease of the six-storey building and undertook to pay annual rent of Kc760,123. Furthermore, the Army "leased to it free of charge" the appliances and equipment. True, the appliances and equipment have been leased for a definite period only. However, this definite period is defined very shrewdly. The formulation reads: "until a proper lease contract is concluded." The lease is set to begin on 23 December 1993. Apart from this, just like in the fictitious supermarket, the Ministry of Defense has left the working stock at Klinlab's disposal. Was this stock worth millions or tens of millions? Who cares? A pleasant way of starting a business, is it not?

### Good Personal Relations

It is worth noting that, naturally, there was no competition. Another physician, an emigre who has returned from Canada, also showed interest in the privatization of the complex, a part of which was subsequently acquired by Klinlab, at the beginning of last year. He was told that these activities could not be privatized. In their analysis, the gentlemen from Klinlab also mention the reasons because of which the lucrative activities should be transferred to them. Apart from the "traditionally good personal relations"

(between Moravek, Choluj, and the management of the Army's medical service), they also emphasize the fact that, when they acquire these activities, the entry of foreign capital will be prevented. Quite so. But did they not get the time wrong? And are the economic section of the Ministry of Defense and Deputy Minister Kalousek not getting it wrong?

The beetle is lying on its back and does not react to prodding. You prod again but nothing happens. So you prod even more strongly, but the beetle still does not move. Could it be dead? The beetle perhaps, but Defense Minister Antonin Baudys is unquestionably very much alive, and still he does not react. Did he choose to act like a dead beetle?

## Moravcik Views Relations With Hungary

*AU3103172794 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 31 Mar 94 p 3*

[Interview with Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik by Gyorgy Jozsef Farkas; place and date not given: "A Solution to the Problems on a Rational Basis"]

[Text] The Bratislava weekly SLOBODNY PIATOK organized a meeting between Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik and 13 journalists. Our correspondent represented the Hungarian press at this meeting that lasted more than one hour and that was also recorded by Slovak Television. We publish here Jozef Moravcik's answers to our correspondent's questions.

[Farkas] Mr. Moravcik! Elections are scheduled in Slovakia in September, but the new Hungarian parliament will be elected in May. Do you still see any possibility of developing cooperation with the current Hungarian leadership?

[Moravcik] From Bratislava, at first sight it seems that the current leadership in Budapest is not particularly worried about the coming elections. We are not dealing with the timing of the Hungarian elections, either, because we are regarding our relations in broader aspects. However, we are aware of the fact that diplomatic actions are in preparation in Europe that could also be used well in shaping the relations between our countries. I mean the coming Paris conference. No doubt, we would both benefit if we could solve our problems without outside assistance like the International Court, and if we succeeded in preventing phenomena that lead to instability. This requires the creation of foundations that facilitate a more rational solution of our problems. We are ready to take such a step anytime.

[Farkas] Do you see any possibility for Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszy to carry out his visit that was postponed in November 1993?

[Moravcik] When I was foreign minister, we confirmed, together with my Hungarian colleague, that the aforementioned visit was to the benefit of both of us. However, as you know, the problem of the extradition agreement emerged at the time. I am convinced that we will overcome this obstacle that hinders this visit, and the planned visits will take place. We are also interested in opening new border-crossing points, and the Slovak-Hungarian border is no exception to this, although there are a lot more crossing points along this border than along our other borders. However, our relations are specific, and, thus, the solutions must also be specific. We are ready to open further crossing points.

[Farkas] The economy can play an important role in our cooperation. However, your predecessor, Mr. Meciar, objected to the fact that Hungarian capital allegedly had an exaggerated presence in southern Slovakia.

[Moravcik] It is generally useless to limit the inflow of capital, and this particularly applies to Slovakia, which is only a small piece of land in Europe. Besides, capital is increasingly becoming international, and it is increasingly hopeless to look for national features on it. Therefore, I find it totally useless to seek ethnic features in the flow of capital.

[Farkas] In conclusion, a question about the distribution of the Danube waters. The European Union submitted a separate note to your predecessor, but Mr. Meciar's answer is not known. Is it possible that it will be your government's task to answer it? If so, what can we expect?

[Moravcik] Actually, there was no talk of any obligation to answer this note because it summed up the position of the European Union for the Slovak Government. As for the distribution of water itself, I regard this primarily as a technical problem, and I agree with Mr. Jeszenszky that, given the fact that this is a technical problem, we should tackle the problem accordingly.

## Minority Representative Comments on Events

*94CH0185A Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech 22 Feb 94 p 10*

[Unattributed interview with Dr. Magda Mrnkova, member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Alliance of Slovakia; place and date not given: "Why They Come to the Czech Republic"]

[Text] On the territory of the Czech Republic [CR], there exists the Slovak Activities Forum. Associated in it are the Slovak Community in the CR, the Union of Slovaks, the Democratic Alliance of Slovaks, and other entities. Because not all of them have identical views, any statement issued in the name of the forum must be approved unanimously. One vote against means an automatic veto.

We spoke with a member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Alliance of Slovaks, Dr. Magda Mrnkova.

[LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE] How many Slovaks are there in the CR?

[Mrnkova] More than 300,000. We do not live in enclaves, but more in something like a diaspora.

[LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE] It is no secret that the Slovaks in the CR hold different views on the Slovak reality. Many times they are in direct contradiction....

[Mrnkova] Yes, in some cases that is true. For example, we, the Democratic Alliance of Slovaks, have different views from those of the Slovak Community in the CR. We are sometimes attacked for being "renegades." That is not true. We perceive ourselves as Slovaks, and we love Slovakia. We have some basic reservations about some of the steps taken by the Slovak Government. And one more thing—if I come up against some problem, I

want to speak up as a citizen who does not like something, not as a Slovak whom others have wronged.

[LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE] Are people leaving Slovakia to go to the CR?

[Mrnkova] This is true especially of intellectuals. There is a hostility toward them in Slovakia. Recently, for example, came Lubomir Feldek, Juraj Jakubisko, Deana Horvathova, Zuzana Minacova, Jan Sebechlebsky, and others.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What information do you have about the atmosphere that prevails in Slovakia?

[Mrnkova] We have very fragmentary information. Observe, if you will, the growing distance between us as a result of poor information. For example, formerly, every CR citizen understood Markovic's jokes 100 percent. Now, the figure is only about 70 percent. We are losing our familiarity with the facts of everyday life. We have to depend on what friends tell us when they come here and what we see when we go to Slovakia. Many people there find themselves in social isolation. There are a few small islands where democratically thinking people meet. You see, even that gives a picture of what the atmosphere there is like.

[LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE] So you do not feel exactly happy....

[Mrnkova] Sad, rather. I am a Slovak and I love Slovakia. I never wanted us to split up. I believe that many people in Slovakia did not want it, either. In spite of that, they voted the way they voted. Even though I did not want the breakup of Czechoslovakia, I have to accept it as reality. But the fact that I am now a CR citizen does not mean that I am indifferent toward Slovakia. I will never be indifferent to it. And I believe that none of us who left Slovkia and are now living here are indifferent to it. That is why we feel somewhat sad now.

[LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE] Those are your personal views. How would the Democratic Alliance of Slovaks formulate its current position?

[Mrnkova] What is happening in Slovakia does, of course, touch us, even though we are CR citizens. We have often heard from various sides the suggestion that we have forgotten Slovakia and that we are sharing in creating a negative picture of it abroad. But the truth lies elsewhere. What is now happening in Slovakia and where these developments are leading could be anticipated already after the 1992 elections. That is why many people left Slovakia. We pointed out several times that democratic development of the society in Slovakia wass at risk. The governing movement was not and is not ready to govern. The proof is that, currently, some of its members went to the opposition.

The only thing we wish for Slovak citizens is that Slovakia become visible as a real democracy. But without any more experiments.

## Several Puzzles Involving Meciar Mentioned

*94CH0184A Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech 22 Feb 94 p 10*

[Commentary by Vladimir Kucera: "Mysterious Phenomenon V. Meciar"]

[Text] He appeared in a peculiar way. Most likely he was suggested by the intellectuals from the VPN [Public Against Violence], with Fedor Gal at its head, as a battering ram who would realize their goals.

Already at the time when it still appeared that it would work that way, a confrontation took place concerning the language law. On the Slovak National Uprising [SNP] Square in Bratislava, crowded with fanatic nationalists, arrived a procession of brave democrats. They chanted: "Long live Czechoslovakia!," "Long live Havel!," and "Long live Meciar!" It is remarkable that Vladimir Meciar did not take part in this demonstration, in which he was the symbol of the democratic forces.

Then the situation developed the way it developed. The battering ram soon got out of hand. He turned against those who thought they would control him. He captivated the citizens. Although he was deftly maneuvered out of executive power, the SNP Square was again crowded with people who again chanted "Long live Meciar!" Most likely, many people shouted this who on the previous occasion booed his name. It is remarkable that, again, Meciar was not present. The crowd was led by Milan Knazko. The doors to the parliament were broken down. Knazko promised on Meciar's behalf that his friend would return. During the negotiations, an extraordinary role was played by Ministers Filkus and Kovac, who surprisingly supported Meciar and joined the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia]. Where are Knazko and Filkus now?

Vladimir Meciar returned in triumph and acted in the same singular manner as before. Again, everything was the way the Prime Minister of the Czech Government, Pithart, used to tell about: "We come to an agreement on everything, then we have a friendly talk about dogs. The next morning I learn, to my consternation, that the Slovak prime minister said something entirely different in Slovakia than what we agreed upon."

But, in the second round, Meciar came up against a different adversary. Even so, all of the negotiations showed that Klaus, who has the reputation of being foxy, is a transparent politician compared to Meciar.

Meciar's mysterious disappearances for several days at a time, about which many rumors have been circulating, also continued. Again, contradictory statements were made, positions changed from day to day. No one will probably ever find out if the Slovak prime minister knows that he said something different yesterday from what he did today. Even that is one of his secrets, just like whether he really wanted to split up Czechoslovakia. But he did split it up.

Vladimir Meciar presents himself as a straight-arrow Janosik [Slovak Robin Hood]. He is, however, more of a deft manipulator. It is another one of his secrets how he forces people to get up from their sickbeds when he needs them, to change their views, to put themselves on the line for him when they clearly do not want to. He does not manipulate publicly but in a kind of "private" way, by personal intimations.

Also puzzling are the surprising changes in the expressions on his face. At one time, a kind of militant fervor. Then a change from one day to the next into an expression of the suffering of a persecuted man. The question is whether these are the two faces of Janus or two masks.

Mrs. Nagyova, his right hand, who always stands by his side, or, if protocol does not allow it, at least very close to him, should know much about Meciar's secrets.

The greatest mystery concerning the Slovak prime minister is, of course, how he manages to stay in office—unless, of course, it happens to be merely part of the much deeper mystery of the Slovak society.

## Knazko Views Prospects of Centrist Parties

*AU3103191194 Bratislava SME in Slovak 29 Mar 94 pp 1, 4*

[Interview with Milan Knazko, chairman of the Alliance of Democrats of the Slovak Republic, by Maria Hluchanova and Jana Pankovcinova; place and date not given: "We Are All Defectors From Totalitarianism"]

[Text] We have learned that, on Saturday [26 March], the government took stock of the economic situation in individual government departments. Deputy Prime Minister Schmognerova had visited the IMF, chiefly to discuss the extension to the Slovak Republic of the so-called standby credit. The government will apparently have to decide either to introduce unpopular economic measures or to consider drawing on the standby credit, which would be connected with restrictive measures in the social sphere.

[SME] What is the opinion of the Alliance of Democrats of the Slovak Republic [AD SR]?

[Knazko] We do not want this government to behave like a government that has elections in mind. Although the government's situation is not easy because some departments have deficits amounting to billions [of Slovak korunas], it should establish good conditions for the next government, even at the expense of electoral preferences. It is necessary to explain pragmatically to the citizen where we stand and stop making promises. I am confident that the coalition will come to an agreement. The path toward it will be difficult and complicated, but the decisions will then be all the more responsible and conceptual. Let us not anticipate events.

[SME] The present opposition is sending out signals about imminent mass dismissals from the state administration to be carried out by this government. If this is true, which and how many posts will be affected?

[Knazko] Professional expertise is the number-one criterion. We have not yet discussed this issue in the coalition, but there cannot be any talk about sweeping or ideologically motivated dismissals. We are not going to make the same mistakes as the previous government; we are not going to make any changes that are not well founded.

[SME] Why did the centrist parties—that is, your party and the followers of Moravcik and Cernak—not merge last weekend? The reasons for the failure to merge cited in the media included technical and legislative, but also other, personal, ones. What was the main problem?

[Knazko] These matters must be decided by the party's political bodies. I will clearly work toward the liberal, or right, center being formed by a single party that would be capable of representing a genuine counterbalance to other political entities. I do not consider having a number of small parties to be an optimal solution at present. I have discussed my ideas with Messrs. Cernak, Roman Kovac, and Moravcik, and we have essentially agreed that we will strive for unification. I think that differences in programs will be minimal, and we have also practically agreed on personnel issues. The merger between the AD SR and the followers of Moravcik will take place in the very near future.

[SME] And what about a merger with Cernak's party?

[Knazko] We will definitely remain open to this possibility. This will depend on the decision of Mr. Cernak and his party. Ludovit Cernak's statements to the effect that we do not want to build the new party any further than the district level or that we have only intellectuals at the top and no structures are imprecise and the result of a lack of information. It is self-evident that we have the ambition to build our political structures in the same way as any serious party.

[SME] Why then did the three parties not merge this weekend, as heralded one month ago?

[Knazko] We can still merge. This also depends on Mr. Cernak's interest in being represented in such a bloc with such an orientation and on his readiness to accept the fact that a person will become chairman of the center party who is the most acceptable from the viewpoint of objective criteria, from the viewpoint of the approaching elections, and from the viewpoint of the post he holds.

[SME] Do you think the parties of the center will actually merge or that they will merely form a preelection coalition?

[Knazko] The AD SR is contemplating a merger rather than a coalition.

[SME] Do you not think your failure to merge right away also with Cernak's group represents a wasted chance?

[Knazko] This is everyone's own decision, but it is a pity—for us but also for Mr. Cernak. I believe that the differences from the viewpoint of being oriented toward the European Democratic Union or the Liberal International are not such that they cannot be overcome. The differences between our programs will be equally minimal, so I regard this [separate existence of two parties] as a waste of energy and time.

[SME] You and the group around Jozef Moravcik define yourselves as a liberal entity. Mr. Cernak, on the other hand, said on Saturday [26 March] that "the new alternative cannot rest in boundless liberalism with its 'dog eat dog' mentality." What kind of liberalism do you represent?

[Knazko] Nothing boundless has a place in contemporary society, only in an extreme one. We have already defined some liberal priorities—from the citizen, via the community, to the state, from courage for changes to support for the private sector. Those are our points of departure, in the implementation of which it is necessary to accept our social and economic reality. Our party operates within the context of the Liberal International. It is a waste of time to talk about boundlessness. Rather, we hould build firm boundaries and seek European contacts.

[SME] Right-wing parties, not to mention liberal-oriented ones, flopped in the last elections, plainly speaking. There is more and more talk about liberalism at present, yet the poll results do not support this. According to the preelection polls, the AD SR currently has the support of slightly over 1 percent of voters, and Mr. Moravcik's group does not even figure in the polls. How do see the prospects for the liberal-oriented parties in the September elections?

[Knazko] I think this political orientation will stop being the isolated voice of individuals and tiny parties. I therefore expect much of the unification of persons and programs. I set great hopes in the membership base growing more numerous and being able, by virtue of the numbers, to assert liberal policies more effectively throughout Slovakia. There will also be far more visible political personalities representing this kind of policy. In my opinion, this is the result of a certain process that was perhaps inevitable. It started in the Public Against Violence movement [VPN] and continued, in part, in the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. Through natural crystallization, a certain selection of political personalities took place who will be capable of representing liberal policies. And I have no doubt that this will also find its expression in public opinion polls—in a substantially increased percentage of electoral preferences.

[SME] Are you not afraid that the people associated in the AD SR and around Jozef Moravcik will be regarded by the people as HZDS defectors, who have nothing in common except their distaste for Vladimir Meciar?

[Knazko] No, not at all. This is a very simplified and demagogic perception of some commentators, by which I do not mean you. We all are defectors from totalitarianism, defectors from the VPN because, without them, the present party structures would not have been created. One of the reasons the HZDS was formed as a broad spectrum movement was to make it possible for new political parties to emerge from it. Some people have supposedly broken away from the HZDS and are now so-called defectors. I consider this, however, to be a very positive process that has not yet ended. Let us return to the defectors. Why use such pejorative terms? These are people whose political views have become crystallized thanks to HZDS policies. These so-called defectors underwent baptism by fire and were forced to defend their views, in defiance of HZDS methods. The HZDS played a positive role in this regard.

[SME] HZDS Deputy Chairwoman Olga Keltosova said on Saturday [26 March] that the movement wants to transform itself into a party of the "pragmatic center." In this context, she said that, personally, she prefers liberal values. How do you assess the possibility of the HZDS joining the Liberal International?

[Knazko] It does not matter who declares what. What matters is the kind of policy one actually practices. The HZDS has convinced me of many things, except that it prefers liberal values. That is the last thing that would occur to me. Had this been true, we all could have calmly remained in the HZDS.

## Head of Confederation of Trade Unions Protests

*LD3103213594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1930 GMT 31 Mar*

[Text] Alojz Englis, the president of the Confederation of Trade Unions, has sent a letter to Finance Minister Rudolf Filkus, drawing his attention to the violation of trade union freedoms as outlined in the accord of the International Labor Organization on the freedom of association and the protection of trade unions' right of association. In his letter, Alojz Englis stressed that the Finance Ministry fundamentally violated trade union rights by a decision calling on the trade unions that are members of the confederation to present their account books outlining their assets to appropriate tax bodies by 31 March. Englis pointed out that he will inform the international trade union headquarters about this, and, if the Finance Ministry does not change its stance, he will forward an official complaint to the International Labor Organization about the violation of trade union rights in Slovakia.

## Walesa Criticizes West on Aid Efforts

*LD3103233394 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] Neither Poland nor Russia can be moved to America. We are forced to depend on each other. This is the title the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has given to an interview with President Lech Walesa.

[Correspondent Andrzej Siezeniewski] Speaking of the tasks of politicians in shaping bilateral relations, the Polish president stressed that, in the first instance, they ought to remove barriers and open opportunities for contacts for industrialists and businessmen and constantly repeat to them: Gentlemen, it will always be shorter from Moscow to Warsaw than to Washington. That is why Poland is a better partner than the United States.

Asked whether his hopes of help from the West had been fulfilled, Lech Walesa gave an unequivocally negative answer. History proves, he stressed, that one cannot seriously count on support from that direction. Apart from promises, we have received nothing. The West does not understand what is happening in our part of the world, said the Polish president. It does not treat us as partners. It acts only when it sees some profit in it for itself.

President Walesa spoke against dividing the world into blocs. The times when that was how things were are disappearing into the past. For that reason, Poland or Ukraine will not be playing the part of sanitary corridors separating the giants of Europe: Russia and Germany.

Lech Walesa is also against the concentration of troops in, for example, the Kaliningrad oblast. If we all say that we do not see each other as enemies, why make such gestures, underlined the Polish president.

It is his conviction that we should aim at building a system of pan-European security, which would give all nations of the continent equal guarantees of a peaceful life.

## Leftist Daily Criticizes Walesa's Actions

*WS0104121194 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 1 Apr 94 p 1*

[Commentary by Dariusz Szymczycha under the rubric "100 Words"]

[Text] When the president says that he is fighting for political balance, he is actually destabilizing it.

He brought about a conflict recently, as well, when he refused to sign the "new popiwek" [tax on excess wage increases] law and appointed Ryszard Bender to the post of chairman of the National Council of Radio and Television before the legal dispute ended over whether the president had the right to recall the previous chairman, Marek Markiewicz. Thus, the Belweder is taking advantage of accomplished facts and accepts only the president's own interpretation of laws. However, one could expect more from the president, who is the moderator of political life.

It is very characteristic that, in recent days, the Belweder has multiplied conflicts. The "no" for Rosati, the budget blackmail, and, finally, the appointment of Mr. Bender and the veto of the "new popiwek" show clearly that Lech Walesa has decided to extend the area of his influence. All this actually happened, even though the coalition of the Polish Peasant Party and the Democratic Left Alliance often declared the will of constructive cooperation with the president. It also proved this by recognizing the president's right to fill the highest positions in three strategic ministries.

Thus, there was a chance for cooperation and balance. However, Lech Walesa is balancing in his own way.

## Comment on Walesa's Rejection of New Popiwek Law

*WS0104112594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 1 Apr 94 p 4*

[Commentary by Piotr Aleksandrowicz: "In the Market Direction"]

[Text] The president vetoed the new popiwek [tax on excess wage increases] because he had sound reasons to do so. He believes that this law gives the administration a lot of power to make decisions concerning tax burdens; it poses a threat to the implementation of the property law and to the development of private entrepreneurship; it strengthens administration at the cost of the parliament. The Sejm may override the veto; however, the question arises whether it could just ignore the arguments submitted by the president.

It seems that, approximately since 1991, there have been reasons to believe that the administrative control of wages in the state-owned sector might be replaced by macroeconomic control and negotiations between employees and employers. The fluidity of companies was limited, the money supply is under control, and inflation is increasingly lower; the unemployment level, however, is high, which curbs wage demands as well as the development of competition.

There is no doubt that the departure from the administrative control of shaping wages would be a step in the direction of market economy principles.

The popiwek, a solution that seems indispensable in the first and second year of transformations, became an increasingly less observed relic of the past as the situation was more and more stabilized. However, it was in a way comfortable to some authorities, establishments, and companies: It freed them from some of the responsibility for the economic results.

Abolition of the popiwek would reinforce the demands submitted by the National Bank of Poland, which should pursue a definitely anti-inflation financial policy. Similarly, it would set higher requirements for banks and the government in the area of execution of credits, taxes, and bankruptcies. Finally, the ministries exercising owner's supervision would have to fill higher requirements as well. The owner should demand responsibility from the directors and not, as it used to be, succumb to joint pressure of employees and their bosses. However, because the state is not an efficient owner, what we need is consistency in privatization and in the development of competition.

Neither the president's decision nor its approval by the Sejm threaten to cause chaos and higher inflation—on condition that the government will be the government, the owner will be the owner, and the central bank the central bank.

## SLD Spokesman on Rosati Case, Walesa, Budget

*WS3103133094 Warsaw Radio Zet in Polish 0615 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Interview with SLD Press Spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatkowski by Andrzej Woyciechowski at the Radio Zet studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of Radio Zet" program—live]

[Text] [Woyciechowski] Radio Zet's guest today is Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, spokesman for the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. Good morning to you, sir.

[Siemiatkowski] Good morning to you, too.

[Woyciechowski] Could you explain to everybody in two or three sentences—well, five at the most—what is currently happening in Poland?

[Siemiatkowski, hesitating] I mean, we are definitely dealing here with some form of political crisis associated with the fact that the president refuses to approve the candidate for finance minister and deputy prime minister, whose name had been submitted by the prime minister—that is, Professor Rosati. For that reason, discussions are becoming lengthy, and also there is the fact that Poland continues to go without a finance minister.

[Woyciechowski] Why does the president refuse to approve of Rosati? What do you think of this? What is your assessment?

[Siemiatkowski] I mean, of course an official [hesitating] explanation was provided by the president. I will just echo what Mr. Rosati has said: These accusations that were levied against him are ridiculous, and I think we are dealing here with a political game being played by the president, the goal of which is to destabilize the current political arrangement and to disavow the existing coalition majority, and perhaps the president hopes, through these measures, to break the coalition and perhaps lead to other types of political configurations. It is a well-known fact that the president always feels very comfortable with situations of political instability. At such times, his activity is always on the increase. But, in periods of hard and peaceful work by cabinets, the president's activity kind of slows down. At any rate, that is no coincidence: If one were to trace the whole period of President Walesa's term, one would see that, more or less three or four months into each cabinet's term, the president decides to launch a counteroffensive. Of course, that is not a good sign for the future of the political situation because every cabinet, including this one and this coalition, is then forced to deal with issues of third- or even fourth-order importance from the standpoint of goals and tasks for which the Cabinet and the coalition were established. This way, we cannot focus our attention on fundamental tasks, such as the current issue of budget implementation and the implementation of economic policies and the big social reforms, which we want to continue.

[Woyciechowski] Mr. Sejm Deputy, does the president want to break the coalition?

[Siemiatkowski] I think the president's goal in this case is perhaps to find differences in the existing coalition. Every coalition is composed of two parties that have their own identities and their own interests, and a coalition is always based on compromise, and, in this case, the coalition between the SLD and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] is also a compromise.

[Woyciechowski] So can one say that President Walesa wants to set the coalition members at odds. Can one put it this way? Could you put it in a short phrase [words indistinct]?

[Siemiatkowski] We thought that was the president's goal at the beginning of his measures, except that he came across a reaction that he probably could not have predicted—namely, a unanimous position by the PSL and the SLD, as well as the tough position of the prime minister, who in a very persistent manner confirmed that Mr. Dariusz Rosati, the SLD's candidate for finance minister, is also the prime minister's candidate, and we highly respect Prime Minister Pawlak for his position. Mr. Rosati is also a candidate for the prime minister's deputy for economic affairs, and, despite resistance from the Belweder, the prime minister confirmed several times that Mr. Rosati is his candidate. So, if the president did indeed have the goal of setting us at odds, he failed to achieve it.

[Woyciechowski] Is it true that Mr. Rosati returned to Warsaw yesterday?

[Siemiatkowski] Yes, it is. He returned for the Easter holiday.

[Woyciechowski] Is it true that Mr. Rosati withdrew his candidacy?

[Siemiatkowski] After yesterday's conversation with Aleksander Kwasniewski, Mr. Rosati upholds his willingness to be a candidate for the post. He made a decision to be completely at the SLD's disposal, and also at that of the entire coalition and the prime minister himself. We respect Mr. Rosati very much for his behavior because we can appreciate the very difficult situation he is in. Anyone else in his shoes, when faced with such attacks and accusations by the president and his closest aides, would perhaps withdraw. But still, Mr. Rosati decided that, because he is supported by concerted action by the entire Cabinet, the prime minister, the coalition, and Aleksander Kwasniewski, it would be inappropriate if he were to withdraw at this stage of the negotiations.

[Woyciechowski] Do you think it is still politically possible at this point for Rosati to be appointed deputy prime minister, after everything that has been said about him?

[Siemiatkowski] Ladies and gentlemen, both the SLD and the prime minister decided to make efforts to convene a meeting with the president himself. It is our view that, during such a direct meeting and conversation, when we will present once again all of the arguments in favor of Mr. Rosati's candidacy and in favor of the need to end this situation of temporariness that exists in the Finance Ministry, we think that, during the meeting, President Walesa will perhaps hear us out and change his mind because it is our view that the opposition should not be ambition driven, on both the part of the president and the coalition. What should prevail is thinking along substantive lines, and, in that regard, we think and are convinced that Mr. Rosati fulfills all of the criteria that should be met by the best candidate for finance minister. It is our view that he is the best candidate for finance minister right now. Poland cannot afford to once again see such talent and such a professional go to waste.

[Woyciechowski] You mentioned the Walesa-Pawlak-Kwasniewski summit meeting. When will it take place? Will it be before Easter?

[Siemiatkowski] I mean, it is the president who has the initiative in that regard. For our part, we have submitted—and that was something agreed upon by the coalition—that the prime minister play the role of an intermediary in these talks. The prime minister has such powers; it would be hard to expect Aleksander Kwasniewski, who is just a faction chief and has not been authorized to [words indistinct]....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Does that mean that the prime minister has addressed the president and asked for such a meeting and is now awaiting a reply?

[Siemiatkowski] According to information we received yesterday, the prime minister has indeed asked that a date for the meeting be set.

[Woyciechowski] Could the meeting take place today, tomorrow, or over the next few days?

[Siemiatkowski] Of course, it is up to the person who makes the invitations to the talks—that is to say, President Walesa.

[Woyciechowski] So you, gentlemen, are simply waiting for [words indistinct]....

[Siemiatkowski, interrupting] Yes, we are waiting. Right now, the situation is somewhat impractical because Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski could not [hesitating] wait yesterday, and today, a Sejm delegation with Speaker Oleksy is coming from Moscow.

[Woyciechowski] Today he is meeting Yeltsin.

[Siemiatkowski] Yesterday, he [Kwasniewski] met the Russian prime minister, and a meeting with Russian President Yeltsin has been announced for tomorrow....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Then we will have Easter, so the meeting will probably take place after that.

[Siemiatkowski] He is coming back on Friday [1 April]—we will regard Saturday as a holiday—so, realistically speaking, one can expect such a meeting at the beginning of next week.

[Woyciechowski] Mr. Deputy, can the president dissolve parliament? He did mention such a possibility yesterday.

[Siemiatkowski] He certainly can dissolve it if three conditions, which are very precisely defined by the Small Constitution, are met. The president has already once taken advantage of such a possibility....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] However, what are these conditions? Can you tell us about them? Is it the budget....

[Siemiatkowski, interrupting] It is the budget....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] However, this is no longer possible....

[Siemiatkowski, interrupting] No, it is no longer possible because the Sejm has managed to do this within three months; right now the [word indistinct] is in the hands of the president....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] The second possibility?

[Siemiatkowski] The second possibility is when the Sejm cannot form the government. However, the government has already been formed. Finally, the third possibility appears if a nonconstructive no-confidence vote is submitted, for this reason....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] If it is submitted and passed, that is?

[Siemiatkowski] Certainly, if it is passed.

[Woyciechowski] Now, such a veto cannot really be passed in today's Sejm. It is hard to imagine....

[Siemiatkowski, interrupting] Of course. If we considered something like that at all, it would be a constructive no-confidence vote. This Sejm has drawn conclusions from the experiences of its predecessor....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] And it does not want to allow itself to be dissolved?

[Siemiatkowski] It is not that it does not want that. Simply, it would not serve Poland at the moment if we entered a new stage of the campaign. Incidentally, we believe that what the president is doing today is the beginning of the presidential campaign, a year and a half before the actual vote.

[Woyciechowski] I will ask my question once again: Can the president dissolve today's Sejm?

[Siemiatkowski] I believe that this is unrealistic and impossible, with the majority and the strong will of political action in the Sejm.

[Woyciechowski] Is then another situation possible, which is for the time being only tentatively mentioned by the commentators of some dailies, that the SLD might leave the coalition? Do you take such a possibility into consideration?

[Siemiatkowski] Well, we defined this very precisely in the coalition agreement. For the SLD, the condition that must be met is the positive influence on the economic processes going on in our country. We can exert this positive influence on those processes by participating in the Cabinet and being in control of the economic ministries—that is, having our own finance minister, ownership transformations minister, chairman of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers [KERM]. In another case, the SLD could not see the possibility of functioning in any other governments because we realize that, in such a situation, our role would be merely a decorative one.

[Woyciechowski] However, if you were to boil this all down to just a few simple words, if the SLD could not appoint its own finance minister, we would deal with a situation that the SLD would leave the coalition.

[Siemiatkowski] We would find it hard to justify our further participation in the cabinet of any coalition if we lost real influence on the economic processes. We can even say more: We can proudly say that, under the SLD leadership in those economic ministries, economic processes are going on exceedingly positively. It is worth recalling that, in the first quarter of the year, the inflation index is at the 5-percent level. In both January and February, we recorded increases in the GDP on the level of over 4 percent. At the same time, the state's revenues are bigger than expected in the Budget Law.

[Woyciechowski] All of this was achieved without a finance minister. Maybe, then, we do not need a finance minister?

[Siemiatkowski] I would certainly not draw such far-reaching conclusions. Of course, this was made possible by the fact that the budget was prepared as it was, by the budget-related laws passed by the Sejm. It was also made possible by the economic team, which was headed by Deputy Prime Minister Borowski and people who stayed in the leadership of the Finance Ministry and KERM after Mr. Borowski resigned. Finally, these achievements result from the efforts made by the entire Cabinet of Mr. Waldemar Pawlak and Prime Minister Pawlak himself, as well as all of the ministers responsible for the economy—the industry minister, the foreign economic cooperation minister, and the ownership transformations minister. It is all the result of the work of the entire Cabinet.

[Woyciechowski] Mr. Deputy, what will happen if President Walesa does not sign the budget? What will be the constitutional fate of this budget?

[Siemiatkowski] It will, of course, return to the Sejm, and I believe that the Sejm is able and efficient enough to override the president's veto by a two-thirds majority vote. I would....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] However, the coalition does not have such a majority in the Sejm today?

[Siemiatkowski] Well, yes it does. This can be very precisely calculated. Even the four people who are no longer members of the SLD club announced when the budget was being read for the second time that, if the president vetoed the bill, they would vote for rejecting this veto. So, even in such a situation....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] That means that you would have to be backed by someone from the parties that does not belong to the coalition, such as the Union of Labor or the Democratic Union? The coalition would still need a few votes, would it not?

[Siemiatkowski] Well, it would not. Exactly two-thirds....[pauses] I do not have the data now, but it has been calculated that the coalition is able to achieve this threshold of two-thirds of the votes. I believe that, in such an extreme situation, we would be backed by many votes from noncoalition parties, which would help us override the president's veto. However, I would rather be inclined to agree with the commentators who, commenting on yesterday's statements by President Walesa, write in today's press that the president will not decide to veto the Budget Law. He would be in a very difficult situation. He must take into account international opinion....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] You believe, then, that, despite all that, the president will sign the budget?

[Siemiatkowski] Yes, I do, because this is a development-oriented budget. It continues the positive trends in

our economy that became visible toward the end of last year. This budget was favorably received by international economic circles. I believe that quite significant was the decision by the London Club, which annulled a substantial part of the Polish debt. If there had not been such a budget, if it had not contained such prodevelopment and growth-oriented indicators, the club's decision would have been different. The president, who has so far been regarded practically everywhere as a supporter of reforms and a man who sees to it very rigorously that economic reforms in Poland are continued, would have to negate the activities that he has pursued so far. I believe that the economists the president wants to ask for advice should tell the president very clearly all the political and economic costs that Poland, and the president himself, will incur if he decides to oppose the trends outlined in this budget.

[Woyciechowski] Mr. Deputy, I am sure you have heard this rumor, which everyone has heard, that Aleksander Kwasniewski might be appointed deputy prime minister.

[Siemiatkowski] For today—I will use the expression of President Walesa—our candidate for the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister is Mr. Dariusz Rosati.

[Woyciechowski] How about tomorrow?

[Siemiatkowski] This will definitely call for a new discussion in the coalition.

[Woyciechowski] Is the candidacy of Paga at all possible?

[Siemiatkowski] It would be rather awkward if we accepted candidacies proposed to us from outside.

[Woyciechowski] Thank you very much for the interview.

[Siemiatkowski] Thank you.

## Borowski: Walesa in 'War Against Coalition'

*LD3103210094 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1911 GMT 31 Mar 93*

[Text] Szczecin, 31 Mar—The deputy chairman of the parliamentary floor group of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], Marek Borowski, former deputy prime minister and former finance minister, said on Thursday in Szczecin that he considered the fact that Lech Walesa had not signed the law replacing the excess wage tax [neo-popiwek] to be a declaration of war against the coalition. He also expressed the opinion that this was an attempt to make mischief within the coalition.

Borowski said that the president would sign the budget law "because, after all, there are limits to absurdity."

As an element of the war with the coalition, Borowski sees the refusal of Minister Kolodziejczyk to fill the post of deputy minister at the Ministry of National Defense [MON] with a representative of the coalition.

It is Borowski's view that, in this situation, parliamentary forces should be mobilized to reject the presidential veto. As far as the situation in MON is concerned, a group of 15 deputies from the SLD and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] should propose a motion in the Sejm regarding a vote of no confidence in Piotr Kolodziejczyk. After its acceptance, Kolodziejczyk must resign.

## Draft Law on Privatization Presented

*94P20585A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 11 Mar 94 p 2*

[Article by Tomasz Swiderek: "Privatization in a New Way"]

[Text] Will an employee of a privatized firm have the right to free shares in his enterprise? Will farmers supplying a privatized factory be able to count on free shares? When will the one and the other be able to get free shares?

Today the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers will deal with the draft of the new law on privatization of state enterprises. This draft enters into the composition of the laws creating the Pact on State Enterprises and, should it become law, will replace the standing law on privatization. The draft, prepared by the Ministry of Ownership Transformations, has already passed through the so-called interministerial coordination.

### Workers' and Farmers' Shares

The draft foresees the cancellation of the right of employees to buy, at half price, up to 20 percent of the shares or interest in a privatized firm. Instead, the work force would receive for free up to 15 percent of the shares (interest).

The draft imposes a condition, however, in that the combined face value of the shares for the employees cannot be greater than 18 average wages in industry (average estimate based on six months' worth of wages, beginning one month before the share is issued) multiplied by the number of employees in the firm.

The employees would receive their shares over the course of six months from the time the joint-stock company, which resulted from the conversion of the state enterprise, is entered into the trade registry.

At present, employees may buy shares in their firm only two months after the shares have been accessible to other investors; in other words, in reality, from about 12 to 30 months after the company has been entered into the trade registry.

The draft states that employees who received free shares will not have the right to vote at general assemblies of the company until the time of "the first general assembly convoked following the disposal of at least half of the general amount of shares (interest) by the state treasury."

The same rights as those held by employees would be offered to private farmers and fishermen who supply the factories with raw materials. However, they will have to submit a written declaration "of intent to acquire shares" within one month from the day the company was entered into the trade registry.

**Capital Privatization**

This path would change the name to an intermediary and could follow the progression of:

—invitations to bid publicly;

—open tender or negotiations undertaken on the basis of a public invitation.

In the ordinance, the minister will be able to designate the rules for acquiring shares.

Without the agreement of the finance minister, shares of privatized companies will not be available for purchase by, among others, state enterprises, state banks, or banks that are joint-stock companies, the sole shareholder of which is the state treasury.

**Direct Privatization**

In the standing law, direct privatization is called privatization by liquidation, and it assumes that the enterprise privatized in this manner can be sold, used as a contribution into a company, or accepted into a leasing arrangement ["repayable exploitation"] by a so-called employee-owned company. Decisions about privatization by liquidation are undertaken by the so-called founding agencies [organy zaloczycielskie] (for example, those controlled by voivodships), but they require the permission of the privatization minister.

In addition, the draft states what kind of factories can be privatized using this method. Direct privatization cannot be carried out if one of the following three conditions is met:

—at the time of the commencement of the preliminary proceedings, the factory employs more than 400 people;

—the value of the sale of goods and services during the year before the preliminary proceedings is more than 12 million ECU's (converted to zlotys at the rate announced by the NBP [National Bank of Poland] on the day of drawing up the balance sheet for that year;

—the sum of the statutory capital and the enterprise capital, counted at the end of the year preceding the commencement of the preliminary proceedings, is more than 8 million ECU's (conversion principle as above).

The draft assumes that, in justifiable cases, the government, at the request of the privatization minister, may agree to direct privatization even if a firm fulfills the condition dealing with the value of sales.

The draft assumes, among other things, that the installment payment of the debt on the factory in the case of leasing may last up to 10 years, and the ownership rights to the factory may be assigned to the employees after payment of one-third of the amount stated in the agreement (but not before two years). The time limit of two years may be reduced to one year, if the company has paid a minimum of half of the debt.

In addition, the draft states that the participants in the employee-owned company may not be foreign firms or individuals residing permanently outside of Poland.

**Detailed Changes**

The draft also assumes many detailed changes, among others, surrendering the existing entry that "Privatization Directions" for this year are passed together with the budget. In the future, this document will be a supplement to the budget because, as is written in the explanatory statement, "privatization is not something separate from the whole of the economy. It is a basic element in the economy."

The draft also regulates the principles for calling forth boards of directors of companies and guarantees a place in the boards for employees as well as for private farmers and fishermen.

It also proposes deletion of the entry that a one-person company of the state treasury should be privatized within two years. In practice, this entry was not implemented in many cases because there were no takers for the privatized factories.

**Transition Provisions**

The draft assumes, among other things, that the proposals on converting enterprises into companies not considered up to the date the new law becomes effective will be considered in accordance with the new law. If, however, as a result of the new law's provisions, there is an obligation to supplement the proposal, the proposer of the motion must do so within two months of the date the law goes into effect.

In addition, if, on the date the new law becomes effective, the state treasury has not yet begun making company shares available to the employees, they will receive them on the basis of the new law. Where such access has already begun, it will be completed on the old model.

## Disagreements at KERM Privatization Meeting

*94P20590A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Economy and Market supplement) in Polish 12-13 Mar 94 p 18*

[Article by Ada Kostrz-Kostecka: "KERM on Ownership Transformation; Everyone Will Privatize Something for Oneself"]

[Text] The law on privatization of state enterprises has a constitutional character, and, because comments and proposals were made up to the last moment, it was not

possible to make a decision on the spot. For that reason, during the Thursday, 10 March, KERM [Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers] meeting, it was decided that a coordination meeting would take place on Thursday, 17 March, and, on Friday, 18 March, KERM would state precisely its position concerning this issue.

It turns out that the proposals went very far, when, practically speaking, there is another privatization philosophy—the divergence between KERM members concerned about who is to initiate the privatization procedures, who is to represent the State Treasury, the role of the chief of the privatization ministry, and the role of particular ministries.

Even during the interministerial coordination meeting, as RZECZPOSPOLITA learned, it was proposed that the Ministry of Privatization [MPW] convert state enterprises into commercial operations, with the enterprises' concurrence. During the KERM proceedings, Marek Pol, minister of industry and trade, proposed instead that the decision on the whole process of privatization pass into the hands of branch ministries. The MPW would, in practice, have the role of a consulting firm at the level of preparing the privatization process as well as a store with the enterprises, with the signing of the contract. And the Ministry of Industry would like to be involved not only with the privatization of these industrial and trade enterprises, for which it is currently the founding body [organ zalozycielski], but also with those under the jurisdiction of voivodes [administrative heads of the voivodships].

This idea was accepted by the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations would like to go even further, separating foreign trade enterprises and independently attending to their privatization.

In the meantime, the Ministry of Privatization, as stated by Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek at a press conference during a break in the KERM meeting, assumes granting the enterprises far-reaching powers that would allow them to decide on the means of privatization. It was also proposed to abolish the half-year time period allowed to select the privatization path, leaving the enterprises with possibilities not restricted by time to undertake these initiatives.

Minister Kaczmarek, when asked by reporters how he would react if the idea presented by Minister Pol were to be accepted, said that he would protest such a move because it was not the privatization direction to which he had agreed. In his opinion, this is an attempt to rebuild the branch structures. In Minister Kaczmarek's opinion, discussion would be easier if the package of laws concerning the State Treasury were to be considered first.

The other subject of discussion dealt with the range of preference for the employees. The Ministry [of Privatization] takes the position that there should be 15 percent of free shares, along with an absolute limit (the value of the preferences cannot exceed 18 average wages). On the basis of the discussion, KERM members aligned themselves rather with the 10-percent free shares concept, but with restrictions on the rights to their transferability. They could be, for example, registered shares (as KPW [Securities Commission] wants to have), or they could be transerred in lots of up to 5 percent annually.

In response to questions, Minister Kaczmarek said that there is no concept for privatization of the agricultural-food-processing industry. On Friday [11 March], the minister was in Lowicz, and he spoke with representatives of the food-processing industry there and came to the conclusion that a concept of merging agricultural producers with the privatization of that sector (regardless of whether they get 10 or 15 percent of the shares) is not a solution for privatization. What is necessary are ideas and money for that industry to make marketable products. The minister's resistance also brings up the proposition that cooperatives have the right to a portion of the shares of processing industries, the more so because there are many individuals in, for example, the budget sphere, who do not have such privileges.

### Radio, TV Broadcasting Council Head Appointed

*LD3103143294 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Excerpt] Ryszard Bender, hitherto a member of the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council, was today appointed chairman of the council by the president. Ryszard Bender told journalists that he does not envisage any changes in the policy of the council regarding the granting of broadcasting concessions. [passage omitted]

### High-Level Military Debate Army Budget

*WS0104121094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 1 Apr 94 p 2*

[Article by "pw": "A Poor Army"]

[Text] *"This year's Defense Ministry budget is so limited that the country's security is endangered," said General Zbigniew Zalewski, chief of the logistics inspectorate of the General Staff, during yesterday's economic meeting of Army leaders.*

It was the first economic meeting since 1989 with the participation of commanders of all military districts and of commanders of all types of the Armed Forces.

Acting Finance Minister Henryk Chmielak, who took part in the meeting, argued that the Defense Ministry's budget is a result of a "difficult compromise," but the military present at the meeting were of the view that it is the Army that is the victim of the compromise. Gen. Zalewski argued that it would be easy to help the Armyby limiting tax levels because it is "illogical for the Army

to put money back into the budget and then use this same money."

The officers argued that the Army finds it hard to adapt to the market economy. They complained of a lack of laws that would make it possible for the Army to sell unused buildings, storage areas, or garages, while there is no money to continue to maintain the premises.

The topic of wasting resources in military housing, revealed by the Supreme Chamber of Control, was discussed repeatedly. According to the general cadre, "deficiencies of human nature" were the main reason for what happened. The logistics chief assured that clearing up the issue completely and bringing the guilty to justice is in the Army's interest.

### Grachev Expresses 'Satisfaction' With Visit

*AU3003152394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 30 Mar 94*

[Text] Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian minister of defense, ended his official visit to Romania today with a joint news conference together with his Romanian counterpart Gheorghe Tinca. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results of the visit.

The Russian guest and his retinue were received during their stay in Romania by President Ion Iliescu, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, and Teodor Melescanu, minister of state and minister of foreign affairs. Likewise, the Russian defense minister and the Romanian minister of national defense, Gheorghe Tinca, signed an accord between the Ministry of National Defense of Romania and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the military cooperation between the two countries, which was considered by both sides as a start for relaunching the overall bilateral relations.

### Grachev, Tinca Look To End 'Stagnation'

*AU3103090694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] Concluding the visit to our country by Russian Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev, a visit that included meetings with President Iliescu, the Romanian prime minister, and the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, the Russian guest held a news conference on 30 March.

The news conference focused on the major results of the visit and revealed the wish of both countries to put an end to the period of stagnation in bilateral relations. Likewise, the sides approached the issue of the future meeting between Ion Iliescu and Boris Yeltsin and Vacaroiu and Chenomyrdin.

General Grachev invited his Romanian counterpart to visit Moscow.

The military cooperation agreement between the two countries was viewed by both sides as a beginning of a period of fruitful cooperation.

During the news conference Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca mentioned that neighborliness should not be understood as a strictly geographical term, as it is also a political concept.

He also said that we consider Greece and Turkey to be our neighbors because good-neighborliness is a much deeper concept that reflects a system of relations based on certain principles that cannot have substance and vitality if they are not regarded in a broader context.

### Spokesman Cited on Loosening FRY Embargo

*AU0104120494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 1 Apr 94*

[Text] At the opening of today's news conference held at Cotroceni Palace, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu, spokesman for the presidency, announced that on 5 April Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic will make a one-day visit to our country.

According to our correspondent, the majority of the journalists' questions referred to issues related to the recent visit to Greece by the head of the Romanian state.

Talking about our country's stance regarding the embargo imposed on Yugoslavia, Chebeleu said that in Romania's general opinion, considering the fact that the embargo, in the way it was implemented, did not help to extinguish the conflict, all measures intended to slacken the embargo are to be saluted.

Answering a question related to the trade unions' request that President Ion Iliescu should intervene again as a mediator [in their negotiations with the government and the employers], Chebeleu reasserted the readiness of the head of state to intervene in various dialogues, whenever necessary, including the current case.

### Official Defends Government on Minority Rights

*AU3003133694 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 26-27 Mar 94 p 2*

[Interview with Ivan Trutzer, director of the Council for Ethnic Minorities in the Romanian Government, by Cristina Trepcea; place and date not given: "We Are Not Intimidated by the Demands of Nationalities"]

[Text] [Trepcea] What have the Romanian authorities done about meeting the commitments to the Council of Europe regarding ethnic minorities?

[Trutzer] Amendment 3 to the report on Romania's application for admission to the Council of Europe recommends the implementation of a law on ethnic minorities and education in the shortest time possible. In connection with the law on ethnic minorities, I can say that there is a draft law on minorities dated 7 December 1993 that was sent to the government authorities of the Council members for their remarks and amendments, and the text is to be submitted to the government to formulate the final draft law. By mid-April it will be forwarded to Parliament. In connection with the educational law, I can say that the draft law has been passed by the Commission for Education of the Chamber of Deputies and is to be put on the agenda of the meetings. Henceforth, everything depends on Parliament.

[Trepcea] What has been done in connection with the European Charter for Local Autonomy and with the Charter for Regional or Minority Languages—Amendments 4 and 5?

[Trutzer] The text reads as follows: "It is recommended that it be signed as soon as possible." So far, this charter for regional languages has been ratified by a only one state, Norway, which did so in November 1993. In our country, this legal instrument will be examined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because it involves things that have to be studied carefully, while reservations have to be formulated accurately. The same applies to the European Charter on Local Autonomy. The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romanian [UDMR] energetically demands that these two European charters be ratified. In my opinion, discussions and preparations on the Charter for Local Autonomy may begin in accordance with Romania's Constitution, which, in Article 119, stipulates that public management in territorial-administrative units is based on the principles of local autonomy and decentralized public services.

[Trepcea] What can you tell us about the creation and operation of religious schools with a special emphasis on teaching children of minority groups in their mother tongue?

[Trutzer] This is also included in the UDMR draft law and in that of the Council for Ethnic Minorities. It has to be the subject of a special law. It is a comprehensive issue that requires time.

[Trepcea] In your view, has Romania done enough to abide by its pledges?

[Trutzer] The majority of the issues are under discussion, which is in a positive stage, and one can say that, even if the pledges have not been honored yet, we are in the process of honoring them. I think that we are in a good position. Regarding the law on minorities, for instance, "formulating" such a law in Switzerland took 20 years, and in Hungary three years. Our draft law was ready within six months. On the other hand, the rapporteurs of the Council of Europe have not come in order to scare us. We have to see things positively. Romania is going through a phase of serious economic difficulties. I think that parliamentary activity is much more important in such areas as economic and fiscal ones. Insofar as the minorities are concerned, we have made steps forward. The activity carried out by the Council for Ethnic Minorities in close cooperation with ethnic minority groups proves this. We have to cooperate. If one side pulls to the right and the other to the left, there is no possibility of moving forward. I think that the visit by the rapporteurs of the Council of Europe augurs well for Romania and we are not at all scared of them. Certainly, we will not be able to say that we have done what we have not yet done. What is important, however, is not to involve politics in minority problems. And there is another thing that should not be forgotten: The problem of minorities does not exist only in Romania; it is a European problem. It would be good if we were the first to solve it, but we cannot make any pledges in this respect.

## Hungary's Entz Emphasizes 'Official' Visit

*AU3103165894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] The executive leadership of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] met with Geza Entz, secretary of state in the Hungarian Government and head of the Office for Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders, at the UDMR headquarters in Cluj-Napoca this morning. From the statements made by UDMR Executive President Csaba Takacs at the subsequent news conference, our correspondent Teodor Mateescu notes that the sides emphasized their similar viewpoints on the existence and activity of Hungarian institutions and organizations beyond Hungarian borders, aimed at preserving and asserting the Hungarian identity in the national areas where Hungarians are in a minority. The UDMR expressed thanks for the support of both the Hungarian Government and Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, on whose behalf Entz made this visit to Romania, with stopovers in Timisoara, Alba Iulia, Targu Mures, and Cluj-Napoca, to hand over important distinctions of the Hungarian Republic to prominent members of the Hungarian ethnic group.

In his speech and answers to journalists' questions, Entz pointed out that his presence in Romania these days also had an official character, given the invitation he received from the UDMR. He added that the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed of the visit through current diplomatic channels. Entz said, among other things, that the Hungarian minority in Romania has solidly structured organizations and institutions which are capable of defending the interests of the community they are representing.

## Timofte, Roman View Intelligence Unit's Work

*AU3103195694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] An analysis of the activity carried out in 1993 by the Intelligence Protection Service-Military Unit [UM] 0215 of the Interior Ministry took place today in the presence of Senator Radu Alexandru Timofte and Deputy Petre Roman, presidents of the Commissions for Defense, Public Order, and National Security of the Romanian Parliament. On behalf of the ministry's leadership, the meeting was attended by Interior Minister Doru Ioan Taracila and Lieutenant General George Ioan Danescu, secretary of state and first deputy interior minister.

The report presented by Unit Commander Major General Dan Gheorghe and speeches made by subordinate cadres emphasized that the concerns and efforts of the unit were directed toward ensuring the intelligence protection of the cadres, units, and missions of the Interior Ministry and preventing and uncovering violations—particularly in the spheres of economy, organized crime, and violent acts—as well as other deeds affecting law and order and national security. The speakers pointed out

that, in actions taken to fulfill its tasks and missions, the unit did not exceed its prerogatives and did not infringe upon citizens' basic rights and freedoms.

In his speech, Senator Radu Alexandru Timofte first said that the activity of the unit is being carried out legally and that, contrary to some ill-intentioned allegations, the Intelligence Protection Service of the Interior Ministry has well-defined duties that do not overlap those of other intelligence structures of the state. In another point, the speaker criticized the damaging and even inadmissible behavior of certain employees of the unit, who, for dubious reasons, are passing on secret data and information to the press, something that harms both the efficiency of the unit and its actual image.

In his turn, Deputy Petre Roman expressed the conviction that the allegations that UM 0215 was involved in political activities are not true. Actually, he said, the unit is carrying out its activity within the limits of legal provisions.

The presidents of the two commissions expressed the backing, understanding, and support of their commissions in solving the problems faced by this unit, including legislative and logistical assistance.

In conclusion, Interior Minister Doru Ioan Taracila praised the seriousness of the inquiry he attended and the professionalism of the members of the Intelligence Protection Service. He emphasized that the activity of the aforementioned unit, as well as that of the entire ministry, will continue to be carried out in accordance with the law, as in the past—a communique released by the press service of the Ministry of Interior reads.

## Editorial Views Ties With Russia, West

*AU3003141794 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 26-27 Mar 94 p 1*

[Alexandra Andon editorial: "The 15th Military Accord"]

[Text] When General Grachev's visit to Bucharest and implicitly the signing of the military cooperation accord between Romania and Russia were postponed last December, there was a strong public reaction. According to the schedule, the Russian minister's appearance in Bucharest was to take place a week after the parliamentary elections in Russia, the moment when the "Zhirinovskiy reality and diversion" were consecrated. Ilie Ilascu's sentence was causing maximum tension in Bucharest. Under those circumstances, the Russian Embassy's reaction, coupled with the two unambiguous factors of political reality, was causing a just perceptible fear. General Pavel Grachev's visit and the signing of the accord already ran the risk of being interpreted as a gesture of succumbing to pressure. Two or three weeks later, with the impending visit of the U.S. President to Europe (Partnership for Peace, Moscow, and so forth), these fears were similarly intense, but had changed in content. The question asked was: Why is Grachev not coming, do the Russians not want to discuss things with us?

Both the attention paid to the planned event and the radical change in the form of concern reflected a simple truth: Russia is the great power next to us that cannot be ignored or provoked.

After 14 military cooperation accords concluded in the wake of 1989 between the Romanian Ministry of National Defense and the defense ministries in Western or neighboring countries, the 15th accord with Russia, which will be signed at the beginning of next week, has been interpreted in numerous ways.

In fact, these documents resemble one another. As for differences, they lie in the form of military cooperation. Concluding the accord with Germany, the Romanian side was interested, for instance, in sending its officers for training by its partner. Ukraine (the last country with which such an accord was signed) is interested in having its naval officers trained in Romania. As for cooperation with Russia, we cannot ignore the fact that a major part of the Romanian Army's equipment, especially aviation, is of (ex)-Soviet origin.

The political will and the substance of the security policy, which have brought about the conclusion of a number of such accords, are, however, alike. The strategy is to try to repeat Titulescu's [inter-war Romanian foreign minister] strategy immediately after World War I when he initiated a basic bilateral accord with the Soviet Union. The fate of a small country affected by the turbulent currents in the Balkans did not permit at that time, as indeed now, a strategy different from that of moving closer and strengthening, in every way, relations with the West, while maintaining amicable relations with Moscow.

For the time being, however, the balance between the two great requirements is being achieved in a dynamic way by constantly adjusting to changes in the domestic and foreign political arena. The mechanism is moving, advancing along a road that, unfortunately, does not resemble a fast train track, but rather our homeland's roads. Guidance requires ability and it also requires the fulfillment of all the European commitments assumed so far, be they in the area of arms reduction or within the Partnership for Peace. To deny one component would be dangerous because it could compromise the entire thing.

### UN Warns of New Wave of Ethnic Cleansing

*AU0104133694 Paris AFP in English 1312 GMT 1 Apr 94*

[Article by Victoria Stegic]

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, April 1 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs shelled the beleagured enclave of Gorazde again Friday [1 April] in one of several Serb attacks on Moslem pockets amid growing evidence of a new wave of ethnic cleansing, UN officials said.

Rob Annink, spokesman for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said the situation in Goradze in eastern Bosnia remained tense, hours after Bosnian sources said the death toll from bombardments Wednesday and Thursday had reached at least 30, with around 100 wounded.

Major Annink said UN observers counted 21 shells early Friday falling on the enclave, only hours after the Bosnian government urged the UN to protect Gorazde in line with the enclave's status as one of six UN-designated "safe havens." [passage omitted]

Meanwhile a spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expressed alarm over the safety of Moslems in the northern Banja Luka region. Spokesman Kris Janovski said at least seven civilians had been killed there in recent days, apparently in revenge attacks sparked after the corpses of seven Serb policemen killed on the front lines were brought back to the town. He added that the UNHCR had only sketchy details of the deaths, which were reported by acquaintances of the victims and confirmed by Banja Luka's Moslem humanitarian association, Merhamet.

Janovski also cited evidence of a fresh wave of ethnic cleansing by Serbs in Sanski Most, 30 kilometres (18 miles) from Banja Luka. Under the pretext that Moslem houses are too large for their occupants, Serb police in the town are forcibly installing Serb families in their place, he said. The tactic has emerged amid an influx of Serb refugees into the Banja Luka region from north and central Bosnian frontline towns, notably Maglaj, Zepce and Zenica. Janovski said more than 850 Serbs had entered the region as refugees in the last three months.

On Thursday, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said he had proof that around 300 Moslems and between 150 and 200 Bosnian Croats were being forcibly expelled from Banja Luka every day. Izetbegovic charged that the UNHCR and UN peacekeepers were helping the evacuation of Moslems and Croats "instead of guaranteeing their security," and called on both communities not to "give way to terror" and to remain in their homes.

Meanwhile Annink said violent fighting had broken out in the northern Maglaj pocket, with infantry clashes and heavy Serb shelling Thursday near Tesanj, 10 kilometres (six miles) from the town. [passage omitted] Annink said 84 Serb shells landed on the pocket Thursday, while its Moslem defenders riposted with eight projectiles.

A British UN armed vehicle which skirted frontlines after a navigation error came under fire from Serb artillery but was not hit, the spokesman said. A total of 13 Serb shells also fell on Zenica, Travnik and Turbe, central Bosnia, Thursday. Annink added that a Bosnian army liaison officer was hit by Croat sniper fire in the southern city of Mostar, in violation of peace accords sealed Wednesday with the creation of the Moslem-Bosnian Croat federation in Bosnia.

UNPROFOR also reported serious violations of the Sarajevo ceasefire Thursday, during which one government soldier was wounded.

Separately, Annink said that the UN's new civil administrator for the Bosnian capital, US diplomat William Eagleton, was due to arrive in the city late Monday. Appointed under UN Security Council resolutions adopted last month, Eagleton's brief is to oversee the rebirth of Sarajevo's shattered public services.

### Izetbegovic Says UN Aiding Ethnic Cleansing

*AU3103185794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] Prompted by the latest wave of ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka and the surrounding villages under Serbian occupation, President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Alija Izetbegovic has written separate letters to the UN Security Council, UN Secretary General's special envoy Yasushi Akashi, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata, and President of the International Red Cross Antonio Samaruga.

There is concrete evidence that every day, Karadzic's fascists are expelling some 300 Bosniaks and 150 to 200 Croats from Banja Luka. The exiles are first stripped of all their property, including their savings and personal jewelry. President Izetbegovic draws attention to the fact that the UN Protection Forces, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Red Cross are providing the one-way transportation, and warns that their duty is actually exactly the opposite. They are supposed to guarantee all the people's survival in their home towns and on their ancestral hearths, stresses President Izetbegovic in letters addressed to the most prominent UN officials and the International Red Cross.

### Cease-Fire Agreement Reached in Bihac Region

#### Zagreb Radio Report

*LD0104083194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0800 GMT 1 Apr 94*

[Text] According to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] reports, Bosnian Serb forces and Muslims in the Bihac region have reached a cease-fire agreement. The agreement must be signed by the highest authorities of the Muslim and Serb sides.

### Further on Cease-Fire

*AU0104084194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 1 Apr 94*

[Text] We have just received a report saying the following: An agreement has been reached between Karadzic's Serbs and Bosniaks on the cessation of fighting in the Bihac region, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] has reported. The agreement envisages the separation of forces, buffer zones, withdrawal of heavy weapons, the possibility of supervision by the UN forces, freedom of movement for international humanitarian organizations, and foundation of a joint commission.

### Gorazde 'Encircled' by 40 Serb Tanks

*AU3103153594*

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1300 GMT on 31 March carries in its regular 34-minute newscast several reports updating the fighting in the republic.

Gorazde correspondent Enes Musovic reports on the continued fighting in the region and says that "the fierce fighting, with periodic hand-to-hand fighting, has resulted in significant losses for the aggressor side. Nevertheless, the (?drugged) Chetniks are treading over the dead bodies of their criminal colleagues and are themselves being killed. Exceptionally fierce and frequent Chetnik infantry attacks are accompanied by fierce fire from all types of artillery weapons [words indistinct] in the region of (?Zigovi) and [name indistinct] is in flames. Everything here is in flames. The Chetniks have encircled Gorazde with 40 tanks. Despite heavy losses in manpower, the mercenaries of the so-called Srpska republic are relentlessly charging on. Some time after 1200 they crossed the bridge on the (?Praca) River in Ustipraca with the aim of infiltrating the region of Gojcevici and Surovi. They were resolutely challenged by Gorazde's defenders. The fighting is fierce, but we still have no information on the development of these extremely [word indistinct] events."

Smajl Terzic reports from Doboj on the situation in the 7th South Operative Group's theater of operations and says that "the situation in this theater is extremely serious today. The aggressor on three occasions attempted to [word indistinct] artillery, but [words indistinct]. In the course of the morning and the early afternoon, the aggressor has been regrouping his manpower and equipment, and has been relentlessly targeting civilian targets. Except for material damage, no casualties have been reported."

An unidentified correspondent from Kladanj reports that "[words indistinct] numerous weaponry of all calibers, 62-mm and 120-m mortars, 105-mm, 122-mm, and 152-mm howitzers, T-55 and T-84 tanks (?are being used to shell) both the center and the outskirts of the town, and the road communication Kladanj-Tuzla. This relentless shelling of the innocent civilian population has resulted in the serious wounding of 10 people. No one has been killed."

Olovo correspondent Amira Salihbasic reports that "the aggressor today continued shelling the free Olovo territory with long-range artillery. In the morning hours the enemy used PRAGA [self-propelled antiaircraft artillery] and mortars to shell our defenders' positions in the area of Bacici. The enemy also intensified his antiaircraft gunfire. The residential areas of the town were also shelled this morning, as were the residential areas along the Krivaja River."

The studio announcer reads a report from the 1st Corps Information Service and says that "the Chetniks today continued their usual small arms' provocations from their positions in Grbavica, Orlovac, Kromolj, and Sjenicka Kosa. Brekin Potok and the area around Vrbanj Most were targeted by various types of weaponry, while a rocket from a portable launcher landed on Slatina. Enemy snipers were active in several places, so it is necessary to exercise caution when moving around the city."

### Muslims Launch Offensive From 'Safe Area'

*LD3103184894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1700 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[By Nevenka Marcic]

[Text] Belgrade, March 31 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslems have launched a new offensive, "spring '94", from the Moslem enclave of Gorazde, one of the U.N.-protected "Safe Areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina which should have been demilitarized last spring, Bosnian Serb military sources said on Thursday.

According to the same sources, around 10,000 Moslem fanatics are engaged in the five-pronged offensive launched on Tuesday in the directions of Cajnice, Rudo and Visegrad, the Bosnian Serb towns on the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and of Grebak and Trnovo, stops on route to Mt. Igman overlooking Sarajevo.

The offensive's objective is for the Bosnian Moslems to link up with the Moslems in the Raska (Sandzak) region in the [word indistinct] and have the war spread to Yugoslavia, i.e. its republics of Serbia and Montenegro, and to link up the Gorazde troops with those on Mt. Igman and in Zepa and Srebrenica, also "Safe Areas" in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to information available to the Bosnian Serb army.

Bosnian Serb military sources set out that, since Bosnian Serb troops are deployed around Gorazde, the town could have been supplied with arms and ammunition only by NATO aircraft as part of the U.S. operation of air dropping relief aid to Bosnian Moslems.

The city of Sarajevo and the Moslem enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla, and Bihac were proclaimed U.N.-protected "Safe Areas" under U.N. Security Council Resolution 824 in May 1993.

The resolution called for the U.N. peacekeepers to demilitarize the "Safe Areas." However, not only have the U.N. troops failed to act accordingly but they have even failed to take any steps to prevent Moslems from using "Safe Areas" for military purposes.

U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, himself, said in a report to the Security Council in mid-March that Moslems were using "Safe Areas" to train, equip and give a rest to their troops, and to open fire at Serb positions in the hope of provoking Serb retaliation.

The U.N. secretary-general urged that the concept of the U.N. protected "Safe Areas," in which he said crime and prostitution were rampant, be redefined so that "Safe Areas" could not be used by Moslems to gain "tactical military advantage."

However, the U.N. Security Council has failed to take a stand on the Butrus-Ghali request, just as it has failed to act in the case of similar reports and warnings from the Bosnian Serbs.

The Bosnian Serb leadership has many times drawn attention to the fact that Moslem military provocations, in particular from Srebrenica and Gorazde, are aimed at forcing Serbs to launch military operations against U.N.-protected "Safe Areas" and, thereby, securing a foreign military intervention.

The warnings from the Bosnian Serbs did not reach the Western public because Western media have been waging a pro-Moslem i.e. anti-Serb propaganda campaign since the outbreak of the war two years ago.

Therefore, it would not be surprising at all if the latest Moslem offensive, launched from the U.N.-protected "Safe Area" of Gorazde, was to be disregarded and the Serbs were instead to be accused of attacking the town.

### UNPROFOR Rejects Claim of Offensive

*AU3103145994 Paris AFP in English 1448 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] Zagreb, March 31 (AFP)—The UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in Bosnia-Herzegovina has detected no signs of a forthcoming "spring offensive" either by separatist Serbs or the Bosnian army, despite continuing Serb bombardments on enclaves in the east of the republic, an official said Thursday [31 March].

Responding to repeated Serb charges that the Bosnian army was preparing a spring offensive, UNPROFOR deputy commander General John MacInnis said he had "no indications" of such a campaign.

"There are various military activities going on, but we don't see it yet as a concerted large scale effort," the Canadian general said.

In Sarajevo earlier UN officials warned of a "difficult situation" in the Moslem-held enclave of Gorazde in eastern Bosnia, where Sarajevo radio said separatist Serbs were continuing a fierce bombardment begun earlier this week.

The offensive against the enclave, launched earlier this week, was "the most violent ever launched against the town," the radio said.

A spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Kris Janowski, said airdrops of humanitarian aid would become necessary if the fighting continued over the next two days.

UN Protection Force spokesman Major Rob Annink said the situation at Gorazde was "tense" following an all-day bombardment of the town. Zepa, further north, had also come under Serb bombardment on Wednesday, with three people seriously wounded, he added.

Janowski said that five people, including an 11-year-old girl, had died, with 21 other people wounded, in Wednesday's bombardment of Gorazde. Sarajevo radio put the figure at 15 dead and 40 wounded.

Annick said the situation was "tense" around the northern pocket of Maglaj, where Sarajevo Radio said the Bosnian army seized several strategic villages and hillsides Wednesday. The radio also claimed military successes by the Bosnian army on the Brcko front, in the north, saying it had forced back Serb forces by 500 metres (yards).

On the Gorazde shelling, MacInnis acknowledged that there were "widespread shellings throughout Bosnia, but at a very low level, and they do not appear to be coordinated."

UNPROFOR was "not convinced as yet that there is a concerted spring offensive, nor a concerted widely coordinated reaction. But it is something of course that we have to be watching very carefully," he said.

In London the Foreign Office said Britain would open an embassy in Sarajevo next month to mark "the progressive return to normal life." London established diplomatic ties with Sarajevo in April 1992 soon after its independence was recognised, but did not open a mission there. A US embassy in Sarajevo was inaugurated Wednesday.

Also in London, the environmental protection group Greenpeace warned of the danger to civilian life in former Yugoslavia created by the more than two million land-mines that still littered the territory fought over by the various combatants.

"Landmines and unexploded munitions set by all factions will endanger civilians and children returning to their destroyed homes for years to come," the organisation said in a statement.

Greenpeace, which recently sent a delegation to the former Yugoslavia, deplored the lack of resources allocated to mine clearance.

### Komsic Rules Out Confederation With Serbia

*AU3103170294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Excerpts] We dedicate the following minutes of the broadcast to yesterday's [30 March] session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constituent Assembly. Ivo Komsic, president, and Luka Markesic, Petar (?Josolic), and Ivan Lovrenovic, all members of the Croatian National Council, today held a press conference at which they stated their position regarding the role of this body in implementing the provisions of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina adopted yesterday. Mladen Bosnjak has the details.

[Begin recording] [Bosnjak] Ivo Komsic, president of the Croatian National Council, assessed the session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly—which ended yesterday—as being a historic turning point for many reasons, and not only for our state, but also for the Republic of Croatia. He assessed that the newly adopted Constitution was proof of Bosnia-Herzegovina's strength. The historic quality of the Constitution is evident in the fact that its contents evolved from the utmost suffering of our state and its citizens. Establishing the place and role of the Croatian National Council, Ivo Komsic said that the Congress of Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats had defined a project around which it was possible to achieve complete accord, and added:

[Komsic] Now that we have a Constitution, it is the Croatian National Council's duty to invest all its strength and potential into implementing this Constitution, to do [words indistinct], and to fulfill its duty to the utmost, a duty for which this body was formed in the first place. We shall, of course, support this and do everything that will be required of us in the course of implementing this Constitution—both in the political sense and on the ground, where very concrete tasks will have to carried out ....

[Bosnjak] For Luka Markesic, Franciscan friar and believer, the most important thing now was to restore the love and the strength of spirit in the people, victims of war, so that they can in peace bear and overcome their hatred and thoughts of revenge. Petar (?Josolic) stressed that one of the roles of the Croatian National Council would be [words indistinct] when the Croats from Vares and the Muslims from Capljina return to their homes—they and all the others. [passage omitted]

[Bosnjak] After the introductory greetings—of which you have heard the most significant details—correspondents' asked two questions. Ivo Komsic answered both. First, about the candidates for the highest offices in the Federation.

[Komsic] Between now and the next Assembly session, we shall be coordinating our positions regarding [changes thought] and we shall try to reach a consensus on this in the Croatian deputy caucus—which is now being formed from the rest of the caucuses that are already in the parliament—just as we reached a consensus in political negotiations regarding this project.

[Bosnjak] The other question pertained to the Croatian National Council's position toward the possibility of a confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia, after the possible participation of the Bosnian Serbs in the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina. Ivan Lovrenovic stressed that there were no definite answers to this. Mr. Komsic stressed that the Croatian National Council cannot support the possibility of any kind of confederal arrangement between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.

[Komsic] [Words indistinct] of confederal relations with Croatia, why then should we not have a confederal relationship with Serbia? The reason for not doing so is very simple; Serbia has carried out aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina with the help of the Serbian Democratic Party, which formed a para-state here. There can be no political or moral justification for such an act, and the world cannot support it. The aggressor must be punished in some way. [end recording]

### HVO Closes Zepce Concentration Camp

*AU0104105394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 1 Apr 94*

[Text] The signing of the agreement and the promulgation of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are already yielding good results in the Zepce Commune. After the cooperation in the field between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] was established and (?two-day) mutual visits of civilian population made possible, the HVO concentration camp in Zepce was closed yesterday. Under the auspices of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] Sector Command in the region, the HVO Command released all the remaining prisoners, members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who then freely decided to travel to free territories or to remain in Zepce with their families.

### Commentary Condemns Turkish Involvement

*AU0104124194 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Mar 94 p 2*

[Commentary by Zorana Suvakovic: "Fable and Bosnia"]

[Text] General [Bertrand] de Lapresle was quite bewildered and surprised when questions started showering upon him in the International Press Center in Belgrade about the Turkish return to the Balkans.

It is a credit to the French general that, in less than a week since he took up the command over UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], he came to visit Belgrade, minding the praiseworthy international procedures. As he nicely put it, he is a general assigned to deal with partners, rather than with enemies, a general who does not aspire to accomplish a personal victory, but rather to give support to his partners so they can find a peace settlement. Hardly any of the former UNPROFOR commanders has ever given such a precise definition of the essence and role of UN peace missions.

**Fatal Mistake**

No sooner did UNPROFOR start to recover, under the political leadership of the wise Akashi, who has a refined sense for most diverse currents, winds, changes of moon, high-tides, and low-tides in the Balkans, when the decision came from New York that Turkish blue helmets are to be sent to Bosnia. That is certainly not the first time that the international organization and community has complicated the already complicated-enough Balkan situation, and make the goal of its own mission even more difficult to achieve. That many of the 54 UN Security Council resolutions are absolutely unfeasible on the ground was stressed, more or less openly, by all the former military and political officials of the UN mission in Bosnia, because of which many of them consciously put an end to their careers. The mistakes made by the international community were subsequently assessed by many former foreign ministers, UN officials, and co-chairmen of the conferences on former Yugoslavia. The deployment of Turkish troops in the Balkans is one of those moves that confirm the theory about the intentions of making the conflict even more complicated at the moment when certain signs of its forthcoming conclusion have appeared.

There are many reasons for believing that the deployment of Turkish UN troops in Bosnia is a great mistake.

Five centuries of Turkish government left many traces all over the Balkans, and many people believe they are an indirect cause of the ongoing conflict. It seems that since the disintegration in former Yugoslavia began, the Balkan countries encumbered with a Turkish heritage have never been so unanimous as they are now, that the arrival of Turkish troops might cause the blaze of the conflict to spread to the entire region. The reactions of Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] have been almost identically severe, calling this decision a complete nonsense, a fatal mistake, and even the surrender of the United Nations to Turkish strategy.

How undoable is the knot intertwining history and the present could best be seen in Athens, where the news from New York came in on a Greek national holiday. The celebration of the historic date of the Greek uprising against the Turkish dictatorship, and the decision that was made in New York on the Turkish reappearance in the Balkans, are a clear illustration of the two opposite ways of reasoning, two ways of thinking.

It is not clear why the United Nations has given up the principle that it itself established as a basic guideline for its peace missions throughout the world. Notwithstanding the explanation that the Turkish troops will be wearing blue berets, by which the latest decision is being justified, the decision still violates the UN rule prescribing that the troops of neighboring countries, or countries that are historically discredited in a conflicting region are not to be sent for peace missions.

**It Will Be Difficult to Close the Door**

The participation of Russian troops in the UN peace mission is hardly comparable with the participation of Turkish troops. Russia, since recently called by the international news agencies "the traditional orthodox ally of Serbia and Greece," is neither a neighboring country, nor discredited in the Balkans as an occupying force. For that reason the Russian battalion has been participating in UNPROFOR from the very beginning, while their presence in the UN Protected Areas [UNPA's] has never elicited any protests or criticisms on the part of the international public.

Once the door is opened, it will be difficult to close it for other questionable guests: Italians, Austrians, Germans, Hungarians... and to keep them away from the yard where the historic curse allows too little tolerance, even for its inhabitants.

It is now difficult to guess why and how Akashi and Butrus Butrus-Ghali have given up the prescribed rules. The insufficient number of peacekeeping troops for the hazardous operation in Bosnia is stated as one of the most decisive reasons. Why was then the good idea of deploying the Turkish troops in some other, more distant sites of UN operations, thereby leaving space for the deployment of some more neutral troops, abandoned so easily? What is the reason for stepping back on the path that leads to a dead end precisely at the moment when, for the first time, the international factors have discerned some light at the end of the tunnel?

Encouraged by the favorable winds blowing from the East River, the Turkish Government has offered three times as much troops. Most probably, the number of troops will amount to 2,700, in contrast to the initially endorsed 1,000 troops. Ankara will spare neither men, nor means to reappear in the Balkans in as impressive numbers as possible.

Does not the fact that all other nations are quite reluctant to commit their troops to the Bosnian adventure, while Turkey is so eager to take the risk, provoke suspicion and doubts? It does, and even the most extreme suspicions, such as that expressed by a Greek minister, who compared the deployment of Turkish peace keeping troops with a wolf used for guarding sheep. All in vain, since nobody is paying attention to the

morals of so many Bosnian fables, stories, poems, proverbs, and above all riddles dating back from Turkish times.

## Saudi Arabia, Iran Financing Muslim Army

*94BA0229B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Mar 94 pp 9-11*

[Article by Renato Cemerika and Vito Bulica: "The Muslims Have Secretly Built a Navy"]

[Text] When the war began in Bosnia and Herzegovina two years ago, the Muslim army was practically nonexistent. There were units of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], a bit of territorial defense [TO], and armed groups of Muslim youths with differing views of the political and military objectives of the fight, and most of the talk was about the Patriotic League. That is why the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] played the decisive role in defending a large portion of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time. The Muslim units became stronger, underwent transformation, and ultimately the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed by unifying all the available potential. Today that army even has trained military cadres, mainly former officers of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], some of whom took part in the war in 1991 against the Republic of Croatia, but left the JNA after the war began in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

No one has as yet given a complete answer to the question of how and where the Muslim leadership has been getting arms and equipment for its army. Official sources speak about "materiel" found in the MUP, booty captured from the enemy is mentioned as an additional source along with its own production in plants of the "special-purpose industry," which are located on territory under control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and occasional purchases are mentioned incidentally. Although no one wants to say anything about the ways in which those occasional purchases are advanced into Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is evident that military equipment is being acquired on the world black market and delivered to Bosnia and Herzegovina in spite of the embargo on the importing of arms. Eyewitnesses, including, for example, a journalist of the German television station ZDF, say that they have seen in Sarajevo ammunition made in Iran; at one time there was quite a bit of noise over the origin of a missile which destroyed an armored vehicle of the HVO in Gornji Vakuf; and even the fact that arms and ammunition are being produced in Bosnia and Herzegovina indicates that there are certain supply channels, because the territory under control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have everything necessary for independent production.

### The Fight for Influence

Although arms and equipment of Western origin in the possession of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be logically explained only by delivery in humanitarian convoys and aircraft for delivery of aid to the surrounded Muslim enclaves, it is not possible to provide a solid confirmation even of that explanation. However, throughout the entire story of delivery of arms to Bosnia and Herzegovina this is not the only unknown, nor probably is it even the most interesting one: It is not more interesting than the one about who "is covering" the costs of the purchase and shipment. One can get a suggestion of the answer from the fact that the Islamic countries, even in an assessment of Alija Izetbegovic, are not setting aside sufficient funds to care for casualties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is, it is hard to believe that the oil-rich Islamic countries, especially those in which Islamic (fundamentalist) regimes are in power, are forgetting Muslims in any part of the globe, especially if they are in a situation which could deteriorate into their complete destruction, but at the same time could also result in the creation of another country with an Islamic regime.

Reliable reports indicate that one should go beyond logical judgment. According to those reports, the Islamic countries, above all Iran and Saudi Arabia, are investing large sums to equip the Muslim army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The visit of every political, military, and humanitarian official from the Islamic countries presupposes an abundant cash donation, and all that money is flowing into accounts which are mostly under the control of Haris Silajdzic, prime minister, and Bakir Alispahic, minister of internal affairs. There is indeed even a certain rivalry taking place between Saudi Arabia and Iran, because each of these two states wants to achieve maximum influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and today this is possible exclusively by offering all possible support to the Muslim army.

### Boats for Fast Missions

The most recent form of rivalry evident between the two countries when it comes to expanding influence on the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the orders of ships for the future Muslim navy and the training of Muslim naval officers. That branch of the surrounded force, in the opinion of the command of the Muslim army, is essential to the survival of the Muslim people. "Unless we have a sea and a navy, Yugoslavia and Croatia will smother us, because those two states have a navy which should be taken into account," says one of the high Muslim officers. Iran has ordered 17 vessels for a future Muslim navy in Scandinavian shipyards. Six rubber boats, each of which carries 25 men fully armed, have been ordered; they are part of the combat equipment intended for the coast guard. These personnel are not part of the boat's crew, but that is the number of marines the vessel carries to the intervention point. There are also orders for six assault landing boats that will be built of light metal. These boats are today being built either of light metal or plastic reinforced with fiberglass, and they are designed for anticommando activities and rapid missions on the open sea. The future Muslim navy is also to get four coastal rescue boats used

in navies to provide assistance in towing larger vessels, in transport, and in aiding landing vessels in their withdrawal after performance of their mission. The 17th vessel is a salvage vessel, a vessel intended above all for carrying arms and ammunition, but it is also equipped to rescue damaged vessels and to raise vessels which have sunk.

**Where To Find Sailors**

Since naval officers in the former Yugoslav navy were largely from the Croatian coast, in spite of the carefully conducted personnel policy, the numerous defections of trained personnel from the JNA to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not provided the Muslim army with a particularly large number of men trained for active service in the navy. So that the vessels ordered, some of which have already done their shakedown cruise, would not be without crews, the Islamic Republic of Iran has decided to accept about 200 Muslims for training as future naval officers. That entire program was annoying to Saudi Arabia, and so that country, in an effort to reduce or completely eliminate Iranian (Shiite) influence on the Bosnian Muslims, ordered four vessels which informed sources say are the most up-to-date in the world.

The number of future naval officers and also the number of naval vessels ordered are only the beginning of activities to organize a Muslim navy, although we can still not say in what port it would tie up. At a time when he was still powerful, Sefer Halilovic publicly announced his intention to enter Ploce with Muslim units and plant his flag there. Muslim politicians one after the other, in much more refined style, of course, began long ago to talk about the necessity of access to the sea for the Muslim national territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian and Muslim negotiators have spent many hours on this problem in negotiations for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but a Muslim navy probably never even occurred to an objective observer. In certain Muslim circles who consider the present state of affairs to be a national rebirth for the Bosnian Muslims and who believe that this is the right moment for a permanent solution of the problem of a state for the Bosnian Muslims, there is constant mention of the idea of a Muslim sea from the Neretva to Bar, which means that there would be an abundance of suitable locations for a naval port.

**A Navy Without a Port**

Semso Tankovic said on a recent television program: "The Bosnian Muslims will have a navy, that is quite certain." Even he did not say in what port it would tie up. The existence of "naval" plans is not denied even by Alija Izetbegovic, but he, taking advantage of the results of the most recent Croat-Muslim negotiations, talks about a joint federal navy. Because an agreement about the armed forces of the future federation and confederation still has not been spelled out precisely, one can only guess about the federal navy. The question, that is, is whether there will be such a navy at all. Corps General Anton Tus said in a recent interview: "From the operational standpoint, preparation of the armed forces and the conduct of defensive warfare will require coordination of certain wartime units of the two states and a joint command in the use of those forces. I am referring to ground forces, air force and air defense, while defense on the sea is in the jurisdiction of Croatia."

The beginning of the Muslim navy was ordered when there was not even any mention of a U.S. peace initiative, so it is possible that even the top Muslim political leadership itself does not know what it will do with it if the negotiations about federation and confederation are taken all the way to a successful conclusion. But the question of the port where they plan to tie up their navy still remains open. If it is Neum or even Ploce, then there is no point in building the navy, not because ecological balance would be destroyed by building a port at Neum, but because that port would not have an outlet to the open sea. A Muslim navy stationed in it would be imprisoned in an area of less than 100 square kilometers.

## Conflict in UNPA Zones Viewed

*94BA0229A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Mar 94 pp 18-19*

[Article by Milan Jelovac: "Martic's Last Card"]

[Text] Are the rebellious Serbs in Croatia now using their most recent tactics? Do the more frequent breaches on the lines of contact come from uncontrolled groups, or are new hotbeds of conflict being generated systematically? Is the focus of the crisis being shifted as a part of that Serbian plan, so that one day there is a crisis in the eastern, the next in the western, and the day after that in the southern sector of the UNPA [UN Protected Area]?

Does that mean that the recent more frequent military breaches and fierce skirmishes in Lika, for example, were incited by those in Knin who are carrying out the policy of the Belgrade strategists on behalf of priority political considerations and to give a signal to the international community, to the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], and to the United States, which has finally become more actively involved in resolving the drama of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia?

There is no doubt that the answers are affirmative to this entire string of questions. Knin, which has been very much shaken politically, is today stopping at nothing in its attempts to prove that world guarantees concerning reintegration of the UNPA into the constitutional system of Croatia "are not realistic," which is evidenced, according to them, by the frequent firefights with the Croatian Army [HV] in the border areas of the UNPA. The resoluteness of Milan Martic, newly elected president of the self-proclaimed "krajina," in proving that "life is no longer possible with the Croats in a joint state," is confirmed by the constant production of breaches. Many analysts do not even preclude the possibility that in a subsequent development of the situation

unfavorable for Martic the krajina Serbs will encourage a general conflict with the Croatian Army, which the international community would have to stop because of the firepower on both sides, the devastation and numerous casualties, and according to the formula of the Vance Plan, the status quo would be cemented in place, which would postpone integration of the UNPA. Such a possibility would be the last step for the Serbian side in maintaining the status quo, and thereby its authority in the UNPA.

**War Hysteria**

Why are the rural Serbs in Croatia deciding on such radical changes at a time when the Serbian policy of normalization of relations with Croatia has been officially proclaimed? For several reasons. First of all, because of the U.S. initiative and normalization of relations between Croats and Muslims and because of the future federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. That is, it is well-known that if Croatia accepts confederation with the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it also gets firm guarantees of recovery of its occupied areas. This is certainly not at all to the liking of the krajina Serbs, who are already announcing that the "krajina" will be annexed to the Srpska republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thereafter also to parent Serbia, if the Croats and Muslims agree on confederation.

As a matter of fact, the merger of the rebellious Croatian Serbs with their Bosnian fellow countrymen is for them only a matter of protocol in view of the high level of linkage there has been up to now with the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. As a matter of fact, for a long time now the self-proclaimed "krajina" has been in a military, monetary, news, intelligence, and administrative alliance with the Srpska republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina and with Serbia. To illustrate, let us mention only the appearance of the newly printed identity card that is in effect at the moment in Knin. Beneath the title which reads "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" it says "Serbian republic Krajina," and after that "Knin Ministry of Internal Affairs."

That inclusion of the self-proclaimed Serbian state in Croatia to that of the Bosnian Serbs is actually the last card which Martic and company can play. With the possible military support of the Bosnian Serbs, their position would be considerably strengthened, and that would certainly cancel a possible Croatian (Muslim) military solution and contribute to an extension of the status quo. Keeping the people in a state of war hysteria, that tried-and-true tactic of the Knin leaders, is counterproductive in the long run, and its first adverse consequences are already obvious—large-scale abandonment of the area of the "krajina" and departure for Serbia. Martic is, of course, aware of that, but so is Belgrade, and so the option of "linking up all the Serbian lands" is new spiritual food for the impoverished Serbian population.

**An End to All the Games**

There have been many breaches in the less than two months of Martic's "presidency," and they have been exceedingly unfavorable for him. The crisis over the Sava bridge between Stara Gradiska and Bosanska Gradiska, first the Serbian taking of the bridge, the possibility of a conflict with the UNPROFOR, and then the withdrawal, which the media moderated by speaking of "joint control," or again the NATO ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, sent a clear message to Martic that there are to be no more games with the international forces.

The downing of the Udbina Hawks belonging to the "1st Squadron of the Air Force of the Army of the Serbian republic Krajina" in the sky over Novi Travnik and Bosanski Petrovac was a new slap in the face to the "sheriff of Knin," who has been unsuccessfully concealing the redness of his cheek from his own media public. From the public which so far has never been officially informed that the downed planes were those which in the past months have been rending the sky with low-altitude passes over Knin, presumably demonstrating both to the people of Knin and also to the UNPROFOR, the strength and spirit of the "krajina army." An army from whose command its chief until yesterday, General Mile Novakovic, has literally been removed. And Major General Milan Celeketic, born in Vojvodina, has been appointed to take his place; whether with the blessing or by the order of Belgrade it makes no difference at all! Alongside the dismissals from the top military leadership, Martic has also been punishing every form of liberalism concerning relations with the legal Croatian authorities. That is best confirmed by the case of Dzakula and Ecimovic.

Martic is bringing up new units to the lines of demarcation with the Croatian Army to replace the old ones. Units from the eastern sector are coming to the southern sector, the command personnel are being replaced with those from Bosnia or even Serbia. The military negotiators are not being given any broad authority, and Martic is applying Milosevic's tried-and-true tactics of increasing the size of police forces on which one can count, because he is aware that slightly less than half of the electorate voted against him. That is why the war hysteria is being maintained with new breaches, and he has been successfully gagging his opponents.

**The Media Offensive**

New (old) crisis points are dots being added every little while on the map of Croatia. The hospital in Vinkovci is being hit from Ceric, just recently renamed Srbac, a place not far from Vinkovci. The extensive area of Perusic, Gospic, Licki Osik, and Otocac is being shelled from the area of Lika under Serbian control. Although we do not have official confirmation of possible skirmishes in the Lika part of the theater (the HV, the UNPROFOR, for example), the krajina media offensive, which has been talking about violent skirmishes between

the HV and Serbian forces "west of Korenica," is indicative. Referring to Kozjan as a battlefield where fierce skirmishes took place over several days, the Serbian side obviously wants internationalization of this report, which for the present has not been verified.

Knin "state television" has even published a report, which could not be verified, that Croatian forces held Novi Licki Osik (renamed Teslingrad) for three days, and then withdrew. Regardless of the authenticity of these reports, their purpose is to create an international public opinion that would oppose reintegration of the UNPA into the constitutional system of Croatia, and would portray Croatia as the attacker.

If we add to that the (Serbian) firing of light antiaircraft SAM missiles on the Spanish transport plane in the general area of Plaski (a city under Serbian control) and its forced landing at the airfield on Krk, and the Serbian accusation of the Croatian side for the attack on the aircraft, the contribution to the new Knin strategy for intensifying the crisis is quite convincing.

### A New Cooling of Relations

How will the new "krajina tactics" of a programmed escalation of the conflict affect Croato-Serbian relations? Certainly adversely, because the signing of the long-awaited complete truce seems further away than it did a month ago. As is already well-known, a cease-fire is a first step toward establishment of a political dialogue between Zagreb and Knin. But recent events have not only put symbolic distance between Zagreb and Knin, they have also postponed the entire process of normalization between Zagreb and Belgrade. The obvious halt in the process of warming relations between Croatia and the FRY is also indicated by the unfulfilled promises made during last month's visit by Zeljko Simic to Zagreb. It was agreed that offices in Belgrade and Zagreb would be opened by the end of February. So far, nothing has come of the announced reestablishment of telephone lines, and few people believe any longer in the opening of the limited-access highway, announced so optimistically for 15 March, when Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister, is supposed to visit Belgrade.

Thus, new barricades in Croato-Serbian relations have again been set up in Knin. And that, in the opinion of many, is the reaction of the Belgrade headquarters and its Knin branch office to the Washington ink with which the agreement between Croats and Muslims was signed. We soon will see what are the next moves envisaged by Slobodan Milosevic. Nevertheless, one thing is predictable. He certainly will not sacrifice his pawn, Martic, in the foreseeable future.

## UN To Redeploy Troops From Sarajevo to RSK

*AU3103192794 Paris AFP in English 1837 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] Zagreb, March 31 (AFP)—The United Nations Protection Force in Croatia needs 2,000 additional troops to enforce the ceasefire between Serb separatists and the Croatian army, deputy UNPROFOR commander General John MacInnis said Thursday [31 March].

The UN peacekeepers were "virtually prepared" to take up positions between the antagonists in line with the ceasefire accord signed here Wednesday which comes into effect at 0700 GMT next Monday, the Canadian general said.

Under the deal the two sides will withdraw their forces and heavy weapons along the confrontation line between the two forces: the Croatian army and Serb separatists who have proclaimed their own "Serb republic of Krajina" [RSK] on one third of Croatian territory. Mortars are to be withdrawn 10 kilometres (six miles) and artillery 20 kilometres (12 miles) from the confrontation lines by Monday at 0700 GMT, while the opposing forces are to move back one kilometre by next Friday at 0700 GMT, creating a two-kilometre buffer zone in which the UN forces will enforce the ceasefire. "We are a little short of resources, but our plans are taking this into account, we are aware of sensitive areas and we will concentrate our efforts on those sensitive areas," MacInnis said.

UNPROFOR will redeploy forces currently elsewhere, notably Belgian and Jordanian troops temporarily withdrawn from Croatia to implement the ceasefire in Sarajevo. The 400 Russian paratroopers sent to Sarajevo from Klisa in eastern Croatia "will remain in Bosnia." The additional resources needed in Croatia—where 15,000 peacekeepers are already deployed—amount to four mechanised infantry companies, a mechanised infantry battalion comprising 1,000 men, four engineering companies comprising 600 men and a squadron of six helicopters comprising 200 men, UNPROFOR spokesman Matthew Nerzig said.

"The first difficult task will be... transforming what was written on the map to precise locations on the ground, the establishment of our joint (Serb-Croatian) commissions which will have the task of confirming on the ground precisely where those lines of separation are to be... a difficult if not impossible task," MacInnis said. The commissions are also to determine the number of Serb and Croatian police who under the accord are to be deployed in limited numbers between the two "separation lines." "We will have to go over the area point by point, village by village, town by town in order to determine the police presence for those areas. It's going to be a lot of hard work," he said.

## Tudjman Address to Government Session

*LD3103185494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1013 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Address by President Franjo Tudjman to the 100th session of the Croatian Government in Zagreb—live]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen: Allow me to add to what I said in my introductory address and to what the prime minister has just said. When I paid tribute to the government and its head, Nikica Valentic, I had in mind its overall successes during—as Nikica said—the ongoing war situation. It is not just a war situation but also an exceptional period. We must bear in mind that all countries in the former socialist bloc are going through a deep crisis even without the war that we have had to endure. The collapse of the socialist system and artificial multinational states have caused a turmoil both of political, administrative, and economic nature. We must look at ourselves with pride when we say that not a single one of the countries that has not had to endure war has succeeded in the transitional period of setting up a free and democratic system, a free market, or in achieving better results than Croatia despite all our difficulties brought about by the war in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only the Czech Republic is slightly ahead of us. All others are far, far behind Croatia in all aspects, in the political and economic sphere.

In other words, these results have been achieved due to Croatia's policy as a whole and to its government and, as Prime Minister Valentic has just said, they provide us with the basis to remain consistent in pursuing our policy. Like me, you have probably heard more than one foreign diplomat or economic expert say that we have succeeded because we knew exactly what we wanted, because we had the leadership, because we had support for our policies in both the parliament and among the people. This experience speaks for itself.

Of course, the government and all of us were faced with enormous tasks in setting up new state administration, in getting rid of the old, communist, self-management system both from institutions and people's minds. This was not easy and the task is still there if we are to create an effective and efficient state administration. However, even under normal conditions, it would take years to complete such tasks. What this means is that despite our situation even in this sphere we have succeeded in achieving a great deal.

I must remind you that we had to set up an army, to arm this army despite the adverse international situation. We had to arm 200,000 men. You know what it means for such a small country as Croatia.

We had to create a new diplomatic service. We are still faced with the same task and this is a big problem in view of the lack of experience of personnel. In other words, we had to reorganize our state administration to get rid of the communes that we inherited, etc. So, what we have so far achieved in reorganizing and introducing the new

system of administrative divisions, i.e. municipalities, counties—this is yet to be completed—nevertheless our state administration is functioning; well, the prime minister cited as the most exemplary case the fact that our taxes, the amount collected in taxes, had doubled up compared to what it was a year ago. Despite all problems and difficulties our state administration is becoming increasingly effective and efficient.

Another task facing us is to set up the rule of law in all its aspects. However, the type of the rule of law we wanted was not possible with the country at war, with one third of the Croatian territory under occupation—later only one quarter remained under occupation after we liberated parts of the territory—with 300,000 refugees who brought to Croatia their pain and suffering and hatred of those who caused their pain and suffering, with the bombing of our towns, and for as long as Croatian people were killed and expelled even from the Croatian territories under UN protection, i.e. from the territories under Serb occupation. In such a situation, while there were still remnants of the Yugo-communist army on our territory—even today, the other day at a location the Ministry of Internal Affairs discovered dozens of kilograms of explosive that was to be used to destroy both the Croatian authorities and Croatian buildings, etc.—well, it is clear that under such circumstances, when the new Croatian state, new Croatian democratic authorities, and the Croatian people were faced with the need to fight for survival, that despite all our efforts to introduce the rule of law we could not achieve the results we could have done. But, even in this sphere we have, in fact, achieved considerable results.

One should have a look at what the situation is like in this respect in all these countries—in all other wars. I was the first to advocate the granting of civil and human rights to the Serbs in Croatia. I am still for it, and it is our duty. But some people keep forgetting that the Serb population was deceived and dragged into the war against the new Croatian authorities. Despite that we managed to maintain our attitude toward the Serbs in Croatia—we still had Serbs in the government, in the parliament, we had them in the supreme judicial bodies.

Should we recall that when America was at war with Japan all members of the Japanese people were put into camps and their property confiscated. These are simply certain patterns in war show-downs. What was England's behavior like in the Falklands and so on and so on. If we are not completely satisfied with the results that we achieved in the area of the law-governed state and democracy, and we are not completely satisfied, we can say likewise that in many respects we have done things beyond our expectations. We managed to streamline our state system into the direction of strengthening democracy, strengthening the law-governed state, and there is no reason not to face the truth and continue on this basis.

As regards other results, I think that it is clear that this government has achieved great results in the ownership transformation in a way that secured, even under war conditions, the continuation of economic trends and avoidance of poverty and privation. For objective reasons a drop in production was recorded, but it was not the same as in other former socialist countries where production and the living standard dropped far more than in Croatia.

Even though we have to speed up the problem of economic recovery, we can nevertheless be pleased particularly with what the government in cooperation with the National Bank has managed to do as regards the program of stabilization and in curbing inflation. This is a Croatian miracle—there are miracles in the political sphere and this is a miracle in the economic sphere—and the people abroad, including the most eminent experts, are surprised and admit... [pauses] and which also contributed to the fact that, alongside with the overall policy that we have pursued, because we coordinated our national state interests with the main European and world players, such a policy is a success for the government in the economic sphere, in the stabilization. This represents a recognition of this government led by Nikica Valentic and of the National Bank led by Pero Jurkovic. This trend should continue and we ought to have a new Croatian hard currency before our deadline, for which absolutely favorable conditions are being created in the changed international circumstances.

Please permit me to say this: It is not a mere phrase but is a historic truth that the international circumstances were not favorable for the creation of an independent and sovereign Croatian state. They wanted to preserve the former Yugoslavia for many reasons, or return us, and so on.

By the policy that we pursued, by our democratic order within the country, by our successes—about which I spoke earlier—and by our foreign policy we brought Croatia to such an international position that we now really have favorable conditions in every respect. Today we have the main world power, the United States, as our ally, as our partner. It is ready for cooperation in all areas. It is ready to lend us support for the resolution of our main problem—peaceful reintegration of Croatian areas under UN protection, i.e. under Serb occupation—into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia.

We have a friendship agreement with China, the country with the largest world population. We have good and friendly relations with the majority of European countries including the main ones. Pursuing our policy we established good relations with Islamic countries; we are on the road to establishing good relations with Israel. Therefore, Croatia's international position is such that it is almost impossible to imagine a better one.

But of course, we must not bring it into question with some stupidities of our own. But, if we were capable of creating Croatia, of bringing it up to here both in the internal and international spheres, then we have enough

experience, intelligence, knowledge, and strength to continue following the same course.

It is now up to you, the government, to be ready to take advantage of these favorable circumstances. Before we were blocked in the international arena, even though we were diplomatically recognized. We were blocked because the world players still procrastinated and did not know what to do with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and so on. When they saw for themselves, they opened up their doors to us and now it is up to us to offer concrete programs to certain countries—the USA, the EC and certain countries, to international financial institutions. In this respect I would ask the prime minister—and I believe that because the government has been ready and able to come to grips with this task so far—that we take advantage of this for our further economic recovery, for Croatia to become a country of prosperity in every respect.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is clear that the creation of the Croat-Bosnian federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the confederation of the federal Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia represents a new development for us, new obligations, new possibilities, but also challenges to which we have to be ready to respond.

The policy that we pursued brought about the federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which means that the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is really becoming an equal constituent nation in every respect, regardless of the fact that it is smaller in number.

As you saw at the constituent assembly, the Croatian banner was hoisted next to the Bosnian Muslim one. Therefore, this is only a formal way of looking at it.

Our people there must learn to take part in administering the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, even more so as it is in the interest of the world that the federal Bosnia-Herzegovina, through Croatia, be linked to Western democracy. Our government, for its part, has to be ready to take an effective part in the confederal relations so that effective economic, cultural, and other links with Croatia can be established. It is in the interest of the Croat people there, in the interest of the Bosnian people there, and in the strategic interest of the Croatian state.

This imposes obligations and challenges, but also creates favorable circumstances because such a federal Bosnia-Herzegovina will be granted credits and be favorably treated by a large number of Islamic countries that will be ready to offer aid both for the reconstruction and the future economic life of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is something that should be well thought about both by the complete government and by some of its departments. In a word, we must equip ourselves for such a task so that the federal relations there and our confederal relations are such as to be useful for the Croatian people, the Croatian state, and of course for the nations living in that federation there; to be in the interest of the political and economic stability; and be in our interest but also Europe and the Western world.

Gentlemen, all this indicates that we shall nevertheless manage to reintegrate these Croatian areas under UN protection, i.e. under Serb occupation, into our constitutional and legal order in a peaceful way. This is now a different situation.

The agreement that was signed does not provide for any demarcation of borders but only provides for the separation of armed formations in order to prevent conflicts—conflicts that have inflicted human losses on us. There have been situations whereby it was difficult to contain the anger of our people in those border areas and the anger of the armed formations of the Croatian Army. Some people lost their nerve and were taken in by provocations and by their actions sometimes did damage to the Croatian state policy. At the beginning of this month I had to adopt a decision on the replacement of a colonel who unnecessarily carried out an offensive action that inflicted political damage on us and caused casualties on our side—12 killed and 44 wounded. This is one example—we have had several—where one should have thought whether it was only carelessness, justified anger, or it was even a provocation, even an intentional sabotage by remnants of the secret service. Let us not deceive ourselves that we have managed to remove them from everywhere and from every position in the light of all that has happened.

Therefore, with this cease-fire agreement we have created conditions to begin the normalization for which those in Belgrade who are responsible for the occupation have voiced their support—which the two great powers are also urging: the main world superpower, the United States; Russia, which has also been cooperating with the United States; and Europe, which has proved to be unsuccessful in the resolution of that crisis in Bosnia and in UN protected areas, is following them. This gives us reasons to count on that, but on our part, we have to be likewise effective in the implementation. We are seeking the restoration of trust, but one should bear on mind that the Serb extremists in those areas between Knin and Baranja were instigated by Belgrade expansionists who wanted a Greater Serbia and that those and suchlike managed to deceive a considerable number of Serb population in those areas that danger was looming from the democratic Croatia.

For our part, we must show that we are truly willing and that we want to ensure all civilian and ethnic rights to the Serbs. What we want to achieve is also in the interest of the Serbian people. We shall now take up....[pauses] The previous agreement on the normalization of relations, the opening of offices—ours in Belgrade and the Belgrade one in Zagreb—is based on the same principle. We shall work on the gradual opening of communications: roads, railways, oil pipelines, and long-distance power lines. In this way trust will gradually be established and efforts will be made to secure the return of our refugees. My particular request to the government is to begin the reconstruction of those villages that were liberated in the Maslenica operation, [names of villages indistinct]. I must admit I was surprised the other day when I saw that

very little has been done in this respect. Wherever reconstruction is possible or wherever the return of refugees is possible, which must be our priority, we must start this process.

You can see for yourselves that refugees have rightly been dissatisfied with the way their return has been stalled. I think that for our part we must take steps to ensure that they start to return gradually. On the other side we must give support to their demands so that the world can see that their demands for return are justified. However, such a procedure, i.e. gradual normalization, should lead to the integration of these areas into Croatia, with the help of major international factors. For our part, we must be prepared to abide by the constitutional law regarding these two districts, Glina and Knin, where Serbs were a majority before the war, and we must ensure that they have elections for local self-rule. In general, we must tackle this problem in the political way in order to resolve it as quickly as possible without new victims.

As far as the government's other task is concerned, I would like them to take into account that we will be able to reduce considerable Army expenses now that war dangers are on the decrease. We must also work on cutting down on bureaucracy wherever possible, introduce austerity measures—as discussed by Mr. Valentic—in order to secure more funds for those areas that have been neglected, such as culture and sciences.

In this context of transformation and denationalization I would ask you to examine whether we could, and I think we can, begin with the transformation of former socialist collective farms and agricultural enterprises and donate part of this land to refugees, especially volunteers, for political and economic reasons.

Ladies and gentlemen, since time immemorial those who carried the burden of war, who gave most in wars to defend their homelands, have been rewarded in this way. We should consider whether it is possible to do it for a period of 10 years and with what kind of compensation and so on, but such a step would pay our debt to those people and perhaps create conditions for the speedier resolution of the problems we are facing at the moment.

Of course, the permanent task of debureaucratization remains, the permanent task of modernizing our state administration. To do that we will probably need more international expertise and, so to say, training or schooling of our people, because the layers of the past when the authorities were not in the service of the nation, of man, of people, but in the service of the ruling party, those layers are still here. We must fight them with resolution in order for the Croatian man to feel that he now has the Croatian authorities that serve him but which in return he has to treat as his authorities and his state. This is a mutual process that needs to be enriched in the right sense, in a legal sense, in the work of the state administration and also in the educational sense.

Let me give an example—a banal example—in education. I watched a French-German tennis match on TV. The stands were full, and there were a lot of Austrian [as heard] flags. One day I went to the Cibona sports hall. The hall was empty and there was not a single Croatian flag. There were a dozen Yugoslav (?flags), they won several championships and so on. I asked myself where the Zagreb of tennis was, where the national Zagreb was. That is something that needs to be looked into. That is how the civic, sport, and national spirit is developed. From Switzerland to America school lessons and sport manifestations begin with national anthems and state flags.

A good part of our people—especially in the media where there are a lot of holdovers from the old times—have not become used to the fact that we have our own state, that people should be brought up accordingly, and that we should behave accordingly everywhere—from sport and culture to economy and so on. This is a banal example, but it speaks clearly for itself.

Excuse me for resorting to such a (?petty) example, but it seems to me that it is characteristic precisely because in other areas too it meets with a huge lack of understanding.

Once again, Prime Minister Nikica Valentic, let me express full recognition and gratitude for the work of the government. I fully agree that it has been possible to achieve these results only because you presented a united front, because the government as a whole was united, and because every minister, every member of government, was responsible for his or her ministry and further progress should be made along the same lines.

You were completely independent in the work of the government as a whole and in individual ministries. We should continue in the same way. But, gentlemen, speaking about that, the government as a whole and every government member—as well as every civil servant, every clerk in the government—must implement the state policy. There cannot be several policies. This government has done this, but in certain places at the level of clerks there are people who think that they can pass decisions according to their own judgment. Yes, everyone should be independent, but independent in the purposeful, useful work of implementing the overall state policy.

At my latest news conference I was asked whether there will be any changes in the government and what kind of changes. I said what the prime minister has just said. There will be no changes in the government. The government has won the majority support in the parliament, the trust of the people, and it also has my trust—and it will have it because it works well and in the interest of Croatia. In my talks with Prime Minister Nikica Valentic we discussed no other problem than Croatia's interests. The interests of the Croatian people and the Croatian state are our priority. They are above all party interests, all particular, group, and other interests. So, rest assured

that we will continue pursuing the policy that has achieved the results—both in the internal and foreign spheres—of which we can all be satisfied and proud. Thank you.

### Tudjman Meets With U.S. Delegation

*LD3003180794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Mar 94*

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has received a U.S. delegation, which included Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and member of the U.S. Government; Charles Redman, special envoy of the U.S. President; General John Shalikashvili, commander of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Peter Galbraith, U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Croatia.

They discussed the political and military situation in the region, as well as the U.S. role in further efforts aimed at the settlement of the crisis. Mrs. Albright thanked President Tudjman for his special contribution toward the settlement of the crisis in former Yugoslavia, praising at the same time the overall policy of the Republic of Croatia regarding peace efforts toward the settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Special emphasis was laid on U.S. support for Croatia's territorial integrity and sovereignty and for the cease-fire agreement signed with local Serbs. The U.S. delegation reiterated U.S. readiness to help in the process of the peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories.

President Tudjman expressed gratitude to the United States for its crucial role in all positive steps and asked for support in connection with the acceptance of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] new mandate, i.e. that the United States should accept Croatia's demand regarding the total control of Croatia's borders, the opening of roads, and the return of refugees as soon as possible.

The two sides expressed satisfaction about the application of the Washington agreement on the ground and hoped that the constituent assembly in Sarajevo would accept the new constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation.

They also discussed all future steps in the negotiating process and said that regular contacts would continue between representatives of the United States and the Republic of Croatia at all levels.

After the talks, President Tudjman gave a luncheon that was also attended by Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic.

On the Croatian side, the talks were attended by Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Jure Radic, head of President Tudjman's office, Defense Minister Gojko Susak, Tudjman's National Security Advisor Hrvoje Sarinic, Gen. Janko Bobetko, chief of the general staff corps, and Maj. Gen. Zvonimir Cervenko, head of Tudjman's military department.

Foreign Minister Granic also held talks with the U.S. delegation. He told the U.S. ambassador that the Croatian Assembly also accepted the Washington agreement.

### Receives Shalikashvili, Albright

*LD3003104594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 30 Mar 94*

[Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, today received in the Presidential Palace [in Zagreb] General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the United States, and Madeleine Albright, U.S. permanent representative at the UN.

The talks were also attended on the U.S. side by the U.S. Ambassador in Croatia Peter Galbraith, and Charles Redman, the special envoy of the U.S. President. The Croatian delegation comprises Dr. Mate Granic, Dr. Jure Radic, Gojko Susak [defense minister], Hrvoje Sarinic [the Croatian president's national security adviser], Janko Bobetko, and Zvonimir (Crnjenko).

Before his meeting with President Tudjman, Gen. Shalikashvili had a meeting at the UN base in Pleso [near Zagreb airport] with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] Commander in Chief Gen. Bertrand de Lapresle, and he also visited the U.S. military hospital.

### Meets With Foreign Journalists

*LD3003232694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 30 Mar 94*

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman granted an interview to a group of foreign journalists, including journalists from Associated Press, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR and DIE ZEIT, in the presidential palace in Zagreb this evening.

Replying to their questions, President Tudjman spoke about the cease-fire agreement reached between representatives of the local Serbs from the occupied Croatian areas and the Republic of Croatia, the Washington agreement, the overcoming of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the causes of the Greater Serbian aggression and its tragic consequences for Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Now that we signed an agreement on the normalization of relations with Belgrade and the cease-fire agreement with the Serbs in UN protected areas in Croatia, a process of reopening roads and telecommunications should begin. At the same the rebuilding of trust between the Croatian authorities and the Serbs from these areas who were dragged into conflicts with the Croatian authorities by the former communist Yugoslav army should begin, President Tudjman said in reply to a question of what he expected from the cease-fire agreement.

By the gradual normalization of relations, President Tudjman said, we will try to restore trust to carry out

elections for the local Serb self-administration in two counties in which they make up a majority. In the beginning we would like to create conditions for the return of more than 250,000 refugees, wherever it is possible, the president stressed, expressing the hope this would be possible to achieve gradually and through negotiations.

As regards the possibility of restoring economic ties, President Tudjman stressed that some Serbs from the UN protected areas a year ago signed an agreement with the Croatian authorities after which they were arrested by Serb extremists. We were called on to restore trade links and to normalize relations by the people from all Serb-held areas, even from Banja Luka, the Croatian president said. In the final phase the Croatian policy and that pursued by the Western countries coincided. That is the basis for the partnership between Croatia and the Western world, particularly the United States, President Tudjman said in reply to a question of whether the Washington agreement and the cease-fire agreement were a result of a turnabout in the Croatian policy or were a result of pressure coming from the West.

We wish to reintegrate the UN protected areas into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia in a peaceful way. If our efforts and those made by the United States and Russia did not bear fruit, Croatia would not be able to bear the present situation for ever, President Tudjman said, stressing that, in the light of the international situation, Serbia would have to agree to the normalization of relations.

### Granic Receives Diplomats Following Agreement

*LD3103174894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, has presented to members of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to Croatia copies of the text of the cease-fire agreement signed yesterday between representatives of the Croatian authorities and Serb rebels from the temporarily occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia.

Minister Granic said Croatia was ready to take on a constructive role in negotiations with the Serb rebels and that it expected further progress in the implementation of the agreement and in the overall process of the peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas in the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia.

Granic also briefed the diplomats on the results so far of the implementation of the Washington agreement. All clashes between Muslim Bosnians and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have ceased and humanitarian deliveries have improved. At the same time deputies of the constituent assembly accepted the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo yesterday.

Granic added that he expected representatives of the Serbian people to soon join in the negotiations on the peaceful settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### Martic Views Agreement as Recognition of RSK

*AU3003192694 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 30 Mar 94*

[Interview with Milan Martic, leader of the Krajina Serbs, by Ratko Koprivica on 30 March; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Martic] We have truly invested the maximum effort and honesty in this agreement, and we intend to observe it to the maximum. If Croatia does the same.-...[pauses] However it should not use the same things as it has used in the past, such as not observing the Erdut Agreement, then I believe that we shall soon be able to establish all other relations.

The next step would involve the demarcation line; therefore, UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] troops will be deployed along the entire border; in those of our villages where UNPROFOR is stationed we will have our police, our authority. Croatian villages will be under Croatian authority. The demarcation line will have a 1 km width. However, UNPROFOR also has the mandate to control 20 km of territory within Croatia, and this is very significant. It is very important that, in addition to the UNPROFOR forces, we also have the involvement of U.S. and Russian diplomacy, which is a guarantee that this agreement will be fully observed.

[Koprivica] Since you have mentioned diplomacy, what does the Zagreb agreement mean for the Krajina in an international context?

[Martic] It means a lot. The fact that two of the most powerful forces—the United States and Russia—are participating in it, constitutes, in a certain way, the recognition of the republic of Serbian Krajina, acceptance of us as a reality, a state with its territory, authorities, and population. What remains is international recognition, and I believe that in the next phase we will be able to achieve this. Therefore, it is no longer the case that we are being treated only as local authorities—which has been the case in the past—but as an equal party to a conflict, as in the case of two states.

### Accord Involves Army Giving Villages to RSK

*AU3003151794 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Mar 94*

[Report by Danko Peric from Knin]

[Text] At a news conference held immediately upon the Krajina negotiating team's return from the Russian Embassy in Zagreb, it was stressed that the essence of the agreement signed this morning is contained in its title—cessation of all armed hostilities. Unlike the present, that is, the two-year long situation on the ground, the UN

Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] will be deployed between the two, until now, warring sides.

The signing of the cease-fire agreement was preceded by a detailed analysis of maps indicating the existing situation by all the parties to the negotiations. According to the Krajina side, the cease-fire agreement also means that Kasici and other villages in Ravni Kotari have been returned to the republic of Serbian Krajina, which the Croatian Army occupied 14 months ago, and that the population of the Obrovac region—a region which during the same Croatian aggression found itself in those parts of the Serbian Krajina that were the least safe—will have a more peaceful life.

We learned at the news conference that the region of Velebit—including its Obrovac part—was the cause of the fiercest debate, or disagreement, that is, during the negotiations yesterday and overnight. The text of the cease-fire agreement is today the most sought-after written document and is being xeroxed and copied in Knin. The first date set in the document is 4 April. AT 0900 [0700 GMT] on that day, the cease-fire will enter into force on the front lines, while in the following 24 hours—so the agreement stipulates—all indirect weaponry will be moved away [razmjesteno]: mortars and antiaircraft guns to a distance of at least 10 km, artillery and tanks to a distance of at least 20 km from the demarcation lines.

By 0900 at the latest on 8 April, all units on the demarcation lines will be disengaged in order to prevent mutual targeting with direct weapons. The cease-fire will be monitored by international observers. The agreement also confirms an agreement on the establishment of a joint commission with the aim of maintaining the cease-fire.

### Serb-Russian Friendship Rally Held in Knin

*LD3103190594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1813 GMT 31 Mar 94*

["Pool" item]

[Text] Knin, Mar 31 (TANJUG)—The vice-president of the State Duma, lower house of Russian parliamant, and of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, Aleksandr Vangerovskiy, Thursday said that the Russian people was standing by the Republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.).

Vangerovsky said at a rally of Serb-Russian friendship in Knin that Russia was rising from its knees and preparing for a campaign to help the R.S.K., adding that great changes were underway in Russia which would enable it to send even one thousand officers to the R.S.K. if necessary.

The rally, at which several thousand Knin inhabitants welcomed the State Duma delegation, was also attended by the R.S.K. President Milan Martic and Foreign Minister Slobodan Jarcevic.

Delegation member Yevgeniy Fyodorov, independent Duma deputee, expressed gratitude to the R.S.K. on behalf of the Russian Army. during the past three years, while Russia was on its knees, the R.S.K. was strong enough to successfully protect both its own and Russia's freedom. Now the Russian Army is with the R.S.K., he said.

The R.S.K. was proclaimed in 1991 by the local Serbs in their ancestral lands in Croatia, in response to Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslav Federation and its trampling on the local Serbs' rights.

The R.S.K. became a U.N.-Protected Area (UNPA) in March, 1992, but the deployment of the U.N. troops had not deterred Croatia from launching four offensives against the territory in attempts to impose its rule there by force.

### Thousands Attend Rally

*LD3103180794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1242 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] Knin, 31 March (TANJUG)—Several thousand people gathered at Stojan Jankovic square in Knin today to greet a delegation of the Russian State Duma at a meeting of Serb-Russian friendship. The meeting was opened by the leader of the Serb National Renewal [Srpska Narodna Obnova], Mirko Jovic, and was attended by the president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], Milan Martic, and the RSK minister of foreign affairs, Slobodan Jarcevic. On its visit to Krajina the delegation of the Russian parliamentarians is headed by Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, the vice chairman of the Duma and of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia. It also includes Vitaliy Sevastyanov, a hero of the USSR, and astronaut Yegeniy Fyodorov, an independent Duma deputy.

Addressing the people of Knin, Vengerovskiy—often interrupted by tumultuous applause—said that "Russia is rising again and is preparing to come to your help." He said that 170 million Russians were behind Krajina and that major changes were underway in Russia which would help to bring 1,000 Russian officers to Krajina if necessary. "We have come here to extend our hands and to ensure that we are never separated again." It was with enthusiastic applause that Fyodorov's following words were greeted: "I express the Russian Army's enormous gratitude to you for having found enough strength over the last three years, while Russia was on its knees, to defend your and our freedom. The Russian Army is now with you." In conclusion Fyodorov said: "We are here, you are here, Turks out, Americans out." The Russian delegation has had talks with Milan Martic, the president of the RSK.

## Manolic Not To Resign, Demands Impeachment

*AU2903185694 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 26 Mar 94 pp 2-3*

[Interview with Josip Manolic, chairman of the Croatian Parliament's House of Districts, by Andjelko Erceg on 25 March; place not given: "My Removal Is Encouragement for the Warmongers"]

[Text] *We talked to Josip Manolic, chairman of the House of Districts [Zupanijski dom] yesterday [25 March], immediately after he postponed—according to the rules of procedure—the debate on the request for his removal, which was put forth by 36 Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] deputies and supported by the HDZ deputy caucus.*

[Erceg] How would you interpret your removal from all functions in the party, and the no-confidence vote of your party colleagues from the deputy caucus of the House of Districts?

[Manolic] This is in complete accord with the policy conducted by President Tudjman. My political views do not coincide with his views, both regarding Croatian policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and regarding the functioning of the civic state and the way he leads the party. These three issues are dominant in my disagreement with Tudjman's policy, and that is the reason why the party is initiating these disciplinary and administrative proceedings against me.

### The Rules of Procedure Must Be Observed

[Erceg] After rejecting the belated placing on the agenda of the HDZ deputies' request for your removal from the post of chairman of the House of Districts, you also mentioned the significant political implications that could arise as a result of removing the House of Districts chairman in such a roundabout way? What implications did you have in mind?

[Manolic] The issue in question is the observance of the established rules of procedure of the Croatian Parliament, in accordance with which all sessions need to be conducted. You cannot allow someone to place something on the agenda by circumventing the rules of procedure on one occasion, and then denying this right to someone else on another occasion. Therefore, the rules of procedure must be conscientiously observed when establishing the agenda and any changes to it in the course of the session.

[Erceg] How would you assess the events that took place at the session of the HDZ's Presidency? Namely, there is rumor that in addition to pressure on you to resign, the removal of several other people was also discussed? Among them are Greguric, Mesic, and Valentic?

[Manolic] I do not know whether they were discussed in some other of the party's bodies and forums, but at the HDZ's Presidency session no other names were discussed apart from the ones whose dismissal is already public.

[Erceg] The differences you mentioned as existing between yourself and President Tudjman have been evident for some time. Why is it, however, that it is precisely at this moment and in such a way that these differences within the party are being addressed?

[Manolic] You know that I have been condemned for three interviews—in GLOBUS of 14 January, in FERAL TRIBUNE, and the latest interview in DANAS, in which I—as early as January—said that Croatian policy in Bosnia was wrong.

Namely, I believe that the beginning of the war between the Croats and the Muslims was an unreasonable act. The consequences of this war are terrible, particularly for the Croatian people because they are the smallest ethnic group in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they have surely had the greatest number of victims. I have believed from the very beginning that this policy was not a good one, that it did not take into account the interests of the Croatian people as a whole. Ways and opinions regarding the protection of Croatian interests in the region of Herzegovina—where 98 percent of the population is Croatian—are one thing, but the position of the Croats is entirely different in places where there are less of them, where they are just a minor ethnic group.

The Washington Agreement has strengthened precisely this position, that is, the position that peace with the Muslims should realize the principle of maintenance of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent and sovereign federation of three constituent nations.

### The International Implications of the Dismissal

[Erceg] Since President Tudjman has signed the Washington Agreement which endorses your current policy, this means that you are on the same side. Where, then, do the conflicts regarding policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina between you and President Tudjman come in?

[Manolic] This is precisely the absurdity that precipitates crucial questions. Is this move of Tudjman's a knife in the back of the Washington Agreement, executed by only one signatory? Does this mean that there is no desire to realize this agreement? The removal from political life of those who strived for such solutions before the agreement was signed lessens the chances for its realization and on the other hand presents a chance for those who initiated the war option to proceed with it under new conditions after the agreement is implemented. This means that various reasons will be sought that will block the agreement and thwart its implementation. Therefore, this is essentially encouragement for the warmongers.

[Erceg] Do you think that there will be international implications?

[Manolic] The very fact that we are dealing with such an act means that it will have repercussions on the international scene. Namely, questions will be asked about the true intentions of the signatories if people, who from the very beginning opted for peace and cooperation with the Muslims in these areas, are removed from politics.

[Erceg] It can be assumed that pressure on you to withdraw from all other functions will continue. It is well-known that you are the head of the State Commission for the Normalization of Relations with Serbs. How would your possible removal from this function affect current negotiations with the Serbs?

[Manolic] I think that my removal would not reflect well on either the party or the policy we are conducting toward the Serbs.

However, the decision is in the hands of President Tudjman who established the commission by decree and appointed me president. Therefore, he can also abolish it by decree. If this is thought out rationally, then I do not expect such a move, however, if irrationality and emotions prevail, then my removal is to be expected.

**HDZ Is Headed Toward Isolation**

[Erceg] We have come to the third reason for the conflict—the way in which the party is led. What, in your opinion, is Tudjman's greatest failing in this respect?

[Manolic] The very preparation of the Congress (the HDZ Congress) was unilateral, with the aim of disqualifying those people who had the proper attitude not only regarding Bosnia, but also regarding issues of denationalization and restructuring of the economy, as well as people who, in a democratic option, have embraced the HDZ as their party with all its ideological and political distinctions.

You are aware that the HDZ is founded on the ideologies of Starcevic [Croatian politician, founder of the Croatian Party of Rights], Radic [prominent Croatian politician, founder of the Croatian Peasants' Party and staunch opponent of Belgrade centralism, assassinated in the Yugoslav Parliament in 1928], and antifascism, and that these three components are essential to the HDZ. Today, however, by stressing that the HDZ is a party, we are deviating from these components. For my part, I maintain that the HDZ is still a movement based on its primary principles, which unites various political currents on the Croatian political scene.

[Erceg] What does the "dissolution" of these distinctions mean for the HDZ?

[Manolic] The dissolution of these distinctions means that the HDZ is actually declining into a narrow party-ideological realm that will in any case—considering the entire Croatian political realm—limit the influence and activity of the party, which will then, of course, lead it into isolation.

**The Chaos of the Civic State**

[Erceg] To what extent is the conflict pertaining to the (non)functioning of the civic state—which you mentioned earlier—connected to the growing number of scandals that are becoming public?

[Manolic] You will remember that I said in an interview that the results of the functioning of the civic state are catastrophic. Every day we are faced with violence, violation of rights and liberties, illegal and unlawful eviction from apartments. We still face the grimmest kind of drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime.

When you compare these incidents with the number of such incidents that were prosecuted, you see how the civic state functions. And it is not by chance that the latest Bishops' Conference raised its voice against crime, violence, and similar occurrences that the civic state is supposed to solve.

[Erceg] Can you be plain? Do you perhaps wish to say that there are currents in the party's leadership that are blocking the functioning of the civic state?

[Manolic] Such a conclusion is self-evident. The civic state may not function from time to time, but if this persists, then chaos is imminent. If this happens, we no longer have a state, the essence of the state being measured by the degree to which it secures the rights and liberties of its citizens insofar as their personal status or resolving their material and other problems.

**I Do Not Feel Guilty**

[Erceg] Are you still a member of the HDZ?

[Manolic] Yes, I still belong to the HDZ. You can be expelled, you can die, or you can resign from the HDZ. I refused to resign either from the party or the parliament, although my resignation was demanded. My resignation would mean that I admit to a certain amount of guilt, and I do not feel guilty because of two reasons. As far as the party is concerned, I do not feel at all guilty. As for the House of Districts, I led it in accordance with the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure, and I conducted policy in accordance with the policy of the HDZ. These are, therefore, the reasons why I will not resign and why I am demanding that the impeachment procedure be initiated in accordance with the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure.

[Erceg] How do you see your future position in the party and the parliament?

[Manolic] There are various possibilities: I may stay in the party and carry out my deputy duties, I may found my own party, or I may become an independent deputy.

[Erceg] How realizable is the option of a new party?

[Manolic] Everything, including this, depends on the development of the situation. If further complications

arise and attempts to block the Washington Agreement continue; if the democratic institutions of the civic state do not begin functioning, then I think that we must build a policy—together with all other democratic forces—that will secure this process.

[Erceg] Is the demand for your removal and the no-confidence vote of the HDZ deputy caucus evidence that you do not have their trust, or do you believe that this decision was imposed on your party colleagues "from above"?

[Manolic] Party discipline in the HDZ is pretty strong. The HDZ holds the majority in both houses of the parliament, and it can make such decisions regardless of discipline. However, a great many deputies—for reasons of pure opportunism—do not wish to defy this discipline and speak out against such decisions.

**Deviation From Tudjman's Line—Expulsion From the Party**

[Erceg] Your opponents insist that you are completely isolated within the party. How do you assess your own "actions"?

[Manolic] If this were accurate, then all these "administrative measures" would not be taken against me.

Such measures are essentially a way of frightening the entire membership and creating a psychosis that makes it clear that unless you adhere to President Tudjman's line you can either leave the party or you know what awaits you. In that case you will be expelled.

[Erceg] Who, in your opinion, has the greatest influence on President Tudjman's line? Who are these people?

[Manolic] I believe that the president himself primarily creates this line. It is Tudjman and Tudjman again.

[Erceg] Would you interpret the latest events as a definite rift in the HDZ?

[Manolic] I think that conditions for a definite rift have been satisfied. It only remains to be seen whether they will be expressed organizationally or not.

[Erceg] Does this mean early elections could be held?

[Manolic] In order for early elections to take place, we must first have such a crisis in the parliament that it would dictate these elections. If the rift in the HDZ becomes "operational," it will mean a crisis in the parliament that could lead to early elections. However, I believe that at this point they would not be to anyone's advantage.

[Erceg] Is this a definite parting of the ways between Tudjman and yourself?

[Manolic] I believe that all this should not yet be taken as a definite parting of ways. I wish to reiterate that everything still depends on developments in the political realm. The political realm still exists, although it has become considerably narrower.

[Erceg] If this is not a definite closing of doors in your relations, where do you see the maneuvering space for a "reconciliation" with Tudjman?

[Manolic] You see, he too can change his position regarding certain problems. For example, we are sure to agree on the issue of denationalization because it is in the party program. You can block the denationalization process for a certain period of time, but this problem cannot remain unsolved forever.

[Erceg] Can you agree with Tudjman on the way to lead the party?

[Manolic] That is much less likely to happen. That would be possible only if we were to hold an extraordinary Congress that would not be prepared unilaterally, but according to a completely democratic procedure.

## Croat Leaders Cautious About Washington Agreement

*94BA0224B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 13 Mar 94 p 15*

[Interview with Damir Zoric, vice president of the Chamber of Zupanijas of the Croatian parliament and a member of the Small Council of the Croatian Social Liberal Party, by Branko Podgornik; place and date not given: "The United States Only Gave a Sign"]

[Text] The Croat-Muslim agreement in Washington should be supported, but without euphoria, says Damir Zoric, vice president of the Chamber of Zupanijas of the parliament of the Republic of Croatia and a member of the Small Council of the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS]. Zoric says that this truly might be a strategic turnaround in Croatian policy, but he adds that caution must be maintained with respect to the results of that agreement.

"Some Croatian opposition parties, especially Drazen Budisa and the HSLS, the Bosnian Croats, and the Franciscans have come out in favor of a Croat-Muslim agreement, and they did so at a point when it was not so popular, nor did it bring political success with most of the public. If at least one human life would have been saved, the agreement would have been successful.

"Nevertheless, those who have now come into their own should not be euphoric, nor should they hunt scapegoats, but should proceed cautiously so that the agreement really bears fruit, because implementing it will be painful," Zoric warns.

[Podgornik] What do you think about the confederation of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina?

[Zoric] Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina can enter into definite intergovernmental relations only after they become sovereign over their entire territory. It is in the

interest of Croatia for Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain an integral state, and for the Croats to be equal citizens in it. But it seems as though some people see in this proposal a confederation of a truncated Croatia with a detached piece of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That would be a triumph for the conception held by Serbian expansionism, which means death to both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, because those two states, whether in confederation or separate, would be territorially untenable in the face of an expanded chetnik Serbia, which is ravaging our entrails.

[Podgornik] But the United States guarantees that it will support the territorial integrity of Croatia, so it seems that we have never been closer to recovery of the occupied territories.

[Zoric] It is true that the United States has changed its policy toward that area. But, if I might so put it, the United States has only given a sign to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There still is not a single reliable manifestation that the United States is really thinking seriously. The United States sent an ultimatum to the Serbs around Sarajevo, but that ultimatum also threatens the Croats around Mostar. Clinton said that the United States has found its strategic interest here; however, this happened at the same time when Saudi Arabia was announcing that it would invest $8 billion to buy U.S. aircraft. The question is whether that will be enough. At the same time, it is easy to see from the Serbian media that with their most recent offensives in Bosnia and the violation of the truce in Croatia they have actually been testing to what extent the Americans are willing to persist in their new course of policy.

**The Specter of a Revived Yugoslavia Is Abroad**

[Podgornik] Are you afraid of a revival of Yugoslavia?

[Zoric] That danger does exist. For instance, the Croats and Muslims create a federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and want to marry it to Croatia—so that Bosnia and Herzegovina formally remains intact, but with the status of the Bosnian Serbs unresolved. What in that case could prevent the international community from allowing the Bosnian Serbs confederation with Serbia? When you have that kind of asymmetrical confederation with a Bosnia and Herzegovina that exists as a legal entity, you could get Yugoslavia in the course of a single night.

[Podgornik] When could a referendum be held of the population concerning the confederation of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina?

[Zoric] That referendum could be legitimate only if it could be conducted in the areas now occupied as well. If it were not conducted in the areas occupied as well, the referendum might legalize the amputation of a fourth of the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

[Podgornik] What consequences will the Washington agreement have on the domestic scene of Croatia?

[Zoric] I think that the Croatian Government has made a good move and should now encourage creation of confidence and national consensus among the Croatian political forces. But the responsibility for that, I would say, lies above all on the opposition, which at this point ought not to cause nervousness and hunt scapegoats for the past, because that could be devastating to the process of peace between Croats and Muslims. For those who favor Croat-Muslim cooperation, the fact that there is an agreement is much more important than to seek justice or a gain for the party. I am convinced of that, and I would like to see that happen, at least as far as my HSLS is concerned. Nervousness would not favor the Croats in Bosnia nor the Croats in Herzegovina, for various reasons.

**The Baneful "Tito's Youth"**

[Podgornik] Does this mean that the HSLS will now be less critical of the government?

[Zoric] No. We have not been critical of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] just because of the disastrous policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now that one of the sore points for the nationality has started to move toward resolution, the opposition ceases to be hostage to the issue of Bosnia and has been given more room. Now we can be still more critical of the incumbent party when it comes to denationalization, transformation of ownership, and many moves made in the economic area.

[Podgornik] Could implementation of the Washington agreement encounter any serious resistance in a segment of the incumbent party or the opposition?

[Zoric] There are more grounds for supporting the agreement than the other way around. Some people will see the agreement as a continuation of Croatian policy, others as a change of direction, still others as an alliance against a common enemy, and yet others as the interest of the nationality or the human interest.

The conduct of the new policy, however, could be very painful in Herzegovina. The policy of reaching agreement between Croats and Muslims is out of step with the facts and emotions at the moment, and we should therefore take care that its implementation does not conflict with reality. Another question is whether the same people can carry out two concepts that are so different, those people who have gone from war to alliance. I am afraid that resistance could arise to people who as bureaucrats go too far in carrying out particular directives. In the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina there are people who do not go abroad because they might have certain problems with foreign judiciaries.

[Podgornik] You are referring to Mate Boban?

[Zoric] I am referring to "Tito's Youth," who are today ruling Herceg- Bosna. Those who at one time sweated profusely in labor brigades in order to earn badges as shockworkers. Some people who are today guiding the

HDZ as a people's party of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina at one time had the first founders of the HDZ in Herzegovina called in for police interviews. They are very clever political operatives, but not very clever with their own people, whom they are now putting between the rock and the hard place, and in the end they have driven many people in Herzegovina crazy.

Look at the result. The Herzegovinians are humiliated. The rest of the nationality looks on them as the problem causing unrest all over Croatia. And it is well-known that the Herzegovinians are that part of the Croatian nation, formerly and now, who from the depth of their soul have been fighting with their lives and resources for Croatian independence even against Yugoslavia, which signifies death to Croatia and Croats.

Today, their political leaders are issuing reports to the effect that there are supposedly no problems in Herzegovina. However, there certainly are problems in Herzegovina. People are confused, because they were waging war for a cause, they were losing their lives, their children, their husbands, their farms. They had more casualties in the war with the Muslims than with the Serbs. Today, many people are asking: Why? That question is troubling a great number of people who have sizable families, and they are living in complete economic and political uncertainty and confusion. This is the average destiny of most people who until yesterday were told that they would be the masters of Herceg-Bosna and that Neum was Croatian. And today they are being given explanations that under the Washington agreement Croatia would be allowed passage through Neum and that what is happening to them and Croatia constitutes a continuation of a successful policy. If Croatian political forces do not act cautiously, I am afraid that the Herzegovinians could again end up on what for them is the perpetual "wrong side." That is in fact why I cautioned that the opposition now has greater responsibility than the government, because this is a question of fundamental interest to the nationality.

**There Is No Split in the HSLS**

[Podgornik] Is the HSLS threatened with a split such as has happened in the HSP [Croatian Rights Party] or the IDS [Istrian Democratic Conference]?

[Zoric] No. In the course of the fierce campaign against us, the HSLS proved that it is a mature political party. Maturity is not a consequence of complete and doctrinaire unanimity of opinion in a party, but above all of responsibility and practicality. The HSLS is a political alternative to the incumbent party in its program, its strength, and the people it brings together.

[Podgornik] Can the HSLS remain the second party? How do you interpret the disagreements in the party which have even broken through to the public?

[Zoric] The HSLS can remain the second party, but it will not, it will do everything to become the first party. As for the second question, let us say that perhaps we have a good conception of political marketing. We live on the public's interest in us, so we have taken pains to interest people in something that sounds more enticing, more unusual.

[Podgornik] Are you really the leader of the "harder ethnic line" in the HSLS?

[Zoric] Many people have attributed that to me. Because I do not see what is bad about that, I can publicly admit that it is my honor to be perceived that way. We are a democratic party, and with us every position is won through a competition in which there is a candidate and an opposing candidate, so some win and some lose. That will also happen in the party convention in May, but that will not signify a split. For example, there are seven candidates for the four vice presidents of the HSLS. If one of the candidates loses in a race with me, that will not signify a split, but will mean that the party is organized along democratic lines. We operate along democratic lines even within the party, which is why I think we are able to bring Croatia real democracy.

[Podgornik] You recently made a trip to the United States with Ivan Herak, who during that trip was expelled from the IDS. Will he really become a member of the HSLS?

[Zoric] I have talked to Herak a great deal, and I think that these are very close political ideas. I naturally tried to persuade him to come over to the HSLS and I will be glad if I managed to persuade Herak. I would also like Denis Jelenkovic to come to the HSLS. I think that the HSLS has a great chance of success in Istria, because it is the second party there, and Drazen Budisa, you recall, obtained a convincing majority of the votes among all the presidential candidates in the election.

## HSLS President Comments

*94P20598A Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Mar 94 p 27*

[Article by P. Livajic: "Drazen Budisa on the HSLS Podium"]

[Excerpt] "The documents which have been signed on the federation of Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina are of historical significance and represent a turning point in the difficult times in which the two peoples are living. I cannot conceal my satisfaction at the fact that this is the implementation of a policy which the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance [HSLS], in contrast to the ruling party, has supported from the very beginning, because this is the concept which will make possible the existence of our neighboring state and thereby the reintegration of occupied territories into Croatia," Drazen Budisa, president of the HSLS, said in a public speech in Omis [a coastal town south of Split]. He stressed his reservations regarding the possible confederal agreement between Croatia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation, warning that only integral states can make agreements on confederal alliances.

"If no significant changes are made to establish the legal order of the Croatian state in the occupied areas, the HSLS will oppose the scheduling of a referendum on creating the confederal alliance," Budisa stressed, stating his opinion that the best solution for all the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be that it remain a federal state of three peoples with equal rights and with good links to Croatia but also to Serbia. [passage omitted]

### Chief Secretary Comments

*94P20592A Osijek GLAS SLAVONIJE in Serbo-Croatian 17 Mar 94 p 15*

[Article by V. Bozic: "Fear of Confederation With Belgrade"]

[Excerpt] Virovitica—The Croatian Social Liberal Alliance [HSLS] is against the creation of a large number of municipalities, increased bureaucracy, and illogical centralization of power. It is necessary to question those who supported such an organization, claiming that it will not be expensive, Bozo Kovacevic, the chief secretary of the HSLS said on the podium in Virovitica on the occasion of founding the HSLS zupanija [parish] assembly for the Virovitica-Podravska Zupanija.

The assembly was opened by the Virovitica HSLS branch president, Dr. Mirko Selak, who pointed out that, five years after the party has been founded, the last zupanija assembly is being formed here in Virovitica. Ivan Knezevic, the president of the Orahovica branch and the initiator for founding the party in this zupanija, addressed the assembly, pointing out social problems and poverty on one hand and the unscrupulous enrichment of some individuals on the other.

"The state must be sensitive to social issues. The state must make it possible for capable individuals to compete and must protect the livelihood of those who are less capable. The HSLS is a liberal party with a clear social emphasis," HSLS president Drazen Budisa said in the introductory speech of the assembly, stressing that the HSLS is a political party of the center, which means that it will not lapse into totalitarism of the right or left.

"The state, as the HSLS conceives it, should be as sensitive as possible toward its citizens and as strong as possible toward the outside world. We oppose the view that the party should be regarded as identical with the state or with patriotism, and we support free markets, trade, and learning, Drazen Budisa emphasized, pointing out that political opposition parties should not just have a decorative function but should also have a corrective role in the area of political power. [no closing quotation mark as published]

According to Budisa, the HSLS supports the Croatian-Muslim federation agreement because it had a similar proposal drafted in its program as early as 1992.

"The HSLA will ask the question of political responsibility for Croatian victims in the Croat-Muslim war. We are viewing the possible confederation with caution, so that it does not result indirectly in a confederation with Belgrade. We are for cultural, economic, and other links with the states that came into existence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, but we are not for political associations, especially not with Serbia," Drazen Budisa said, emphasizing that a peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories of Croatia is expected under the pressure of Washington and Moscow. [passage omitted]

### Arkan's Forces Withdraw From Erdut, Disperse

*AU0104114694 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 30 Mar 94 p 15*

[Unattributed report: "The Reconciliation of 'Hardheads'"]

[Text] The departure of the members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard from the Erdut Military Training Center is not going to be a cause of yet another Serbian quarrel. Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina, and Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, commander of the "Tigers" [the Serbian Volunteer Guard], are adamant about that.

The Center changed owners last Friday and the ceremony was attended by both Martic and Raznatovic, who thereby implemented the agreement reached earlier. The Erdut Training Center will in future serve for the training of special units of the army of the Srpska republic.

"Arkan's soldiers have not been expelled. Dust has been raised about that in public completely unnecessarily. There is simply no need for their presence in Erdut," Milan Martic claims categorically. "The Serbian Volunteer Guard contributed to the liberation of some parts of Krajina and, if the need arises, we are going to count on their help in the future as well."

Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, hitherto commander of the Erdut Military Training Center, said something similar: "We have also assessed that, after three years, there is no longer any need for us to be concentrated in Erdut. We have left the Training Center in perfect condition, well furnished and equipped," Raznatovic says. "My 240 soldiers are now dispersed in three directions: Those who were born in the Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina have placed themselves under the command of the local armies, and some of them have removed their uniforms."

Touching upon the earlier disagreements with Martic, Raznatovic says that they were not upon a personal, but a strategic basis. What is involved, he says, is the different views (his and Martic's) of the Maslenica events last year.

"Martic and I are hardheads, but, being real Serbs, we forgot our disagreement and buried the hatchet. After all,

it suits me, as the chairman of the Serbian Unity Party, to be reconciled with every honorable Serb," Raznatovic concludes.

## Ministry Accused of Role in HSS Rift

*94P20556B Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Mar 94 p 5*

[Article by Slavica Lukic: "Mirko Madjor Is Lying"]

[Excerpts] "The key role in the attempt to destabilize the Croatian Peasants' Party [HSS] was played by government circles outside our party. We have proof that the Information Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its chief, Ante Babic, participated in it. Kilograms of material intended to undermine confidence in the present HSS leadership were sent from the fax machine in Mr. Babic's office and in envelopes belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some material was sent from fax machines in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and we have other proof of the involvement of government bodies about which we do not wish to speak." This is what the head of the HSS, Drago Stipac, said after 16 days of silence regarding the events in the HSS, the Kasinski [Kasina, a town near Zagreb] meeting, and the open letter of Mirko Madjor. HSS Political Secretary Mirko Glokovic and vice president of the party's Presidency Stjepan Radic also spoke at a news conference held on Monday at HSS headquarters.

Drago Stipac admits that, due to a rapid increase in HSS membership, organizational, personnel, and financial problems occurred, but he claims that they are not nearly as drastic as Madjor and Stojanovic are trying to portray them. Stipac believes that the claims that Madjor and Stojanovic have presented in the open letter and in the media are lies and half-truths. The HSS, he states, is not some kind of a peasant trade union. Only 27 percent of its members are peasants; the rest have other occupations. Certain communications problems with the field branches also exist, but they are gradually being resolved. [passage omitted]

Stipac informed the journalists that a closed meeting of the HSS Executive Council was held on 12 March at which the documents of the Kasinski meeting were discussed in detail. It was established that 51 HSS members were present in Kasina and that some of them had been misled and falsely informed about the content of the documents they had signed. The HSS Executive Council assessed that the Kasinski meeting was convoked in an illegal manner and that the claims in the Kasinski documents are not true. Mirko Madjor and Dr. Stojanovic were removed from all their party functions with 90 votes for and only four against. Thus, the decision on their suspension made earlier by the HSS Presidency was confirmed. The HSS leaders repeated several times that there is no rift in the HSS and that the rebellion of Madjor and Stojanovic stems from their dissatisfaction with their own positions in the HSS. It was heard at the conference that "Madjor became dissatisfied from the moment when he was not elected president of the HSS." [passage omitted]

## ΩNotes From the Press

*94P20594A*

[Editorial Report]

### Vukovar Officials Visit Exiles in Croatia

Vukovar Mayor Dr. Jure Kolak, Deputy Mayor Grgo Plenkovic, and secretary of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] city council Petar Mlinaric reportedly visited Vukovar exiles in the Makarska littoral region of Croatia to examine housing accommodations and problems. According to the 13 March Split daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, the exiles were "increasingly disappointed with empty promises," and "felt abandoned." They complained about "food, health services, and various types of harassment." The major topic of conversation in the Alga Hotel, where most of the Vukovar exiles are housed, was an impending transfer of 170 exiles from Vukovar and about 90 from Slavonia and Drnis in order to prepare the hotel for the tourist season. However, the Vukovar exiles have already been moved as many as six times and are refusing to consider another transfer, the paper states. They also refuse to be moved into weekend houses belonging to Serbs or into other facilities on the coast, insisting on remaining in the Alga Hotel. The paper cites Mayor Kolak as promising the exiles that no one would force them to leave the hotel and that he would insist that the Croatian Government improve their standard of living. The members of the Vukovar leadership found "an even worse situation" among 180 sick and elderly Vukovar exiles housed in the Djuro Salaj resort center in Grac. The delegation from Vukovar was also received by Makarska Mayor Ivan Ivanda and other local officials. During that meeting, Kolak expressed his gratitude to the city of Makarska for taking such good care of the Vukovar exiles, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA reports.

### Possible Violation of Sanctions Against Serbia

In an article titled "Is Western Bosnia a Banana Republic of the Voce [Fruit] Enterprise?" the Zagreb weekly GLOBUS on 10 March reports that Fikret Abdic, president of the so-called autonomous province of western Bosnia, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman held a "regular" meeting at the presidential palace in Zagreb on 7 March, immediately after which Abdic, in "his Mercedes with Vienna tags, accompanied by police vehicles, drove to the main office of the Voce Import-Export enterprise, which is today his most important, and perhaps only, business partner." GLOBUS explains that Voce, based in Zagreb, "in just a few months," had dispatched 30 million German marks' worth of goods in the direction of Velika Kladusa in the autonomous province of western Bosnia. The weekly maintains that the goods were transported in about 100 convoys of trucks belonging to Agrokomerc, a large agricultural and

industrial firm located in Velika Kladusa and headed by Abdic. Each of the convoys transported about 400 metric tons of goods, GLOBUS reports, and, in the last four months, tanker trucks had been transporting about 200 tons of crude oil each. Voce bought the goods from the Zagreb-based petroleum processor INA, other Croatian firms, and "a few" Slovene firms, reselling them to the local government in Velika Kladusa. All the convoys passed through Serb-held Croatian territory, from Turanj, a suburb of Karlovac, via Vojnici to Velika Kladusa. Since the quantity of goods transported would be sufficient for a population three times that of western Bosnia, "it is clear that Fikret Abdic is buying the free passage of his convoys by reserving a portion of the goods for Serbs in the occupied Croatian territories," GLOBUS asserts. The weekly states that since all the goods sent to Velika Kladusa came from Voce, the following questions should be asked: "Has the firm violated the embargo against Serbia by helping Fikret Abdic, whom the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo has declared a traitor because of his trade with the Serbs? Has Voce, with the blessing of the Croatian Government, been selling the goods to Fikret Abdic...? Has Voce, once the largest export firm in the former Yugoslavia, which lost the majority of its partners after the disintegration of that former state, created, in the autonomous province of western Bosnia, an indispensable market for the sale of its goods?" GLOBUS cites Jure Klaric, director of Voce, as admitting that "even today, we are using the contacts that Fikret Abdic has established with the Serbs."

### HDZ Conflicts Linked To Cement Factory Deal

Herceg-Bosna is not the only controversial topic among leading Croatian politicians, says the 25 February GLOBUS. The weekly comments that the case of the unsuccessful attempt in 1991 to sell the Split Dalmacijacement cement factory to the Italian firm Calcestruzzi shows that the most intense political conflicts in the Croatian Democratic Community are linked to important economic issues. In the case of Dalmacijacement, the weekly notes, a grave conflict emerged between the present chief of the intelligence service, Hrvoje Sarinic, who was the head of the Office of the President in 1991, and current Minister of Trade Nadan Vidosevic, who was director of Dalmacijacement at that time. GLOBUS publishes the minutes of a heated quarrel in 1991 between Sarinic and Vidosevic on the issue of the sale of Dalmacijacement, commenting that the minutes, in addition to revealing the extent of the previously unknown conflicts in the HDZ leadership, also indicate how business decisions are made in Croatia: "The minutes from Sarinic's office plainly show that even today the main decisions in Croatia are made just as they were during the communist regime.... The office of the president tried to make the decision on a business deal worth hundreds of millions of German marks [DM], against the will of the Dalmacijacement management! Hrvoje Sarinic tried two-and-a-half years ago to persuade, at all costs, the director of Dalmacijacement to sell the enterprise to the Italians as quickly as possible." Another significant issue, GLOBUS states, is an alleged commission of $12.5 million, which, according to the director of Calcestruzzi, was paid in 1991. The weekly adds that it is believed in Croatian political circles that the money was spent for government needs.

### Denationalization of Housing

The Croatian Government has drafted a proposal for the return of apartments and houses that the communist government confiscated and nationalized after World War II, reports the 10 March GLOBUS. The owners, however, would be able to take possession of them only after a period of three to 10 years. GLOBUS points out that Croatian and foreign citizens who participated in the "aggression against the Republic of Croatia" would not have the right to retake possession of their properties. About 43,000 apartments will have to be returned to the owners from whom they were confiscated, and 150,000 current occupants will therefore be looking for new homes, GLOBUS states.

### Apartments for Government Workers

The 15 March edition of the Zagreb weekly DANAS reports that the Croatian Government, as part of its housing reform program, plans to build 8,600 apartments for government workers in the next 10 years. The construction cost of the apartments will amount to DM670,800,000.

### Hotel Shares Sold

The sale of shares of the Solitudo tourist hotel enterprise on the Adriatic island of Lastovo has been completed, says the 13 March SLOBODNA DALMACIJA. According to a decision by the Croatian Privatization Fund, the enterprise has become a shareholding company. The value of the enterprise has been assessed at 25,557,873,600 Croatian dinars, or DM6,811,800. The shareholders have bought 11 percent of the enterprise, paying a total of DM758,600. Of the 44 shareholders, 20 are from Lastovo and the remainder from other parts of Croatia.

### DM1 Million for Zadar Enterprise

At a 17 March public auction at the Zagreb stock market, 1,139 shares in three enterprises were sold for a total of DM1,062,000, or 3.884 billion Croatian dinars. The report in the 18 March SLOBODNA DALMACIJA says that the largest number of shares traded at this auction, the year's eleventh, was for the Mehanizacija firm. The Croatia Bank purchased 999 shares of this Zadar enterprise for approximately DM999,000. Ten shares of Zagrebgradnja [Zagreb Construction] were sold to the Investco brokerage company for DM50,000, while the Rijeka Bank bought 130 shares of the Rijeka Usluga [Services] enterprise for DM13,000.

**Shares of Solta Island Firm Sold**

The 15 March issue of SLOBODNA DALMACIJA reports that the entire offering of 51,325 shares, priced at DM100 each, in the largest HTP [Hotel-Tourist Enterprise] firm on the Adriatic island of Solta was sold in the last few days. The shares sold represent half the enterprise's value. Shares constituting the other half will be transferred to the Croatian Privatization Fund, which will retain 10,400 of them, with a value of DM1,040,000, for possible owner restitution and offer the rest—40,925 shares—for public sale in the next 30 to 40 days.

### Gligorov Receives U.S. General Shalikashvili

*AU0104125194 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 1 Apr 94*

[Unattributed report: "Shalikashvili-Gligorov Meeting"]

[Text] Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] President Kiro Gligorov received yesterday U.S. Chief of Joint Staff General John Shalikashvili. The meeting was also attended by Foreign Minister Crvenkovski and Defense Minister Popovski. They expressed satisfaction with the role of the U.S. contingent serving as members of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] in Macedonia thus far, and discussed replacing the Nordic contingent with another American unit. They also exchanged ideas on the situation in the region and President Gligorov stressed the importance of resolving the Greek-Macedonian dispute, saying it could destabilize the south of the Balkans. Gligorov again actualized Macedonia's request to be included in the project "Partnership for Peace."

General Shalikashvili pointed out his country's interest in a stable Macedonia as an exceptionally significant factor of stability in the Balkans. He also announced appointment of U.S. Army representative to Macedonia in the near future.

General Shalikashvili also visited U.S. soldiers in Macedonia and patrol units on the Macedonian-Serbian border.

### More U.S. Troops Possible

*LD3103200294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1920 GMT 31 Mar 94*

[Text] Skopje, 31 March (TANJUG)—General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a news conference in Skopje today that U.S. President Bill Clinton was ready to send fresh military units to The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] as part of the UN mission. Shalikashvili said this after talks with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov and Defense Minister Vlado Popovski.

Popovski said that they did not discuss the issue of establishing an American military base on the Krivolak training grounds, adding that the issue "is not on the agenda now."

Gen. Shalikashvili today visited American soldiers deployed in FYROM.

### PDP President Views Albanians' Political Role

*AU3003110194 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 26 Mar 94 p 15*

[Interview with Arben Djaferi, president of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, by Panta Dzambazovski; place and date not given: "Macedonia Has a Future If a Historic Agreement Is Reached"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Dzambazovski] How do you view The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], with autonomy for the Albanians, with cantons, or the way it is now?

[Arben] In this matter, we want the Albanians to be a constitutive element. We ask Macedonia to cultivate a democracy of consensus. We see the possibility for equality in constructing special institutions of education, culture, and so on, as well as a kind of a broader autonomy for the communes, according to European standards.

[Dzambazovski] Do you mean communes according to the map of the so-called "Ilirida?"

[Arben] To be honest, I do not know what that map looks like, but I know that the people who have engaged themselves in that matter have a grotesque approach to policy. I know that the man elected for president of such an autonomous region is now president of a parallel branch in Gostivar. That makes it clear how much those people with their list of wishes are lacking in seriousness, and they do not know the mechanisms.

[Dzambazovski] Compared to your faction?

[Arben] First of all, we are not a faction, we are the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity]. The answer to your question is positive because we are a serious party and serious politicians.

[Dzambazovski] You mentioned equal representation of the Albanians in the institutions. In number, from the professional viewpoint, or how?

[Arben] I have a different approach. A historic agreement is needed. Without such an agreement we can continue the agony and waste our energy. History shows that after such agreements a period of great stability has come about in many countries. It is easy to operate after an agreement.

[Dzambazovski] If there is such a climate and if your proposals are acceptable?

[Arben] It is wrong to think that. The agreement will certainly stop the confusion. The Europeanization of the region is our long-term goal, while our short-term goals are issues that we can solve through policy, like the introduction of institutions into the Albanian way of life, starting from kindergarten.

[Dzambazovski] Does this imply that you think the Albanians are endangered?

[Arben] I think we are. There have been many decadent processes within the Albanian people, which must become a concern of the Macedonians, too.

[Dzambazovski] Do you personally feel you are endangered?

[Arben] I can be very flexible as an individual, and when I feel I am endangered, I can slow down. However, we are changing the identity of the collective—the cultural identity, which is not the same as that in Albania, where there are all the necessary institutions, or in Kosovo, where there used to be such institutions. We are endangered because we do not create values, and we create bad values, wasting our time on vain projects. I think there are many political goals that we can realize without including the Macedonian political factor. We shall work toward conquering that political space, we shall create values that depend exclusively on ourselves. We must introduce into the Albanians' lives institutions that must not present an obstacle for any political party, because we shall be engaged in our own political space.

**Outside the Macedonian Space?**

[Dzambazovski] However, you cannot bypass the Macedonian parliament, speaking of such issues.

[Arben] That is why we are taking one step at a time. We must reach a historic agreement, and the way to do so is through terms that we shall have to agree on, about who is going to create what. We are not asking to enter the Macedonian space.

[Dzambazovski] It sounds like creating parallel institutions in the state.

[Arben] No. I am talking about the fair competition that we must have, from culture to sports. The Macedonians in the area where they are dominant are competitive, and thus new values are created. However, the Macedonians in western Macedonia, for instance, are the same as the Serbs in Kosovo—they are not competing, because they are "genetically disposed" to having the values, to being employed, to getting a flat, and so on. The Macedonians in eastern Macedonia have to strive to achieve the same advantages. It is absurd, but it is true that the Albanians have a better understanding with the Macedonians in eastern, than in western Macedonia. It is no wonder that the Macedonians in the western part are working hard to maintain the present relations between the Albanians and the Macedonians. I also wish to say that the danger for the Macedonians does not come from the Albanians or Albania, but from Serbia and Bulgaria, which only sees the country in terms of territory.

[Dzambazovski] It is true that official Albania supported your faction in the long process of divisions within the PDP. Why?

[Arben] That is how it looks from the outside. If we analyze the pictures, we come to that impression. Albania's influence I think, must be relevant in Macedonia, because it is a stabilizing factor in the Balkans, and it affects some stabilizing political processes. I think we have the right to communicate with the political factors in the Balkans, particularly with Albania.

[Dzambazovski] Yet, you did not say why Albania supports you.

[Arben] Certainly because we are more serious and because we have constructed a political vision for Macedonia, without projects like just employment in the system's institutions.

[Dzambazovski] However, it is true that the PDP is an indigenous party, active in Macedonia with its program.

[Arben] Yes, it is true, but the PDP also asks for legitimacy in the Albanian tissue in the Balkans, and that is natural, as it is for the Macedonian parties related to the diaspora. I think that if we have the support of Albania, we are on the right road, because the whole Albanian political course in the Balkans has demonstrated political maturity in the latest crisis.

[Dzambazovski] There is one view that the affair of the paramilitary formations of Albanians in Macedonia lies behind this support.

[Arben] That is political intrigue. And finally, why do you not talk about the so-called affair with those who are involved in it—some Albanians and the Macedonian authorities, who certainly know more. Taci and I, as well as the others, have no connection with it.

[Dzambazovski] Why do you make so many remarks regarding the work of the delegates and ministers?

[Arben] There is a transition going on in Macedonia, but with people who used to be in positions, including the Albanians. It is a kind of a silky communist transition. Our demands are deeply human, they are not irrational, and we hope to find people who think the transition must be better. Tensions must be avoided.

[Dzambazovski] Can they also be created by you?

[Arben] Yes, if Macedonia does not establish a European system of values. Then such tensions arrive. We shall ask for support from the foreign factor, and we shall ask for the right to self- organization, which starts with the political organization of the political structure. We will gain efficiency in our political activity if there is a strong political organization, a public one. At this stage we are trying to strengthen a political structure that was not strong. There was a political elite in the system, and the other political subjects were on the fringes, for instance the delegates who have much stronger political semantics.

**[Box, p 15]**

**"If There Is a War in Kosovo, I Shall Volunteer"**

The vice president of the faction, Menduh Taci, also made a statement at the interview with Arben Djaferi. Here is a part of that statement:

"I stated the following for the London OBSERVER: If there is any destabilization, it will be as a result of the Macedonian authority's mistake, the Macedonians, because the Macedonians are the majority.

"Some Greek Dzambazovski asked my opinion about the name of the state. I said that the citizens of Republic Macedonia must decide about the name, and that the Albanians should be included in the dispute with Greece.

"The Albanians do not want bloodshed. The Macedonians should know who their friends are. Certainly not Serbia, nor Bulgaria, because it does not want to hear of the existence of the Macedonian people, and we know about Greece. So who is left?

"We are constantly accused of being radicals. I shall say, in principle—in constitutional and legal principles, if we have agreed on a matter, we want to have a definite term for its realization. If the Government wishes to make policy with 'representatives of the people,' it is doing its people wrong. The times of such tricks belong to the Turkish era.

"Will we organize assistance and volunteers if there is a war in Kosovo? It is not just a positive answer, but I also state that I, personally, will go to Kosovo as a volunteer—that is my right and nobody can stop me.

"The issue on autonomy will depend on the Macedonian parliament and the attitude of the Macedonian authority. And 'Ilirida' is an empty project of delegate Mersim Polozani, from the time when his rating was decreasing.

"The document shown by Naser Ziberi on A1 Television Broadcast looks like a 'headquarters document of Lazar Mojsov.' Let us see the record—it is not my signature, neither are the alleged tasks for cooling down interethnic relations, and so on. Nevertheless, I do not want to sue him, because I do not want to adopt his or Djeladin Murati's manners.

"It is a public secret how Muhamed Halili became a candidate and how he won the elections. I conducted the campaign. If he thinks he has confidence in the constituency now, let him come, we shall present a candidature."

## Goals, Actions of PDP Factions Examined

*AU3003082094 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 29 Mar 94 p 4*

[Report by Panta Dzambazovski: "Retirement from the Institutions of the System"]

[Text] After the interview with Arben Djaferi, president of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] radical faction, and vice president Menduh Taci that was published in the 26 March edition of our newspaper, some matters related to the division within the largest party of the Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] are becoming clearer. The conflict within the PDP is not at all naive, and it involves two irreconcilable currents. Both claim to have the right to the name PDP. The radical faction, according to the statements, doesn't intend to negotiate with the group of delegates and ministers, it considers them "old communist personnel," "Gligorov's men," "participants in the silky communist transition of Macedonia." The intention of the radicals is to create Albanian "cultural" institutions in Macedonia, "without entering the Macedonian political space." What is not clear is whether they have parallel institutions in mind, as well as the question for or against autonomy to the Albanians, except for the fact that such projects as "Ilirida" in the past were ridiculous. What is not only of great concern to the members and PDP fans, but also for Macedonia in general is the struggle for the name of the party. The radicals are not alone in having no intention of forming, that is registering, a new party with another name or a suffix to the name PDP, but are also resolute in fighting for the name until the end. Even if the state, or the competent bodies, don't allow them to enter the Fall elections with their candidates under the name of PDP, they have announced that they were backed by "an enormous membership, which should mean something," and that there was a "counter project" planned, as Djaferi stated, if such a decision is taken by the authorities. And if the state takes such a decision, it is clear that the actions will be outside the institutions. Taci added they had all the facts on their side, and if the police tried to solve the dispute "anything may happen."

It seems that these statements were certainly meant to warn of the possibility of arousing the people, which certainly represents the worst and most dangerous variant, an experiment that has taken place in other regions. How large the membership is and who the "people" behind them are cannot be divined, however, in some chance situations, a statement about an alleged "hunt against the Albanians" can sometimes be sufficient to invalidate all the political efforts for coexistence.

In a situation where the delegates and ministers are continuing their political engagement in the institutions of the system, we can conclude that the goal of the radicals is to discredit the people in authority and in the institutions, in order to force the delegates and ministers to retire from the government.

The example of the Tetovo assembly is very characteristic. A normal police action in which a number of Albanians were arrested for the illegal possession of arms and explosives became a political problem. The assembly convoked a session on that topic, it invited Ministers Frckovski and Gosev, it even demanded the presence of President Gligorov. The delegates connected this case regarding the 10 accused with the creation of a paramilitary army, although the competent bodies said it was not the case and that the police would perform their duties no matter which nationality was involved. Of course, is there a country in which a local authority discusses a number of people caught with arms, asks for their liberation, and moves the process in another direction? There are opinions that the Tetovo assembly is testing its possible future activities as a parallel institution (parallel parliament).

It is worthwhile mentioning that the PDP delegates in the Tetovo assembly are 90 percent dedicated to the radical group, headed by the head of the delegate group. They are working under the direction of Taci's and Djaferi's group. Some sources claim that the session dedicated to the arrested Albanians and attended by the PDP ministers had the unique goal of discrediting them as representatives of the authority that is "carrying out arrests," so as to make them retire from the government, thus increasing the possibility of actions outside the institutions.

Due to the intensified actions of the radicals, there is evidently increased nervousness among the delegates' and ministers' group, which is trying hard to create a new image in the period before the elections by saying that the authority is supported by Taci's group (following the session with the government), issuing information about the arrested Albanians, and accusing the authority of which, by the way, they are a part. Before that it demanded that the court decide about the legitimacy of the PDP, and, because of unfavorable reactions among the Albanian radical political factors, it withdrew the charges. Apparently the delegates' and ministers' group is making mistakes in the new situation, which is not the case with the radicals. The basic mistake is that it is trying hard to show itself in a different light and be what it is not. As long as it is so, the radicals will be on the offensive.

## Commentary Views U.S. Involvement in Balkans

*AU3103190994 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 31 Mar 94 p 9*

[G. Mihajlovski commentary: "A Group Photograph With the Forest Ranger"]

[Text] The United States has taken matters into its own hands. Just like the joke about the partisans and Germans fighting in the forest, when the forest ranger arrives and kicks the latter and the former out of the forest. The United States has been observing the EU countries expressing all their principles, vetos, ministerial councils, rotating presidencies, voting practices, and declarations without displaying the strength to cope with the Greek-Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] dispute, and it finally decided to send its own man to try and finish the job.

U.S. President Bill Clinton's special envoy, New York lawyer Matthew Nimietz, was very clear: "We bear in mind the fact that we have very friendly relations with both sides, but also the fact that this issue is of concern to the region and the world." He was even more plain in Athens: "This is a dispute that endangers peace and stability in the region, therefore it is of concern to the United States."

Formally, Niemitz is only helping the interrupted negotiating process begun under the sponsorship of the United Nations. Therefore, the fate of future Macedonian-Greek relations, right now, depends on the skills of Cyrus Vance and Matthew Niemitz—both New York lawyers.

After recognizing Macedonia, the United States halted the establishment of diplomatic relations because of Greece's opposition. However, its clear interest in this region was expressed for the first time last Summer, when 300 U.S. soldiers landed at Skopje Airport and joined the UNPROFOR forces. The inclusion of Niemitz in the mediation process between Greece and FYROM, particularly the arrival of John Shalikashvili, chairman of the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Skopje that same week, only added to the belief that the United States is really determined to have a strong influence in this part of the Balkans.

Greece, on the other hand, is caught in a very inconvenient position—on the one side pressed and embarrassed by its partners in the European Union, and on the other side limited in its actions because of public opinion, to which it continually serves up mass national meetings, has also turned to the United States. After discussions with Niemitz, Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papulias stated that he hoped the following weeks would give a positive result. Papulias's optimism becomes more understandable in the context of the announced visit of Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou to the United States, scheduled for 22 April. Namely, Niemitz made it clear that Washington would like to see the dispute between the two countries solved before this date.

In view of Clinton's posing with Tudjman and Izetbegovic for reporters after setting down on paper their Constitution within two weeks, something the European Union did not succeed in doing in two years, a logical question arises: Will Gligorov and Papandreou have a picture taken together with the "forest ranger" before or after 22 April?

## Prime Minister Drnovsek on European Ties

*BR3103145194 Brussels LE SOIR in French 31 Mar 94 p 2*

[Interview with Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Edouard Van Velthem in Brussels; date not given: "Slovene Rapprochement With NATO and Europe"]

[Text] [Van Velthem] You are in Brussels to sign the NATO offer of Partnership for Peace, yours being the first independent republic of the former Yugoslavia to be involved in that initiative. Do you believe that it provides sufficient security, or do you expect more from the alliance?

[Drnovsek] We are rather satisfied...no doubt because we are fairly realistic. We were not expecting more at this time because we know that the alliance is a complex organization, comprising a large number of members, and that there are questions of coordination to be settled for the implementation of the concept of enlargement.

However, this flexibility is an advantage for us, because it will enable us to progressively become involved in the process of common defense and security. We have made a firm decision to continue in this vein, and we are sure that the final stage, in the years to come, will be full membership of NATO for Slovenia.

[Van Velthem] At the same time, you are also asking for the arms embargo still imposed on the whole of Yugoslavia to be lifted...

[Drnovsek] The embargo was imposed right at the start of the Yugoslav crisis, from which Slovenia escaped nearly three years ago. However, it was no doubt much easier for the superpowers and the United Nations to leave the decision in place, for any modification in terms of moving toward lifting the embargo threatened to snowball toward Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other war zones.

Today, beacuse of such inertia, Slovenia remains a victim trapped by that measure for no reason whatsoever. However, we are pragmatic and do understand the actual state of affairs within the region. So we are waiting, confidently...

[Van Velthem] Willy Claes and Alain Lamassoure have both successively visited Ljubljana: Slovenia is accelerating its rapprochement with the European Union (EU).

[Drnovsek] The EU is a natural partner for us. Sixty percent of our trade is already conducted with the union. The cooperation agreement in application today was signed at the beginning of last year. It is satisfactory, but we intend to go beyond it in the very near future, all the more so since we believe we have already made much more progress than certain other countries which already benefit from associate status. The talks on this subject will start in May, and provided that everything runs as scheduled, it should be possible to sign by the end of the year.

[Van Velthem] How did the Slovene economy transform itself following the dismantlement of the former Yugoslavia?

[Drnovsek] The economy is making good progress. Admittedly, in the wake of achieving independence in 1991 we found it difficult to adapt after losing the domestic markets and experiencing a drop in industrial activity. However, since 1993, more rapidly than even we had predicted ourselves, we are once again experiencing positive growth, and have brought down inflation sharply—indeed, it dropped from 270 percent when our currency, the tolar, was introduced to approximately 20 percent last year.

### We Will Pay Our Debts

[Van Velthem] And tourism, formerly an appreciable source of revenue for Slovenia?

[Drnovsek] It is starting to develop again. Above all for people from neighboring countries, such as Italy, Austria, or Germany, increasing numbers of whom are coming to Istria and the Adriatic coast. On the other hand, tourists from further afield are still more cautious, perhaps because they still picture Slovenia as being directly involved in the Yugoslav conflicts.

[Van Velthem] Nonetheless, the republics have yet to share out the debts and assets of the former Yugoslavia...

[Drnovsek] That is true. We are not at all satisfied with the slowness of progress on the question of Yugoslav succession at the Geneva conference. Admittedly, up to now most of the other republics have been saddled with other problems. Slovenia did not expect a definitive agreement on this question: We have already settled our financial relations with the IMF, the World Bank, or the Club de Paris, and we are negotiating with the international banks the share of the commercial debt of the former Yugoslavia that has been assigned to us. We want to present a very clear bill of health of our financial situation. So the only thing that will remain to discuss with our former partners is how to share out our common heritage, especially the embassies and other buildings that Yugoslavia had abroad.

[Van Velthem] Do the Bosnian refugees who were flowing toward Slovenia at the start of the war still represent a major burden, both financially and socially?

[Drnovsek] It is not as worrying a problem for us as some demagogues are attempting to make out. There are still something like 30,000 refugees, and we have done everything possible to ensure that they can lead as normal an existence as possible in terms of housing, food aid, and psychological support. It is our elementary duty to show such solidarity.

### Need for Domestic Stability

[Van Velthem] The night before you came to Brussels, the Slovene Parliament dismissed Defense Minister

Jansa from office. Is the coalition government, comprising your Liberal Democratic Party, the Christian Democrats led by Mr. Peterle, and the Social Democrats led by Mr. Jansa now threatened?

[Drnovsek] I do not think we are heading for a domestic crisis. The defense minister was replaced in the wake of a specific incident, and if the Social Democrats leave the government, then we are prepared to continue with the Christian Democrats alone. Following this option would just enable us to retain the majority.

[Van Velthem] So there are no plans to hold elections, which would plunge the country into a state of uncertainty?

[Drnovsek] I do not think so. And I have good reason to believe that: If elections were held today, then the polls show that my own Liberal Democratic Party would emerge as the main victors. Consequently, the other political groups are in no hurry to return to the ballot box. Above all, the entire country first needs continuity and stability. After all, we are in a good position to know what a political crisis and power vacuum can mean....

## SKD Proposes New Coalition With Liberals

*AU3003090694 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0500 GMT 30 Mar 94*

[Text] At the joint session with the party's executive committee late last night, the council of the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] decided to propose to Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek that the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] and the SKD form a government themselves. Sandi Frelih reports:

[Frelih] Even before the decision to impeach Defense Minister Janez Jansa, the SKD announced that it would reconsider its further cooperation in the government. At the end of last week, the highest party officials discussed this, however they postponed any decisionmaking until the extraordinary parliamentary session. At the joint session of the party council and executive committee last night, they actually discussed two possibilities—immediate departure from the government as proposed by Ivan Oman and the proposal of the party leadership to stay in the government, but under certain conditions.

For the first time so far, the party council took a secret ballot. By 20 votes to 11 they decided that the LDS and SKD should themselves form a government of speedy and accelerated democratic and economic development of Slovenia, as the conclusion says.

They also explain that such a decision in the times of political crisis is dictated by the hitherto cooperation of both parties, the current political situation, and the need to establish a new political balance, which would all help stabilize the political circumstances in divided Slovenia.

They put Lojze Peterle in charge of the negotiations with Dr. Janez Drnovsek. They expect the reply of the LDS president by 7 April.

SKD Secretary General Edvard Stanic is of the opinion that the political balance in the government after the departure of the Social Democrats is 2 to 1 and should be balanced out. He is also of the opinion that a coalition agreement, which would involve a greater degree of reciprocity and trust, should be drafted. When asked what they will do if the prime minister decides to keep the United List in the government and draws another right-wing party into it, Stanic replied that a new situation would emerge that would have to be discussed anew. They definitely expect Drnovsek's reply by next Thursday when the party council will meet again.

Let me also add that Drnovsek has already been announcing changes in the coalition, saying that the coalition will have to be balanced out again.

## Serbia

### Milosevic Adviser on 'Fundamental Interests'

*BR0104125394 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 1 Apr 94 p 5*

[Report on interview with Michailo Markovic, vice chairman of the Socialist Party of Serbia and identified as President Milosevic's "leading adviser," by Karin Veraart in Belgrade; date not given: "Greater Serbia Is Not on the Agenda Just Yet—Adviser To Milosevic Thinks Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia Should Go Their Own Way"]

[Text] Belgrade—Two years ago Serbian philosopher Michailo Markovic joined President Slobodan Milosevic's SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]. Since then Markovic has become vice chairman and leads the SPS's think-tank. He is the party's ideologue and regarded as the most important adviser to the Serbian leader. Now Serbia has to mark time for a while in its goal of a Greater Serbia, the professor said.

"The time has come for us to turn to the status quo," Markovic said. "That meant," he said, "that Serbia should not regard uniting areas of Croatia and Bosnia inhabited by a Serbian majority with the Serbian 'motherland' as the highest priority.

"The Serbian republic of Krajina in Croatia and the Srpska republic in Bosnia, as their leaders have baptised their unrecognized states, could develop a very good independent existence," Markovic said. "With economic links with Serbia of course and also with neighboring counties," he said. "That is the goal in the first instance. In the end, and that could last a very long time, a decision must be made about their definitive political status, or about a possible unification of the Serbian areas."

As a member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and the Committee for National Questions, Markovic is working on a memorandum "which defines the most important objectives for Serbian national policies," he said. "My colleague Anton Razmazic and I have virtually finished the draft version. It is a sort of guideline, advice to the party leadership for a national program."

The memorandum lists the fundamental interests of the Serbian people. "At present the most important things are peace and the right to self-determination in the areas where Serbs are in the majority," Markovic said. "Referendums should be held at a local level in Bosnia and Krajina," Markovic said, "so that the people could itself decide whether it wanted to be part of the Serbian area or preferred to belong elsewhere."

"If Krajina voted for reintegration with Croatia, something which the international community is pushing for, then Serbia would not oppose that in any way," Markovic said, but he "was certain" that Krajina did not want this at all. However, in recent weeks the leadership of Krajina in Knin have been put under heavy pressure by the international mediators, the United States and Russia, but little support has been seen from Belgrade. Both the SPS and the opposition parties are leaving their options open. A large flow of rumors has been set off, according to which the Serbian leader wants to give Krajina to Croatia in return for the lifting of international sanctions. The independent papers in Belgrade published photomontages of Milosevic and Tudjman in bed together this week.

Markovic grinned. "I know these rumors are going round in the West," he said, rejecting the reference to the Serbian media. "But you should understand two things," he said. "Point one: Milosevic is a man of few words, he does not feel such a strong need to talk to the press. He sees no reason to endlessly repeat himself. Believe me, Knin knows that it is guaranteed Serbian support. In recent days I toured villages in the region and I once again told people that Serbia is behind them. Should Croatia try to take Krajina using military force, that would mean war by 10 million Serbs again four million Croats."

But things would not reach that point, Markovic thought. "In fact Croatia can never get together enough people who want to fight," he said. "Should a few extremist groups want to try it nevertheless, then Krajina can deal with that itself. In that way Split and Zagreb would be wiped off the map."

But would Milosevic finally bend under the pressure of the economic sanctions and nevertheless advise Knin to give up the search for independence? "That is the second point that the West should now understand," he said. "Serbia will not bend before sanctions. Unlike Croatia, which has allowed itself to be forced into that peculiar confederation agreement at the moment when an embargo was about to be installed because of involvement in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Markovic has his own opinion of the latest peace plans—Germany is behind them. "Germany is the biggest financier of the Croats, but war is expensive," he said. "Also Croatia did not have great perspectives in the fighting and Germany wanted to prevent a Muslim state being founded in Europe. On the other hand, a plausible solution had to be found for the Muslim question, because they and their brothers in the rest of the world represent a great interest for both Europe and the United States: oil."

"This reasoning was picked up by the United States, which wanted to show that Europe is not able to solve the conflict in the Balkans without U.S. intervention," he said. "Result: The Washington agreement of 18 March, when the Croats and Muslims decided to form a federation in Bosnia, possibly to be expanded later into a confederation with Croatia."

"This agreement would never be completed," Markovic said. "The people do not want to live together at all," he said. "Heavy fighting is still taking place now. What ever the case, Serbia still wants to negotiate and make a few territorial concessions, but there can be no possibility of forming part of a union with the other parties."

And what would happen if the country which had defended Serbian interests up to a certain point started to stir?

"Russia will never go so far as to force us into an agreement against our will," he said. "Kozyrev might want to do that, but he could not sell that to his rank and file." Markovic sighed. "For Serbia it would be better if someone like Rutskoy, for example, came to power. The present Russian leadership is too keen on a good understanding with the United States."

## Kosovo

### Rugova on U.S. Policy, Mediation Role

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[Text] More than ever before, the question of Kosova has been put on the daily agenda of international issues, President Rugova stressed in a recent interview with ZERI journal.

Speaking about the possibility of starting the process of resolving the Kosova problem, Rugova stressed that the Muslim-Croat agreement in Bosnia and, before it, the NATO ultimatum, mark the beginning of the process of ending the war in Bosnia. Within this framework, we can consider the possibility of the necessity of resolving the Kosova issue.

After assessing the pragmatism of U.S. policy and its role in considering the question of Kosova, President Rugova added that so far, Europe has enabled the preservation of the status quo but not the solution of problems in former Yugoslavia. He stressed the role of U.S. initiative in mediation, in which European allies should take a part in consultation with Russia.

He added that the beginning of a dialogue would mark an important achievement, although dialogue should be seen as a process. We should be prepared for negotiations to defend our position.